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Abstract
Chapter 1 deals w ith the  origin and lim itations of m athem atical economics 
and its im plications for economic applications of optim al control theory. Using an 
historical approach, we have proposed a hypothesis on the origin and lim itations 
of classical and m odern m athem atical economics. Similar hypotheses proposed 
by Cournot, W alras, von Neumann-M orgenstern and Debreu are shown not to be 
convincing. Conditions are established under which applications of m athem ati­
cal m ethods, in general, and optim al control theory, in particular, m ay produce 
economic results of value.
C hapter 2 concerns the form ation and development of optim al control ap­
plications to economic policy optimisation. It is shown th a t the application of 
mathematical control theory (as compared with engineering control) may signifi­
cantly contribute to mathematical economics (as compared to econometrics). The 
development of optim al growth theory has been examined as an example. W ithin 
the context of economic policy optim isation, a critical exam ination of the  recent 
developments in macroeconomic modelling, the relationship between theory and 
observation, rational expectations, the Lucas critique and the  problem  of time- 
inconsistency is presented.
C hapter 3 provides the  first illustration of the  m ain them e of the  earlier chap­
ters. Using the generalised Ham iltonian in Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle, as 
well as using Bellm an’s dynamic programming, we have obtained a num ber of 
new results on the  m athem atical properties of optim al consumption under liquid­
ity constraints. For example, we have dem onstrated how the response of optim al 
consum ption to liquidity constraints is conditioned by the consum er’s in tertem ­
poral elasticity of substitution. Considered as a m athem atical structure , this is 
shown to capture the effects of the following variables on the optim al consum ption 
path: pure preference param eters, the interest rates variations and the structura l 
param eters prevailing in the credit m arkets.
In chapter 4, the dynam ic Leontief model, which according to the  conditions 
established in chapter 1, is one of the most successful applications of m athem atical 
m ethods to economic policy analysis, is first considered as a control problem . We 
have then obtained the optim al consumption path  for determ inistic and stochastic 
dynam ic Leontief models w ith substitu te activities which are in tu rn  form ulated in 
determ inistic and stochastic environments. Our solution uses Pontryagin’s m ax­
im um principle, Bellm an’s m ethod and A strom ’s Lemma on stochastic dynam ic 
programming.
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Chapter One
The Origin and Limitations of 
M athematical Economics and its 
Implications for Economic 
Applications of Optimal Control: An 
Historical Approach
1.1 Introduction
Our starting  point is the recognition of the fact th a t optim al control is no more 
than an advanced m athem atical m ethod in the field of dynam ic optim ization 
theory. Its applications to economic analysis are therefore constrained by the 
lim itations in m athem atical treatm ent of economics. It follows th a t m any ques­
tions on economic applications of optim al control cannot successfully be exam ined 
w ithout a direct reference to the origin and limitations of the m athem atization of 
economics. As an example, consider the following questions: W hat is the logical 
justification for optim al control applications to economic analysis? W hat are the 
salient features of optim al control theory which have made it so a ttrac tive  to the 
com munity of m athem atical economists and econometricians? W hat factors have 
contributed to its successful applications and what have been the underlying con­
ditions responsible for its partial failure in satisfying the earlier great optimism? 
The key to all these, questions lies in the m athem atical nature of optim al control 
theory and on its capabilities and lim itations in handling specific problems in
9
economic analysis.
We s ta rt the analysis of the origin of m athem atical economics by presenting 
the following questions in section 1.2: W hy is Cournot (1838) unanim ously agreed 
as the b irth  of m athem atical economics while 38 research work on this subject had 
been published before tha t?  Why was the m athem atical economics of Cournot 
totally ignored by classical economists for more than 30 years until Jevons (1871) 
revived it? W hy is the im portance and significance of applications of m athem at­
ics to economics still an unsettled issue whereas physical sciences can hardly do 
w ithout m athem atics? To answer these questions, we have first exam ined the hy­
potheses pu t forward by Debreu, Cournot, Walras and von Neumann-M orgenstern 
in sections 1.2.1 to 1,2.4, respectively. We have found tha t none of these hypothe­
ses is satisfactory.
Our hypothesis of one-dimensionalisation of economic analysis is discussed in 
section 1.2.5. Historically, advances in classical economics together w ith theo­
retical developments in M arxian economics had produced a num ber of different 
economic doctrines which were considered by the advocates of m athem atical eco­
nomics as a chaotic state, The “scientific” or m athem atical approach and the 
socio-political approach as two possible responses to such an environm ent of m ulti­
dim ensionality in economic studies are examined. M athem atical economics and 
the form ation of economic science is discussed in section 1.2.5 where “the  nature 
of classical m athem atical economics” and “m athem atical economics as a remedy 
to multi-dim ensional political economy” are analysed. The hypothesis th a t m ath ­
em atical economics has been developed as a response to M arxian economics is 
another topic which is discussed in section 1.2.5.
The origin and form ation of modern m athem atical economics is the subject of 
section 1.3. The origin and nature of forty years recession in theoretical develop-
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m ents in m athem atical economics from Marshall(1890) to  the emergence of a new 
era in m athem atical economics are explained in this section. D ebreu’s hypothe­
sis which regards the publication of von Neumann and M orgenstern’s Theory o f 
Games and Economic Behaviour (1944) as the starting point of modern m athe­
m atical economics is critically exam ined and rejected in section 1.3.1. In section 
1.3.2, we have proposed our hypothesis th a t the  creation of th e  Econometric So­
ciety in 1930, the Cowles Commission in 1932 and the concom itant advances in 
coordinated research programmes in m athem atical economics can be considered as 
epoch-making events which have marked the beginning of m odern m athem atical 
economics.
To identify the salient features of m odern m athem atical economics, we have 
compared the a ttitudes of classical m athem atical economists and their percep­
tions on the lim itations of economic applications of m athem atical m ethods with 
those of m odern m athem atical economists in sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, respectively. 
The theoretically im portant question of whether economic tru th s  are discoverable 
through the instrum entality  of m athem atics is discussed in section 1.4.2.
The objectives of the Cowles Commission and the Econom etric Society in co­
ordinating the m utual penetration of economic theory, m athem atical m ethods and 
statistics, discussed in section 1.3.2, have been seriously challenged by the recent 
developments of the  relationship between m athem atical economics and economet­
rics. This problem  is discussed in section 1.5 where the natu re  of the disparity 
between m athem atical economics and econometrics in building up models for em­
pirical analysis is discussed. This provides a background for section 2.5 in C hapter 
two where a discussion of the critique of macro-econometric models is presented 
in the light of the ongoing debates on the relationship between theory and obser­
vation.
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Having discussed the origin of m athem atical economics, the  salient features 
of m odern m athem atical economics and its lim itations and the  problems asso­
ciated w ith the relationship between m athem atical economics and econometrics, 
the economic applications of optim al control theory is discussed in section 1.6 as 
an illustration. In section 1.7 attem pts are made to identify the sources of lim ita­
tions in the m athem atization of economics. The implications of such lim itations 
are also studied for economic applications of optimal control. It is hypothesised 
th a t the logic of abstraction employed in obtaining basic economic concepts of 
narrow components which facilitate quantitative formulations plays the  key role 
in generating such lim itations. Conditions under which economic applications of 
optim al control can produce more reasonable results are also discussed in this 
section. Finally a sum m ary and concluding remarks are presented in section 1.8.
1.2 M athem atization  of Econom ics: H yp oth eses  
on th e  Origin and Significance o f M athem atica l 
Econom ics
We present our argum ent in an historical context. This will, hopefully, pro­
vide a basis for future speculations. It is now agreed th a t Civa (1642-1734), an 
Italian m athem atician, is the first author to apply m athem atical m ethods to  eco­
nomic problems. His work on money, w ritten in 1711, is the first true  example 
of m athem atical economics in which the ideas of definitions, postulates, rem arks, 
propositions, theorems and corollaries are used in analysing money. This work, 
however, was completely ignored until 1871 when it appeared in Jevons’s List o f 
Mathematico-Economic Books, Memoirs, and Other Published Writings.
127 years after Civa’s work, Cournot, professor of m athem atics at Lyon and 
the Rector of the Academy of Grenoble, published his epoch-making contribution 
to economics under the title  Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la
12
Theorie des Rechesses in 1838. Economists today unanimously agree th a t the 
symbolic b irth  of m athem atical economics is the year in which Cournot published 
his book. The first key question is th a t why Cournot (1838) and not Civa (1711) or 
any other work among the 38 research work published before Cournot on m ath ­
em atical economics,1 is not considered to be the pioneering work in this field? 
W hat has m ade C ournot’s work to  be recognised as an epoch-making contribu­
tion? Has C ournot’s m athem atical excellence been responsible for this success or 
has it been realized th a t this work can be regarded as starting point for a new 
current of thoughts in political economy? We will come back to these questions 
in section 1.2.5.
However, C ournot’s book received little  or no attention at the tim e: “For
several years not a single copy of the book was sold. In 1863 the author tried
to overcome the indifference of the public by recasting the work and om itting
the algebraic formulae. This tim e the  book was called Principes de la Theorie
des Richesses. In 1876 he published it again in a still more elem entary form
/
and under the title  of Revue Sommaire des Doctrines Economiques bu t w ith the 
same result” .2 J. B. Cherrim an, a Canadian m athem atician, published a ten page 
review on Cournot in 1857. This was the only published recognition of C ournot’s 
book. C ournot’s significant contribution to m athem atical economics was finally 
revived by Jevons (1871). On page 26 in the preface, Jevons s ta ted  th a t “This 
work m ust occupy a remarkable position in the history of the subject. It is strange 
tha t it should have remained for me among Englishmen to discuss its value” .3
According to Fisher (1891, p .109) “The introduction of m athem atical m ethod
1For a list of 38 work before Cournot, i.e. during the period 1711-1838 and 62 work from 
Cournot to Jevons, i.e. 1838-1871, published on mathematical economics, see Jevons’s List 
of Mathematico-Economic Books, Memoirs and Other Published Writings, pp. 322-339, in his 
Theory of Political Economy, 1871.
2See Charles Gide and Charles Rist (1909, 1948), p. 499.
3All references to Jevons (1871) made in this chapter are from its 4th edition, London: 
Macmillan, 1911, 339 pages.
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m arks a stage of growth -perhaps it is not extravagant to  say, the entrance of 
political economy on a scientific era ... Before Jevons all the m any attem pts 
at m athem atical treatm ent fell flat. Every writer suffered com plete oblivion until 
Jevons unearthed their volume in his bibliography” . This will lead us to  the second 
key question: W hy Cournot’s significant contribution together w ith previous work 
on m athem atical economics were completely ignored, or were not taken seriously, 
by classical economists?
A more fundam ental point which is related to the above m entioned two key 
questions is the following: Why has the application of m athem atical m ethods 
in economics not been very successful? In other words, if physical sciences can 
hardly develop w ithout m athem atics why is the im portance and significance of 
m athem atics in economic analysis not yet a settled question? We exam ine these 
points in the context of the following hypotheses in sections 1.2.1-1.2.5.
1.2,1 D eb reu ’s In cid en ta lity  H yp oth esis  o f  E arly  D ev e lo p ­
m en ts in M ath em atica l E conom ics
The hypothesis th a t m athem atical economics has emerged from nowhere and has 
grown w ith no aims while being independent of any current of economic thoughts 
has received supports from a num ber of economic historians and even from m ath­
em atical economists. Gherity (1990) held th a t “For m any years historians of 
economics saw those who pioneered the application of m athem atics to  economics 
as individuals who had appeared out of nowhere, spoken their piece and fallen 
back into oblivion without im pact or influence on their contem poraries or on 
those who came after” . In a similar but more elaborated line of argum ent, De- 
breu (1986, p. 1259) regarded the emergence of m athem atical economics simply 
as an historical coincidence: “[The early progress of m athem atical economics] is 
m arked by several m ajor scientific accidents. One of them  occurred in 1838 ... 
w ith the publication of Augustin C ournot’s [book] ... The University of Lausanne
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was responsible for two others of those accidents, W hen Leon W alras delivered 
his first professional lecture there on 16 December 1870, he had held no previous 
academic appointm ents; he had published a novel and short story4 bu t nothing 
on economic theory and he was exactly 36 ... For Vilfredo Pareto, who succeeded 
Walras in his chair in 1893, it was also a first academic appointm ent; like his 
predecessor he had not published anything on economic theory before; and he 
was 45” .5
The hypothesis of incidentality of developments in m athem atical economics 
has also been reported in Robertson (1949, p. 535). He speaks of m athem atical 
economists as “more or less isolated figures who cannot be said to have contributed 
to a current of thought because there is no discernible flow ". Theocharis (1983, p. 
1) has tried  to  partially improve this hypothesis by saying th a t “in m any instances
4In here, Debreu has referred to Francis Sauveur, published by Walras in 1858, Paris: E. 
Dentu.
5See, also, Debreu (1987, p. 399). It should be noted that there are a number of errors in De­
breu’s (1986) comments on Walras and Pareto. The following facts reveal such shortcomings: 1) 
Walras, unhappy with his engineering studies at Ecole des Mines and dissatisfied with literature 
and journalism as his second academic challenge, was persuaded by his father, an economist, to 
study economics at the age of 24 to continue his father’s research on mathematical economics. 
It was after 12 years of hard work that this self-taught economist was offered the new chair 
of political economy at the University of Lausanne. 2) The reason that Walras had held no 
previous academic position was his lack of any officially recognised educational credentials in 
economics. 3) Walras presented a paper on Taxation in 1860 in an international conference on 
taxation in Lausanne which remarkably impressed the audience. [For 1, 2 and 3 see Jaffe (1954), 
the translator’s forward to Walras (1874), pp. 5-6]. 5) During 1859 to 1862, when Walras was 
working as a journalist for the Journal des Economistes and La Presse, he published VEconomie 
Politique et le Justice, Paris: Guillaunin, 1860, in which he strongly attacked the normative eco­
nomic doctrines of P.-J. Proudhon, [See Donald A. Walker (1987), p. 852]. 6) Vilfredo Pareto, 
graduated in mathematical and physical sciences in 1867 and engineering in 1870, started to 
write and publish articles, as early as 1872, on commerce, the state of Italian industry, railways, 
advantages and disadvantages of public and private use of the railway system and support of 
free trades to prevent any form of state intervention in economic activity. Pareto was one of the 
founders of the Adam Smith Society, which spread and upheld the doctrine of economic liber­
alism. In October 1891, Pareto published his controversial article “L’ltalie economique” which 
was followed by another critical work in April 1892 on Italian Government economic policies. 
In 1890, Maffeo Pantaleoni, the famous Italian economist, advised him to study the work of 
Walras on mathematical economics, and Pareto met Walras himself on September 1890, before 
accepting the chair of Walras in political economy in 1893. [See G. Busino (1987), p. 800]. The 
above facts clearly reject Debreu’s hypothesis on the incidentality of mathematical economics 
in Lausanne school.
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these writers were familiar w ith the work of their predecessors and did, in fact, 
build upon them ” .
We can classify the pre-Cournot’s early m athem atical economists, starting  
from Civa (1711), as purely academic and intellectual exercises in which economic 
concepts were being translated  into m athem atical symbols and operations. These 
work all lacked any sense of direction. On the contrary, pioneers in m athem atical 
economics in the  19th century, i.e. Cournot (1838), Jevons (1871), Walras (1874), 
Marshall (1890), Fisher (1891) and Pareto (1896), were all completely aware of 
their backgrounds, their current positions and, most im portan t, their aims. In 
this section, we establish the validity of our hypothesis for Cournot, which is more 
controversial due to  his historical isolation of being 30 years before Jevons. In the 
course of our fu ture analysis, the validity of this hypothesis will be established for 
Jevons, Walras and Pareto.
To reject D ebreu’s hypothesis of incidentality of Cournot’s contribution we re­
fer to the first paragraph of the preface in Cournot (1838). He has clearly adm ired 
and appreciated the one hundred years of developments in political economy be­
fore him , but a t the  same tim e has urged the necessity of developing a positive 
economics due to the fact th a t the public has become so tired of theories of differ­
ent economic system s and doctrines: “The science known as Political Economy, 
which for a century has so much interested thinkers, is to-day more generally dif­
fused than  ever before. It shares w ith politics proper the atten tion  of the  great 
journals, which are to-day the most im portant means of spreading information; 
but the public is so tired of theories and systems tha t now the dem and is for 
so-called “positive” m atters, i.e. in political economy, custom-house abstracts, 
statistical docum ents and government reports, such as will throw the light of ex­
perience on the im portant questions which are being agitated before the  country
16
and which, so greatly interest all classes of society” .6
D espite the fact th a t C ournot’s prim e objective was to support an econometric 
type analysis, the shortages of organised data  and the lack of appropriate statis­
tical m ethods of estim ation, forced him  to concentrate on pure theorization of 
economic concepts towards building up a positive economics. The second para­
graph in his preface explains this point: “I will only observe th a t Theory ought not 
to be confounded with systems ... and th a t, to a m an of my position in particular, 
more than  to any other, it should be permissible to consider from an exclusively 
theoretical standpoint, a subject of general interest which has so m any different 
sides” .
The few facts presented above reject the hypothesis th a t m athem atical eco­
nomics has come from nowhere and has developed with 110 clear aims. But the 
question remains why the early m athem atical economists failed to achieve their 
objectives? Or equivalently, why em inent classical economists did not employ 
m athem atical m ethods in their economic analysis? In this regard, we examine 
the following hypothesis.
1.2.2 C ou rn ot’s H yp oth esis: Erroneous P resen ta tio n s  and  
P oor M a th em a tica l K now ledge
According to this hypothesis, the inaccurate early writings in m athem atical eco­
nomics and their weak economic contents together with the  fact th a t the com­
m unity of classical economists were not well equipped w ith basic m athem atical 
knowledge, were the significant factors which hindered the pace of developments 
in m athem atical economics. This hypothesis which was first proposed by Cournot 
(1838) has received support from a num ber of economists including Fisher (1891).
6All references to Cournot (1838), made in this Chapter, are from its English translation by 
Nathaniel T. Bacon: Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, New 
York: Macmillan, 1897, reprinted 1927.
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According to  Cournot “The a ttem pts which have been m ade in this direction 
have rem ained very little  known and I have been able to learn only the titles of 
them , except one, Les Pricipes de VEconomie Politique by Canard, a small work 
published in 1801 and crowned by the Institut. These pretended principles are so 
radically at fault and the application of them  is so erroneous, th a t the approval 
of a distinguished body of men was unable to preserve the work from oblivion. It 
is easy to see why essays of this nature should not incline such economists as Say 
and Ricardo to algebra” [Cournot (1838), preface].
If the  above hypothesis was true, then Cournot’s work, a concise, original
and well presented work on m athem atical treatm ent of economics, should have
attrac ted  the atten tion  of economists of his time; but we know th a t his work
was absolutely ignored by economists for more than  30 years until Jevons (1871)
revived it. The subsequent developments in m athem atical economics can also
provide useful evidence to reject Cournot’s hypothesis. For exam ple, the  concise
/
and m athem atically  elaborated contribution of Walras, i.e. Elements d ’Economie 
Politique Pure was hardly noticed in France during the twenty-five years after its 
publication in 1874. Even Alfred M arshall, a m athem atician and an economist, 
has only m entioned Walras in the briefest of comments in his Principles o f Eco­
nomics (1890) and did not take W alras’s general equilibrium  seriously at all. 
Eighty years after Walras, m athem atical economists of the 20th century such as 
A braham  Wald, John von Neumann, John Hicks, Frank Hahn, Oscar Lange, Paul 
Samuelson, Lionel McKenzie, Gerad Debreu, Kenneth Arrow and Michio Mor- 
ishim a acknowledged W alras’s contribution and paid atten tion  towards further 
developments in W alras’s general equilibrium analysis.7
Let us now examine the hypothesis of poor m athem atical knowledge. Ac­
cording to this hypothesis the complete oblivion of early developments in m athe-
7See Weitraub (1986) for extensions of Walras’s general equilibrium.
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m atical economics was m ainly due to the inadequacy of m athem atical knowledge 
among economists. This argum ent is not satisfactory either. Despite the fact th a t 
economists, in a rare unanimous agreement, would select Jevons (1871), a m athe­
m atician, a logician and educated in chem istry but self-taught in economics, as the 
first economist who made known to the world the remarkable position of Cournot 
in the  history of economics, Jevons himself confessed th a t he could not m athe­
m atically understand all parts of Cournot’s book. On page xxx in the preface to 
the 2nd edition of his book (1879), Jevons m aintained th a t “Even now I have by 
no means m astered all parts of it, my m athem atical power being insufficient to 
enable m e to follow Cournot in all parts of his analysis” .
The above quotation raises the question tha t if Jevons, like m any other economists 
before him , did not completely understand Cournot, what m ade him  pronounce 
the forgotten Cournot as the most influential m athem atical economist of the early 
19th century? A detailed analysis of this question is given in section 1.3 below. 
However, to complete the present argum ent, let us refer to the fact, as discussed 
in section 1.2.5, th a t Jevons and Walras were trying to design a scientific eco­
nomics which was characterized m ainly by its m athem atical nature. This is ex­
actly what Cournot had in mind. It is not surprising, therefore, th a t Jevons 
appraised Cournot w ithout fully understanding him. It was the compatibility of 
C ournot’s methodology and his a ttitude  with those of Jevons and Walras which, 
after all, brought him  recognition after 30 years. In summary, the higher levels 
of m athem atical knowledge among economists in the 1870’s as the m ain factor 
in understanding Cournot and thus reviving his work, do not count since Jevons 
himself did not possess such a m athem atical knowledge.
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1.2.3 W alras’s H yp oth esis: T h e N arrow ness o f  Ideas
According to W alras,8 the dichotomy between deduction and induction or be­
tween pure reasoning and experience which had separated sciences from arts was 
the m ain reason th a t classical economists disregarded the use of m athem atics 
in their work. “If nineteenth century ... has completely ignored [m athem atical 
economics], the fault lies in the idea, so bourgeois in its narrowness, of divid­
ing education into two separate com partm ents: one turning out calculators with 
no knowledge whatsoever of sociology, philosophy, history, or economics; and the 
other cultivating m en of letters devoid of any notion of m athem atics” [Elements o f 
Pure M athematics (1900), 4th edition, p. 48], Walras claimed th a t by employing 
both deductive and inductive reasoning, m athem atical economics can be ranked 
with sciences such as astronomy and mechanics: “The tw entieth century, which 
is not far off, will feel the need, even ... of entrusting the social sciences to men 
of general culture who are accustomed to thinking both  inductively and deduc­
tively and who are familiar with reason as well as experience. The m athem atical 
economics will rank with the m athem atical sciences of astronom y and mechanics; 
and on th a t day justice will be done to our work” (ibid, p. 48).
Developments of m athem atical economics in the 20th century have strongly 
rejected W alras’s hypothesis. The question remains however th a t why Walras 
did not simply add the experim ental dimension (i.e. quantitative analysis and 
m easurem ents) to  classical economics? In other words, if according to  Walras, 
the fam iliarity o f economists with reason as well as experience would have ranked 
economics w ith the  acknowledged m athem atical sciences, why, instead of com­
pletely ignoring the  well-established classical economics, did he not make an effort 
to represent classical economics m athem atically for the purpose of quantitative
8All references to Walras (1874), made in this chapter, are from its English translation by 
William Jaffe: Elements of Pure Economics, or the theory of social wealth, London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1954, 620 pages.
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analysis and em pirical m easurem ents?9
On the contrary, an exam ination of the Elements o f Pure Economics indicates 
th a t Walras did not make any significant contribution either towards inductive 
thinking in economics or in measuring economic relations and advancing exper­
im ental aspects of economic theorization. His work, instead of taking classical 
economics one step towards experim entations, completely erased the em pirical 
contents of classical political economy. In summary, W alras’s actual contribu­
tions to economics did not follow his injunctions on the objectives of economic 
studies.
It is interesting to note tha t the academic life of Vilferedo Pareto  confirms 
the contradiction existing between W alras’s prim e objective in economic theoriza­
tion and his actual contributions. Recall th a t Pareto, accepted W alras’s chair at 
Lausanne in 1892. After making a num ber of contributions m ainly to W alras’s 
theory of general equilibrium ,10 he realized the weakness of pure economics and 
its possible applied versions. In Cours d } Economie Politique (1896-7) he stated 
th a t “... pure economics shows us the general form of the phenomenon; applied 
economics provides a second approximations; but neither will even be able to 
show us how to manage the economic life of every individual” [Busino (1987), p. 
801]. In Cours he clearly stated  the im portance of interrelations of economics and 
social phenomena. In 1905, Pareto published his Manuale d ’Economia Politico,} 
his words at the end of this book are clearly a departure from W alras’s principles: 
“W hoever wants to make a scientific study of the social facts has to take account 
of reality and not of abstract principles and the like Pareto then gave up
9For example, William Whewell, the Cambridge mathematician, represented mathematically 
some doctrines of political economy in general and Ricardo’s system in particular. See Whewell 
(1829, 1831, 1850). His work were completely ignored by Walras.
10It should be noted that after accepting Walras’s chair in 1892, “Pareto spent the whole of 
the next year writing a refutation of Marx’s theory of value which was published in Paris in 
1893 as the introduction to an anthology of passages by Paul Lafargue taken from Marx’s Das 
KapitaF . See Busino (1987), p. 801.
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economics and concentrated exclusively on sociology, (ibid, p. 802).
In summary, w ith regard to the above facts, it is very difficult to accept Wal­
ras’s hypothesis th a t the nineteenth century economists ignored m athem atical 
economics simply due to the prevailing narrowness of ideas in discrediting exper­
im entations in economic analysis. On the contrary, evidence is more in favour 
of the  hypothesis th a t W alras’s own contributions have fu rther advanced and 
strengthened such narrowness of ideas.
1.2 .4  von  N eu m an n  and M orgen stern ’s H yp oth esis: T h e  
U nfavourab le C ircum stances
von N eum ann and M orgenstern (1944) have examined the problem  of m athem a­
tization of economics w ithin a wider context. If economics is a science why, in 
contrary to other sciences where m athem atics has been applied w ith great suc­
cess, has its use not been highly successful? Most sciences could hardly m ake any 
progress w ithout m athem atics and yet the real contribution of m athem atics to 
economics has rem ained an unsettled question. According to von N eum ann and 
M orgenstern the com bination of the following unfavourable circum stances are the 
m ain factors at work.
1. T h e  V ag u en ess  o f B as ic  E c o n o m ic  C o n c e p ts , von Neum ann and Mor­
genstern (1944, p. 4) have pointed out th a t “Economic problems were not formu­
lated  clearly and are often stated  in such vague term s as to make m athem atical 
trea tm en t a priori appear hopeless because it is quite uncertain w hat the  prob­
lems really are. There is no point in using exact methods where there is no clarity 
in the concepts and issues to which they are to be applied” . This is in sharp 
contrast to the general view held among m athem atical economists th a t the m ath­
em atization of economics facilitates a more concise exposition of problems and 
avoid the digressions of vague argum entation.
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von N eum ann and M orgenstern’s claim implies the following contradiction: 
Further developments in m athem atical economics as a science depends entirely on 
prior developments in “non-scientific” descriptive economics. To provide further 
evidence to  our claim, we refer to page 4 (ibid): “Consequently, the initial task is 
to clarify the knowledge of the m atter by further careful descriptive work” . This 
is in dispute w ith the established view in the profession th a t if economics is to 
be a science it m ust be m athem atical. Moreover, von Neum ann and M orgenstern 
have not specified the conditions under which careful and concise advances in 
descriptive economics can be attained -i.e. with or w ithout m athem atics. If the 
la tte r holds, the uniqueness of m athem atical economics as an exact science will 
collapse.
2. In a d e q u a te  E m p ir ic a l E co n o m ic  F ac ts . According to  von Neum ann and 
Morgenstern, m athem atical economics has not achieved very much because the 
em pirical background of economic science has been definitely inadequate. They 
held, however, th a t their comment should not be construed as a disparagem ent of 
statistical-econom ic research program m e which was very promising at the time, 
(p. 5, ibid).
The recognition of the fact th a t statistical-economic research work, or w hat is 
now known as econometrics, could have made progress while m athem atical eco­
nomics was stagnating refers to the point th a t von N eum ann and M orgenstern 
have adm itted  th a t economics as a science can make advances outside the re­
stricted  framework of Jevons’s calculus of pleasure and pain or W alrasian u tility  
and profit maximization.
3. L im ita t io n s  in  M a th e m a tic a l  T re a tm e n t  o f H u m a n  B e h a v io u r . It ap­
pears th a t von Neumann and M orgenstern are the first m athem atical economists 
of reputation in the tw entieth century who have acknowledged the fundam ental
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objection th a t economic theory cannot be modelled in the same form at as physical 
sciences for it is a science of social and hum an phenom ena which has to take into 
account a num ber of non-economic elements such as psychological, historical and 
cultural factors. This implies lim itations in m athem atical form ulations of hum an 
behaviour: “We should a ttem p t to utilise only some commonplace experience con­
cerning hum an behaviour which lends itself to m athem atical trea tm en t” (ibid. p. 
5).
von Neum ann and M orgenstern have m ade a very im portant point th a t there 
are uncertainties about the exact m athem atical methods which should be used in 
economic analysis in general and even in m athem atization of th a t class of hum an 
behaviour which lends itself to m athem atical treatm ent. The existing tools in 
m athem atical economics such as calculus of variations or differential equations 
might not be the right instrum ents for economic analysis since they are mainly 
developed for physical sciences: “It is therefore to be expected -or feared- th a t 
m athem atical discoveries of a stature comparable to th a t of calculus 11 will be 
needed in order to produce decisive success in [economics]. ... A fortiori it is 
unlikely th a t a mere repetition of the tricks which served us so well in physics will 
do for the social phenom ena too” (ibid. p. 6).
In summary, von Neumann and M orgenstern’s final recom m endation to  m ath ­
em atical economists is to wait for new discoveries in m athem atical m ethods which 
are more appropriate for the analysis of social sciences. But have they proved the 
existence of such m athem atical m ethods? The answer is no. Moreover, before 
the discovery of such m athem atical methods, how can the real economic prob­
lems “scientifically” be examined for policy recom mendations? According to von 
Neum ann and M orgenstern, economists cannot examine such real economic prob-
11In here, von Neumann and Morgenstern have referred to the role played by infinitesimal 
calculus in the creation of the discipline of mechanics.
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lems simply because they are not yet qualified: How to stabilise employment,
how to increase the national income, or how to distribute it adequately? Nobody 
can really answer these questions and we need not concern ourselves with the 
pretension th a t there can be scientific answers at present” (ibid. p. 6).
1.2.5 T h e H y p oth esis  o f O n e-d im ensionalisa tion  o f E co­
nom ic A nalysis: T h e R ed u ction  o f E conom ic Life to  M e­
chan ical E conom ic Science
We now propose a hypothesis to examine the three questions m entioned ear­
lier. The growing desire for one-dimensionalisation of economic analysis in the 
second half of the nineteenth century strongly m otivated th e  m athem atization 
of economics. Let us start by a brief reference to the underlying factors which 
encouraged this approach in economic analysis.
Advances in classical economics ensued from contributions of Sm ith (1776), 
Ricardo (1817) and Mill (1848) together with further developments in theoretical 
socialism in general and Marxism in particular [Marx (1848, 1856-57 and 1867)], 
produced a sta te  of multi-dimensionality in economic analysis in which economic 
issues were studied in relation to other dimensions such as historical, sociological 
and political aspects. There could be the following two inter-related responses 
to such an environm ent of multi-dimensionality in economic studies: “scientific” 
approach and “non-socio-political” i.e. “m athem atical” approach.
1. Scientific and m athem atical developments of the 18th and 19th centuries 
had a rem arkable im pact on many authors in shaping their a ttitudes towards 
searching for an economic science similar to physical or exact sciences. Close 
connections in all aspects of social life make a special study of any one of them  not 
sufficiently productive. However, these authors favoured the idea th a t economists 
should assume their distinctive role and not devote themselves to study the laws
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of a unified social science. The rapid progress in physical sciences in the 19th 
century was m ainly regarded to be the result of breaking up the broad problems 
into their component parts. Such an outlook m otivated some authors to accept 
the view th a t political economy should no longer be seen as if it were a single 
undivided and indivisible science.
The next step towards making a science of economics, in the same fashion 
as physical sciences, was to discover the general laws of economics which rem ain 
the same throughout all different ages and conditions: “Just as there is a general 
science of mechanics, so we m ust have a general science or theory of economy. 
... The theory of economy proves to be, in fact, the mechanics of u tility  and 
self-interest” [Jevons (1876), pp. 198-199]. However, to some authors, economic 
science was identified w ith m athem atical or pure economics which was confused on 
occasion with w hat is known today as econometrics. Since advances in mechanics 
had the greatest im pact on the form ation of m athem atical economics, the role of 
calculus in m athem atization of economics has always been profound.
2. W ithin an environm ent of conflicting theoretical developments between the 
m ainstream  classical economics and the newly established M arxian economics in 
the second-half of the 19th century, any significant theoretical contributions in 
classical economics usually had political and social im plications, escalating the 
prevailing tension in political and social dimensions. Separation of economic is­
sues from other related social subsystems could have been the rem edy to this 
inter-related, multi-dimensional, “chaotic” state  of economic studies. The con­
cept of pure or mathematical economics, which was identical to economic science, 
was invented to represent a positive or politically neutral system  of economic 
knowledge.
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The Failure to Recognize Cournot?
Before starting  to examine the role of calculus in one-dimensionalisation of eco­
nomics, we are now in a position to  provide an answer to our earlier question 
of how can the 30 years tim e lag in the recognition of Cournot (1838) be ex­
plained? Recall th a t according to Cournot (1838, p. 1), the wide varieties of 
different theories and doctrines had m otivated the public desire for “positive” 
economics. However, despite C ournot’s view, the social, political and economic 
conditions were not chaotic enough in C ournot’s tim e to generate a strong driving 
force for one-dimensionalisation of economics. During the 30 years from Cournot 
to Jevons, the  diffusion of socialism and M arxism had produced a different en­
vironm ent. W hen Jevons (1871) and Walras (1874) started  their campaigns to 
popularise m athem atical economics, the work of Cournot together w ith 38 work 
on m athem atical economics before Cournot and 62 such work from Cournot to 
Jevons12, were all revived to provide an army of supportive literatu re  for the suc­
cess of this new school of thought in economics. Even the antiquated work of 
Civa in 1711 was needed to give more strength to this army which was about to 
launch an attack  upon the  tradition of great classical economists as well as on 
Karl M arx’s new unified and all-embracing approach to economic studies. We 
will come back to this point in section 2 below.
1. Mathematical Economics and the Formation of Mechanical Eco­
nomic Science
M athem atical economics, in the sense discussed above, was developed in con­
junction with the concept of pure economics. We will show in section 1.5 th a t 
m athem atical economics cannot be defined properly w ithout using the  concept 
of pure economics and vice versa. This will play an im portan t role in under-
i2See Jevons (1871), pp. 322-339, for a complete list of these contributions.
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standing the underlying factors at work in lim itations of m odern m athem atical 
economics in general and economic applications of optim al control theory in par­
ticular. In this section, we first examine the nature of classical m athem atical 
economics before presenting an analysis of m athem atical economics as a remedy 
to multi-dim ensional political economy.
i) T h e  N a tu r e  o f C la ss ica l M a th e m a tic a l  E co n o m ics
According to  Jevons (1871, p. vii in preface), since economics “deals throughout 
w ith quantities, it m ust be a m athem atical science in m atte r if not in language. 
... The Theory of Economy thus trea ted  presents a close analogy to  the science 
of S tatistical Mechanics and Laws of Exchange are found to  resemble the Laws 
of Equilibrium  of a lever as determ ined by the principle of v irtual velocities. 
The nature of W ealth and Value is explained by the consideration of indefinitely 
small am ounts of pleasure and pain, ju s t as the theory of Statics is m ade to rest 
upon the  equality of indefinitely small amounts of energy” . Furtherm ore, on page 
3 (ibid) he writes: “It is clear th a t economics, if it is to  be a science at all, 
m ust be a m athem atical science ... My theory of Economics, however, is purely 
m athem atical in character” .
By m athem atics, Jevons basically m eant differential calculus: “The theory 
consists in applying the differential calculus to the fam iliar notions of wealth, 
utility, value, dem and, supply, capital, interest, labour and all the other quan­
tita tive  notions belonging to the daily operations of industry” (p. 3). However, 
he held th a t the minim ization of costs in fulfilling the u tility  of an individual is 
the u ltim ate objective of economic science which he defined as the the Calculus o f 
Pleasure and Pain  (1871, p. m, preface). He wrote on page 27 th a t “the calculus 
of u tility  aims at studying the ordinary wants of m an at the least cost of labour” . 
Although Jevons has been usually praised for introducing into economic analysis
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the idea of m axim ization (or minimization), the origin of these ideas traces back 
to Cournot in 1838 when he wrote on page 44 in chapter 4 of his book th a t “we 
shall invoke bu t a single axiom, or, if you prefer, make but a single hypothesis,
i.e. th a t each one seeks to derive the greatest possible value from his good or his 
labour” .
From this point of view, the m odern definition of economics as the  allocation 
of scarce resources for optim um  satisfaction of alternative objectives is in fact the 
generalization of Jevons’s calculus of pleasure and pain; and m odern m athem atical 
optim ization techniques in general and optim al control theory in particular, which 
are the  most efficient m athem atical tools for achieving such optim um  satisfaction, 
are nothing but the advanced versions of elementary calculus employed by Jevons.
The natu re of general m athem atical methods in economic analysis has been 
rem ained basically unchanged since Jevons; although, as will be discussed in sec­
tion 1.4, its role has been remarkably improved. According to Jevons (1879), 
the m ethod consists in assuming certain simple conditions of the functions as 
comformable to experience and then disclosing by symbolic inference the im plicit 
results of these conditions” (p. xxxi preface to the 2nd edition). As for the role 
of m athem atics, we refer to Fisher (1891, p. 119) where he stated  th a t “The 
efforts of the economist is to see, to picture the interplay of economic elements. 
... M athem atics is the lantern by which what before was dim ly visible now looms 
up in firm, bold outlines. We see better. We also see further” .
It is interesting to note th a t this idea can also be traced back to  Cournot 
(1838). According to him  the objective of using m athem atical symbols is “to 
facilitate the exposition of problem, to  render it more concise, to open the way 
to more extended developments and to avoid the digressions of vague argum en­
ta tion” (p. 3). A simple comparison of Cournot’s definition of the objective of
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m athem atical economics w ith similar modern definition expressed by the  editor of 
the Journal o f Mathematical Economics reveals the fact th a t there has not been 
any significant change during the past 157 years. B. Allen (1995), the editor, 
expresses his view in the Journal’s statem ent of aims as follows: the formal
m athem atical expression of economic ideas is of vital im portance to economics. 
Such an expression can determ ine w hether a loose economic in tu ition  has a coher­
ent logical meaning. Also a full formal development of economic ideas can itself 
suggest new economic concepts and intuitions. The prim ary objective is ... to 
express economic ideas using formal m athem atical reasoning” .
ii) Mathematical Economics: a Remedy to Multi-dimensional Political 
Economy
From the early 19th century, it was felt th a t the prevailing philosophical and his­
torical approach to economic issues had produced a state  of m ulti-dimensional 
political economy. Some economists, confused by such m ulti-dimensionalities and 
also impressed by rapid advances in pure and applied sciences, regarded this situ­
ation as the source of the prevailing alleged chaotic state of economic knowledge. 
Let us quote again from Cournot (1838) on this point: “The public is so tired 
of theories and systems th a t now the demand is for so-called ‘positive’ m atte rs” 
(p. 1). A similar idea is expressed 40 years later by Jevons (1879): “The present 
chaotic sta te  of Economics arises from the confusing together of several branches of 
knowledge” (p. xvi preface to the 2nd edition). Walras (1874) has also expressed 
similar views.13
13 “There are today heaven knows how many schools of political economy: the deductive 
school and the historical school, the school of laisser-faire and the school of State intervention or 
Socialism, of the Chair, the Socialist school properly so-called, the Catholic school, the Protestant 
school, etc. For my part, I recognize only two: the school of those who do not demonstrate and 
the school, which I hope to see founded, of those who do demonstrate their conclusions. By 
demonstrating rigorously first the elementary theorems of geometry and algebra and then the 
resulting theorems of the calculus and mechanics, in order to apply them to experimental data, 
we have achieved the marvels of modern industry. Let us follow the same procedure in economics 
and, without doubt, we shall eventually succeed in having the same control over the nature of
30
Subdivisionism was generally regarded to be a remedy to this alleged chaotic 
sta te  of economics. For Cournot this subdivisionism m eant constructing a pure 
or positive economic theorization which should be developed independent of the 
prevailing political systems: “I will only observe th a t theory ought not to  be 
confounded w ith systems ... and th a t ... it should be permissible to  consider 
from an exclusively theoretical standpoint, a subject of general interest which has 
so m any different sides” (1838, pages 1 and 2 in the preface). Jevons (1871, p. 
20) clearly signifies the necessity for subdividing economic knowledge: “Political 
economy is in a chaotic sta te  at present, because there is need for subdividing a too 
extensive sphere of knowledge” .14 Moreover, “we must distinguish the em pirical 
elements from the abstract theory, from the applied theory, and from the more 
detailed art of finance and adm inistration. Thus will arise various sciences, such 
as commercial statistics, the m athem atical theory of economics, system atic and 
descriptive economics, economic sociology and fiscal sciences ... Then will be 
division according to  the m anner of treating the branches of subject. The m anner 
may be theoretical, empirical, historical, or practical; the subject m ay be capital 
and labour, currency, banking, taxation, land tenure, etc. -and not to  speak of the 
more fundam ental division of the science as it treats of consum ption, production, 
exchange and distribution of wealth” (1879, p. xvii, 2nd edition).
Differentiating between scientific and literary tem per in economic analysis can 
best be seen in Walras (1874) who nam ed his book Elements d } Economie Poli­
tique Pure. The fact th a t he was indebted to Cournot (1838) for using calculus in 
economic analysis implies th a t by pure economics he basically m eant m athem at­
things in the economic and social order as we already have in the physical and industrial order” 
[Walras (1874), English translation (1954), p. 471].
14 A similar idea is expressed by Jevons in a lecture on the Future of Political Economy delivered 
at the University College, London in 1878: “... One hundred years after the first publication of 
the Wealth of Nation, we find the state of the science to be almost chaotic. There is certainly 
less agreement now about what political economy is than there was thirty or fifty years ago” 
[see Jevons (1876), p. 191].
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ical economics. On page 37 in the preface to the 4th edition of his book, Walras 
wrote as follows: “I readily acknowledge Gossen’s priority15 w ith respect to  the 
utility  curve and Jevons’s priority w ith respect to the equation of m axim um  utility  
in exchange, bu t these economists were not the source of my ideas. I am  indebted 
to my father, Auguste Walras, for the fundam ental principle of my economic doc­
trine and to Augustin Cournot for the  idea of using the calculus of functions in 
elaboration of this doctrine” . Walras interchangeably used the term s m athem ati­
cal economics and scientific economics to  explain pure economics. This can clearly 
be seen in the introduction to the English translation of W alras’s book Elements 
o f Pure Economics in which W illiam Jaffe, the translator, wrote in 1954 about 
how the economist Auguste Walras asked his son, Leon, to study m athem atical 
economics at the age of 24 in order to build up a scientific economics.
W alras is perhaps the first m athem atical economist who exam ined the problem 
of abstraction in pure or m athem atical economics. Being impressed by advances 
in physical sciences, he argued th a t (1874, p. 71): “From real-type concepts, these 
sciences abstract ideal-type concepts which they define and then  on the basis of 
these definitions they construct a priori the whole framework of their theorem s 
and proofs. A fter th a t they go back to experience not to confirm but apply their 
conclusions” . The surprising fact th a t Walras was not looking for any confirma­
tion of the proposed m athem atical model stems from his perception th a t “reality 
confirms these definitions and dem onstrations only approxim ately and yet reality 
adm its of a very wide and fruitful applications of these propositions” (ibid, p. 
71). Following the same procedure, Walras defined the pure theory of economics
15In here Walras has referred to Hermann Heinrich Gossen who published his book Entwick- 
elung der Gesetze des MenschUches Verlehrs, und der daraus fliessnden Regeln fur menschliches 
Handeln (The laws of human relations and the rules of human actions derived therefrom) in 1854. 
“[Gossen] remained an obscure civil servant all his life. His book, of which there is still a copy 
in the British Museum -the only one in existence possibly- was accidentally discovered by Pro­
fessor Adamson and Stanley Jevons was again the first to recognize its merits” , see Gide and 
Rist (1909, 1948), p. 491.
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as a science which “ought to take over from experience certain type concepts, like 
those of exchange, supply, demand, m arket, capital, income, productive service 
and products. From these real-type concepts the pure science of economics should 
then  abstract and define ideal-type concepts in term s of which it carries on its 
reasoning” .
Despite the fact th a t Walras has not considered the crucial issue of the  method 
o f abstracting ideal-type concepts from real-type concepts, the practice of modern 
econometrics invalidates his hypothesis th a t testing m athem atical models against 
reality cannot be possible due to the existence of inherent approxim ations. How­
ever, when Walras was faced with the  question th a t “do these pure tru th s find 
frequent applications?” he responded with the following set of contradictory an­
swers.
1) Walras goes to  one extrem e by saying th a t it is not the aim of pure economics 
to provide solutions to real-life economic problems; it only furnishes an academic 
pleasure to  an economic scholar: “To be sure, a scholar has a right to  pursue 
science for its own sake, ju st as the geometer has the right (which, in fact, he 
exercises every day) to study the most singular properties of geom etrical figures, 
however fantastic, if he finds th a t they excite his curiosity” (ibid, p. 71-72).
2) Walras goes to the other extrem e by saying th a t pure economics cannot only 
solve real economic problems but can control the nature of things in economics 
and social order exactly in the same m anner as physical and industrial order are in 
control: “By dem onstrating rigorously first the elementary theorem s of geom etry 
and algebra and then the resulting theorems of the calculus and mechanics, in 
order to apply them  to experim ental data, we have achieved the marvels of modern 
industry. Let us follow the same procedure in economics and, w ithout doubt, we 
shall eventually succeed in having the same control over the natu re  of things in
economics and social order as we already have in the physical and industrial order” 
(ibid, p. 471).
3) Walras has also taken a middle-way. He has reduced th e  difficulties asso­
ciated w ith applications of m athem atical economics simply to a set of technical 
complications which can easily be trea ted  by other economists in due course: “... 
practically all the criticisms levelled against me have consisted in calling my a t­
tention to  complications which I had left to one side. I find it very easy to reply 
to these criticisms. So far as I am concerned, since I was the first to elaborate 
a pure theory of economics in m athem atical form, my aim  has been to describe 
and explain the mechanismjs] ... in term s of [their] bare essentials. It is for other 
economists who come after m e to introduce one at a tim e whatever complications 
they please. They in their way and I in mine will then, I think, have done what 
had to be done” (ibid, p. 478). Unfortunately, Walras has ignored the very im ­
portan t problem th a t how the “ideal-type” economic concepts can embrace the 
increasing num ber of complexities existing in real-economic life and at the same 
tim e m aintain its abstract nature which is so essential for m athem atization  of eco­
nomic behaviour.16 This is the key question to the lim itations of m athem atical 
economics which will be briefly discussed in section 1.4.
16Like Walras, Charles Roos, a founder of the Econometric Society in 1930, (with Ragnar 
Frisch and Irving Fisher), has confused the structural shortcomings of mathematical economics 
(due to the abstraction method discussed in section 1.6) with the number of explanatory vari­
ables in a behavioural equation. In an article published in the second volume of Econometrica 
(no. 1, January 1934), he stated that “So many mathematical economists -Cournot, Walras, 
Pareto, Fisher, Frisch, Evans, Schultz and others- have already given such excellent reasons for 
employing mathematics in economics that it seems unnecessary for me to add anything. How­
ever, ... some economists and others have said that there are so many variables involved in a 
study of human behaviour that it will never be possible to develop a science of economics. To 
these who would use these as an argument for not using mathematics in economics, one might 
reply that because there are so many variables, there is all the more need for an exact language 
to keep track of them” pp. 73-74.
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2. Mathematical Economics and Marxian Economics
The emergence of m athem atical economics as a discipline has coincided chrono­
logically w ith the  diffusion of M arxian economics.17 This proffers the  hypothesis 
th a t the  revival of m athem atical economics in the 1870s could have possibly been 
a response to dissem ination of socialism in general and M arxian economics in 
particular.
M arxian economics is an integrated body of knowledge which aims at studying 
economic issues w ithin a three dimensional sphere of philosophical (Germ an phi­
losophy), historical (dialectical materialism ) and classical economics (Smithsonian 
and R icardian schools). In the M arxian tradition, every fundam ental economic 
concept, such as value or capital, can best be explained w ithin this three dimen­
sional space. By concentrating only on the economic dimension and ignoring the 
feedback mechanism with philosophical and historical aspects, pure or m athe­
m atical economics necessarily depleted the real content of fundam ental economic 
concepts. This naturally  downgraded the aim of economic analysis to  a simple 
logical or m athem atical inference based on some basic assum ptions which were 
laid upon such em pty concepts. An exam ination of the concept of value might 
reveal this fact. The concept of value in M arxian economics w ith its class dim en­
sion, was reduced to the concept of return , pleasure, or u tility  in m athem atical 
economics. In this approach, class had been replaced by an individual economic 
agent, thus the historical dimension associated with class developments (dialec­
tical m aterialism ) and its relation to  value (the formation of surplus value and 
exploitation) will become effectively futile or irrelevant w ithin the context of pure
or m athem atical economics.
17Marx’s contributions before Jevons (1871) included the followings: Manifesto of the Com­
munist Party  (1848), Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1858), Grundrisse: 
Foundations of a Critique of Political Economy, (written in 1858-59, first published in 1939) 
and Capital, vol. 1, 1867.
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As an exam ple, consider Jevons (1871) or Walras (1874) who defined utility  
as the origin of value: “Repeated reflection on inquiry have led me to  the some­
w hat novel opinion, th a t value depends entirely upon utility. Prevailing opinions 
make labour ra ther than  u tility  the origin of value; and there are even those who 
distinctly assert th a t labour is the cause of value ... Labour is found often to 
determ ine value, but only in an indirect m anner, by varying the degree of u tility  
of the  com m odity through an increase or lim itation of the supply” [Jevons (1871), 
p. 1]. On the basis of a one-dimensional concept of utility, Jevons (1871) defined 
his aim as to  find the laws of variations of utility  and to  derive a theory of ex­
change on the basis of utility: “We have only to trace out carefully the natural 
laws of the variations of utility, as depending upon the quantity  of com m odity in 
our possession, in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of exchange, of which 
the ordinary laws of supply and dem and are a necessary consequence” (p. 1). 
One-dimensionalisation of value was further advanced when Jevons in his Princi­
ple o f Economics, which was published after his death in 1905, sta ted  th a t "... as 
value, after all, is bu t a development of utility, I have seen reason to  take utility  
rather than  value as the subject-m atter of economics” (p. 49).
The im plications for historical and philosophical aspects of economic analysis 
are interesting. The community of m athem atical economists believed th a t these 
topics would be the subject m atter of the  science of the evolution of social rela­
tions, i.e. the newly established science of sociology. According to  Jevons (1871, 
p. 20), “instead of converting our present science of economics into an historical 
science, u tterly  destroying it in the process, I would perfect and develop what 
we already possess and a t the same tim e erect a new branch of social science on 
an historical foundation. This new branch of science ... is doubtless a portion 
of what H erbert Spencer calls Sociology, the Science of the Evolution of Social 
Relations” .
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The above argum ent does not however constitute a solid basis on which one 
can com pletely accept the hypothesis th a t the revival of m athem atical economics 
in the 1870’s has been a response to  Marxism; because w ithout M arxism one 
should not have expected the developments in m athem atical economics- a hy­
pothesis which is difficult to prove. However, we cannot disregard the fact th a t 
opponents to  M arxism  would have been very pleased with the emergence of m ath ­
em atical economics, for instead of challenging M arxian economics here and there 
the whole body of M arxian economics could have been safely left to one side. The 
subdivisionism, propagated so strongly by Jevons (1871) and W alras (1874) to 
justify  the pure or m athem atical economics as an abstract science, was in a sharp 
contrast to  the underlying M arxian notion of economic life w ithin the “science of 
society” . This M arxian approach strongly challenges the existence of an economic 
science which is isolated from sociology, anthropology, politics, etc. Moreover, the 
basic underlying assumptions in m athem atical economics, i.e. an individual eco­
nomic agent and the u tility  m axim ization principle, together w ith the dynamics 
of m athem atical reasoning in which im plicit results are inferred from the  assumed 
conditions, m ade the m achinery of M arxian economics irrelevant in the new dis­
cipline of m athem atical economics. This explains the fact th a t despite having 
topics on value, Jevons (1871) as well as Walras (1874) could have m anaged their 
argum ents on this subject w ithout making even one single reference to  M arx or 
his work on value.18
W hether the  form ation of m athem atical economics in the 1870’s has been the 
outcome of a ttem pts to establish an economic science similar to physical sciences 
or has been a response to  Marxism- or a combination of both- the fact is th a t
18Jevons did not have any chapter on value in his Theory of Political Economy (1871). How­
ever, chapter vii in his Principles of Economics (1905) is on value. Chapter 16 (or Lesson 16) 
in Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics is on the “Exposition and refutation of Sm ith’s and 
Say’s doctrines of the origin of value in exchange” . Neither in this chapter, nor anywhere else 
in his book, has Walras made any reference to Marx or the Marxian theory of value.
37
it has transform ed the studies of real economic life to an abstract mechanical 
science of economics. An im portant point is tha t the real driving force behind 
such transform ation has neither been a theoretical motive nor an em pirical neces­
sity; otherwise the em inent classical economists would have taken the initiative 
in the form ation of m athem atical economics. No single acknowledged economist 
has played any significant role in setting up m athem atical economics. Cournot 
was a m athem atician; Jevons studied m athem atics, logic and chemistry; Walras 
studied m athem atics and engineering; and Pareto was an engineer.19 As will be 
discussed in section 1.3, there was a period of 30 years after M arshall (1890) 
when no significant contributions in m athem atical economics were observed; the 
com munity of economists had apparently remained faithful to their old tradition  
of political economy. Again, it was the m athem aticians who revived m athem ati­
cal economics. Ramsey (1928), Kantorovich (1939), and von N eum ann (1928 and 
1944) broke the silence and m ade the initial individual moves towards the  m odern 
era of m athem atical economics; but this tim e within a different framework which
will be discussed in section 1.3.2.
19It is interesting to note that these authors used all possible means to convince classical 
economists that the new discipline of mathematical economics was highly important. In his 
introductory lecture at the opening session 1876-1877 at University College, London, Jevons 
warned British economists strongly in the following words: “It may be safely asserted, however, 
that if English economists persist in rejecting the mathematical view of their science, they will 
fall behind their European contemporaries. How many English students, or even Professors, 
I should like to know, have sought out the papers of the late Dr. Whewell, printed in the 
Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, in which he gives his view of the mode of applying 
mathematics to our science? What English publisher, I may ask again, would for a moment 
entertain the idea of reprinting a series of mathematical work on political economy? Yet this is 
what is being done in Italy by Professor Gerolamo Baccardo, the very learned and distinguished 
editor of the Nuova Enciclopedia Italiano ... Now, too, that attention is at last being given 
to the mathematical character of the science, it is becoming apparent that a series of writers 
in France, Germany, Italy and England have made attempts towards a mathematical theory. 
Their work have been almost unnoticed, or, at any rate, forgotten, mainly on account of the 
prejudice against the line of inquiry they adopted ... On the present occasion, I cannot do more 
than mention the names of some of the principal writers referred to, such as Lang, Kroeneke, 
Buquoy, Dupuit, von Thunen, Cazaux, Cournot and Francesco Fuoco, on the continent; and 
Whewell, Tozer, Lardner, Peronnet Thompson, Fleeming Jenkin, Alfred Marshall and probably 
others, in Great Britain” , Jevons (1876), pp. 199-200.
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1.3 T he Origin and Form ation of M odern  M ath­
em atica l Econom ics
It is generally agreed [for example, Debreu (1986)], th a t the symbolic beginning 
of contem porary m athem atical economics is 1944, when the well-known m ath­
em atician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar M orgenstern published 
their work on the Theory o f Games and Economic Behaviour. This book “sets a 
new level of logical rigour for economic reasoning” [Debreu (1986), p. 1261] and 
presented for the  first tim e a new m athem atical m ethod for economic analysis, 
i.e. the game theoretic approach. However, to examine the validity of D ebreu’s 
hypothesis we refer briefly to the developments in m athem atical economics which 
have taken place in the interval between M arshall and von Neumann.
W hile being very conservative in the use of m athem atics in economic analysis, 
M arshall’s Principles o f Economics (1890) was a synthesis of classical economics 
of Sm ith, Ricardo and Mill and classical m athem atical economics developed by 
Cournot, Jevons and Walras (see section 1.4.2). Marshall, who was a m athem ati­
cian before becoming an economist, gave special emphasis to non-m athem atical 
analysis and kept all his m athem atical presentations in a long appendix to his 
book. Even most diagram m atic representations were included in footnotes. His 
book dom inated economic literature for more than  30 years.20 It can be claimed 
th a t M arshall’s book was one of the m ain sources of economic knowledge in cap­
italist economies before the Keynesian revolution in 1936.
It seems th a t during the period from Pareto (1897) and M arshall (1890) to the 
1930’s, one cannot identify a course of continual developments in m athem atical 
economics. Different individual contributions can be classified either as a ttem pts 
to reorganise and consolidate previous m athem atical trea tm ents of economics or
20The 8th edition of the Principles of Economics was published in 1920 in 850 pages. The 
9th edition, published in 1961, can be regarded as a reprint of a classical work.
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to provide new and comprehensive reports on the significance of already known 
results. Bowley, Evans and Wicksell are the three most im portant writers on 
m athem atical economics in this period.
Bowely published his Mathematical Groundwork o f Economics in 1924. De­
spite being an acknowledged and well-respected statistician and economist at the 
London School of Economics, his work did not have any im pact on the direction of 
research work in economics. Evans, who studied m athem atics at Harvard and was 
a professor of m athem atics at Berkeley in 1934, published his Mathematical In ­
troduction to Economics in 1930. This, together with his earlier contributions on 
the applications of calculus of variations to economic analysis [Evans (1925)] did 
not influence the prevailing state of economic research. Wicksell, who intended 
to become a professor of m athem atics but studied economics upon completing his 
doctorate in m athem atics, published his Lectures on Political Economy in 1934, 
again w ith the same result as Evans’s and Bowley’s contributions.
The highly inventive use of calculus of variations in economic analysis in the 
1920’s has been the most im portant contribution of m athem atical economics which 
did not significantly affect the profession at the time. Frank Ramsey, a well-known 
young Cambridge m athem atician, successfully applied this m ethod to  study sav­
ing behaviour. Ramsey contributed two papers to the literature of m athem atical 
economics. His first paper,appeared in 1927 in the Economic Journal, was on the 
theory of taxation. However, it was his second paper, published in 1928, again 
in the Economic Journal, which is regarded as an epoch-making contribution to 
economic optim ization. Keynes (1972, pp. 335-336) stated  th a t R am sey’s sec­
ond paper “is, I think, one of the most remarkable contributions to m athem atical 
economics ever m ade ...” .
Unfortunately, as Koopmans (1965) reports, Ram sey’s contribution was al­
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m ost to tally  ignored by economists until the middle 1960’s. We will come back to 
this point in section 1.6 where economic applications of optim al control theory are 
studied. It should be noted however th a t historically, the earliest a ttem p ts to ap­
ply variational methods to economic analysis can be extended back to  Edgeworth 
(1881). Besides, the work of Hotelling (1925), Evans (1925) and Roos (1928) are 
known to be good examples of such applications. Before closing our discussion on 
the theoretical contributions on m athem atical economics in the 1920’s, let us add 
the von N eum ann’s contribution on game theory and its potential applications to 
economic analysis in 1928 to the above list. This work, which was published in 
German, was also totally ignored by economists until von Neum ann and Morgen- 
stern published their book on the Theory o f Games and Economic Behaviour in 
1944.
Despite all these individual contributions, the community of economists, quite 
sensibly, had rem ained faithful to their non-m athem atical M arshallian type eco­
nomic analysis. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to accept D ebreu’s hy­
pothesis th a t von Neumann and M orgenstern’s Theory o f Game and Economic 
Behaviour (1944) has marked the beginning of a new era in m athem atical eco­
nomics. In w hat follows, we first examine the evidence which contradicts D ebreu’s 
hypothesis.
1.3.1 R efu ta tio n  o f D eb reu ’s H yp oth esis  on von  N eu m an n  
and M o rg en stern ’s E poch-m aking C ontribu tion
According to the following evidence, we find tha t D ebreu’s hypothesis, which 
regards the publication of Game Theory and Economic Behaviour in 1944 as the 
symbolic b irth  of m odern m athem atical economics, is not convincing.
1) Earlier contributions were equally im portant. Recall th a t Keynes (1972, 
pp. 335-336) regarded Ram sey’s second paper (1928) on optim al levels of saving
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as “one of the  most remarkable contributions to m athem atical economics ever 
m ade” . Moreover, contributions of Leonid Kantorovich (1939) on organizing and 
planning of production and Wassily Leontief (1941) on input-output analysis were 
so significant th a t they were awarded the Nobel prizes in 1975 and 1973, respec­
tively.
2) Recall th a t von Neumann and M orgenstern have m ade the strongest attack 
on m athem atical m ethods used in solving consumer’s u tility  m axim ization and 
producers profit m axim ization in W alrasian type m athem atical economics. They 
claimed th a t the  exact description of an economic agent’s effort to a tta in  m axi­
m um  satisfaction can be obtained by employing a gam e-theoretic approach: “It 
is well known th a t considerable -and in fact unsurm ounted- difficulties this task 
[utility or profit maximization] involves given even a lim ited num ber of typical 
situations ... It will appear, therefore, th a t their exact positing and subsequent 
solution can only be achieved with the aid of m athem atical m ethods which diverge 
considerably from the techniques applied by older or by contem porary m athem at­
ical economics ... [i.e.] the m athem atical theory of games o f strategy” (1944, p. 
1).
The publication of Theory o f Games and Economic Behaviour in 1944 did 
not strongly influence the direction of research in m athem atical economics. The 
m ain contribution of this work has been the application of m athem atical theory 
of “games of strategy” developed by von Neumann in 1928 to the analysis of eco­
nomic behaviour. Moreover, they have tried  to  make it clear th a t their objective 
is not to  produce an analogy between economic behaviour and game theory bu t to 
establish tha t “the typical problems of economic behaviour become stric tly  iden­
tical w ith the m athem atical notions of suitable games of strategy” [von N eum ann 
and M orgenstern (1944), p. 2]. Their prime goal was, therefore, to introduce a
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new m athem atical tool, i.e. game theory for the analysis of the well-known fun­
dam ental economic questions. We can see this fact clearly from the three opening 
lines of their book: “The purpose of this book is to present a discussion of some 
fundam ental questions of economic theory which requires a trea tm en t different 
from th a t which they have found thus far in the literature” .
From a purely m athem atical point of view, von Neum ann and M orgenstern’s 
work is a departure from W alrasian tradition and hence can be regarded as the 
beginning of a new era in m athem atical economics. But their work was overlooked 
by the com munity of m athem atical economists until recently when the game- 
theoretic approach has been increasingly applied in microeconomics. In summary, 
their contribution did not change the course of developments in m athem atical 
economics following 1944 and thus cannot be valued as the beginning of a new 
phase in m athem atical economics.
3. Despite von Neumann and M orgenstern’s emphasis on a gam e-theoretic ap­
proach in economic analysis, the actual developments of m athem atical economics 
after 1944 were m ainly along the analysis of general equilibrium  and optim al 
properties of growth models in the 1950’s and 1960’s. A lthough von N eum ann’s 
generalization of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem  to prove the  existence of an op­
tim al growth path  has been a remarkable contribution, this has no relation with 
the gam e-theoretic approach to economic behaviour.
One cannot ignore th a t von Neum ann and M orgenstern’s contribution pro­
vided a profound and extensive new level of m athem atical rigour in economic 
reasoning. The introduction of convex analysis into economic theory (1944, chap­
ter III, section 16) has m ade the concept of convexity an integral part of the m ain 
topics in m athem atical economics such as consumption theory, production theory, 
welfare economics, efficiency analysis and more im portantly  in the theory of gen-
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eral equilibrium . Again, these minor contributions cannot count as the beginning 
of a new era in m athem atical economics.
1.3.2 T h e H y p o th es is  o f C oord inated  R esearch  P rogram m es
A new phenomenon which has been observed in the beginning of 1930’s is the for­
m ation of academic research institutions to coordinate and encourage advances 
in m athem atical economics. Let us m ention at the outset th a t there has been 
no coordination in research work in the  first phase of developments in m athe­
m atical economics, i.e. during the 1870’s. Despite independent developments of 
Jevons’s and W alras’s contributions, Walras initially respected Jevons’s work and 
acknowledged his priority in formulating the Equation o f Exchange which was 
identical to W alras’s Condition o f M aximum Satisfaction. However, soon Walras 
took an unfriendly position against Jevons and regarded him  as a plagiarist of his 
work. In fact, there was not any research coordination between Jevons, Walras 
and Pareto. In section 1.2.3 I observed how Pareto, the successor to Walras in 
the chair of political economy at Lausanne, departed from W alras’s trad ition  and 
gave up economics and concentrated exclusively on sociology.21
21T o provide evidences on the absence of coordination in the classical mathematical economics, 
we refer to Walras (1874). In the preface to the first edition (pages 35 and 36) he stated as 
follows: “This work was completely written and almost completely printed...when...my attention 
was drawn to a work on the same subject, entitled: The Theory of Political Economy, in 1871, by 
W. Stanley Jevons, Professor of Political Economy at Manchester...I acknowledge Mr. Jevons’s 
priority so far as his formula is concerned, without relinquishing my right to claim originality for 
certain important deductions of my own. I should not enumerate these points which competent 
readers will readily discover. I need only add that, as I see it, Mr. Jevons’s work and my 
own, far from being mutually competitive in any harmful sense, really support, complete, and 
reinforce each other to a singular degree” .
The above passage might indicate a harmony between the work of Jevons and Walras; but 
the lack of coordinated research programme, soon put an end to this friendly attitude. Donald 
Walker (1987, pp. 861-862) reports that “[Walras’s] initial cordiality towards Jevons, as a fellow 
pioneer in mathematical economics, was dissipated by Jevons’s failure to recognize Walras’s 
[main] contributions ... and eventually Walras ... came to regard Jevons as a plagiarist of his 
work (Walras to M. Pantaleoni, 17 August 1889) ... Walras felt neglected by Alfred Marshall 
[too] ... Walras wrote in 1904 that “I have not the least doubt about the future of my method 
and even my doctrine; but I know that success of this sort does not become clearly apparent 
until after the death of the author” (Walras to G. and L. Renard, 4 June 1904)” .
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The starting  point in the form ation of modern m athem atical economics has 
been the  realization of the fact th a t the revival of classical m athem atical economics 
necessarily required an integration of statistical techniques into m athem atical eco­
nomic analysis. The creation of the Econometric Society on December 29, 1930, 
in Cleveland, Ohio, was m ainly for the unification of economic theory, m athem at­
ical analysis and statistics. The early a ttem pts by Ragnar Frisch, Professor of 
Economics, University of Norway, Oslo; Charles Roos, Perm anent Secretary of 
the Am erican Association for the Advancement of Science, W ashington; and Irv­
ing Fisher, Professor of Economics, Yale University, had a profound significance 
on the  creation of Econometric Society. Irving Fisher became the President and 
Chairm an of the Council, while the other two, together with A rthur Bowley, Pro­
fessor of Statistics at LSE, Joseph Schumpeter, Professor of Economics, Harvard 
University and Alfred Cowles,22 Director of the Cowles Commission for Research 
in Economics,23 (as treasurer), formed the Council of 10 members. Section I  of 
the Constitution reads as follows: “The Econometric Society is an international 
society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and 
m athem atics” .
Econometrica , the journal of the Econometric Society, began publication in 
January 1933, Ragnar Frisch was appointed editor. It is interesting to  note 
th a t, in line w ith the Constitution, the associate editors represented the em pha­
sis on economics, m athem atics and statistics: Alvin Hansen, Professor of Eco­
22It should be noted that Alfred Cowles was not among the first Council of 10 members in the 
Econometric Society. When L. V. Bortkiewicz from University of Berlin, who was a member of 
Council, died in August 1931, Alfred Cowles was appointed as a member and the treasurer of 
the Council.
23The Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, founded in 1932 by Alfred Cowles 
and a group of economists and mathematicians concerned with the applications of quantitative 
techniques to economics and the related social sciences at Colorado Springs. The Commission 
moved to Chicago in 1939 and was affiliated with the University of Chicago until 1955 when 
it moved to Yale. The research staff of the Commission along with other members of the Yale 
Department of Economics established the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics to 
sponsor and encourage the development and application of quantitative methods in economics 
and related social sciences.
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nomics from University of M innesota, Frederick Mills, Professor of Statistics from 
Columbia University and Harold Davis, Associate Professor of M athem atics from 
Indiana University.
To clarify the im portance of the Econometric Society in advancing the new 
phase of m athem atical economics it is opportune to refer to  some points which 
Ragnar Frisch m ade in his first editorial to Econometrica. “Econometrics is by no 
means the same as economic statistics. Nor it is identical to  what we call general 
economic theory, although a considerable portion of this theory has a definitely 
quantitative character. Nor should econometrics be taken as synonymous with 
the application of m athem atics to economics. Experience has shown th a t each of 
these three view points, th a t of statistics, economic theory and m athem atics, is a 
necessary, bu t not by itself a sufficient, condition for a real understanding of the 
quantitative relations in modern economic life. It is the unification of all three 
tha t is powerful. And it is this unification tha t constitutes econom etrics” (p. 2).
According to Ragnar Frisch in his first editorial (ibid), the m utual penetration 
of quantitative economic theory and statistical observation, which is the essence 
of econometrics, can profoundly change the tradition of economic theorization in 
classical m athem atical economics: “Theory, in formulating its abstract quantita­
tive notions, m ust be inspired to a large extent by the technique of observation. 
And fresh statistical or other factual studies m ust be healthy elements of distur­
bance th a t constantly threatens and disquiet the theorist and prevents him  from 
coming to rest on some inherited, obsolete set of assum ptions” .
The emphasis given by Ragnar Frisch on the role of m athem atics in quanti­
ta tive economics is interestingly confusing. On the one hand, he m aintained tha t 
(ibid, p. 2) “M athem atics is certainly not a magic procedure which in itself can 
solve the riddles of m odern economic life, as is believed by some enthusiasts. But
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when combined w ith a thorough understanding of the economic significance of 
the phenom ena, it is an extrem ely helpful tooF . On the other hand, he held the 
view th a t “Indeed, it will be an editorial principle of Econom etrica th a t no paper 
shall be rejected solely on the ground of being too m athem atical. This applies no 
m atter how highly involved the m athem atical apparatus m ay be” (pp. 2-3).
The coordinated program m e of research work m apped out by the  Econometric 
Society24 was not m utually com petitive in any harmful sense w ith traditional 
classical m athem atical economics of Jevons and Walras; on the  contrary, it really 
completed it. To respect the founder of classical m athem atical economics, the 
first volume of Econom etrica is opened by a portrait of Cournot accompanied by 
a paper in French entitled “Cournot et L’Ecole M athem atique” by Rene Roy.
Applications of statistical m ethods to economic analysis, advocated so strongly 
by the Econom etric Society, produced a more positive a ttitude  towards m easure­
m ent in economic analysis. Recall th a t u tility  m axim ization was the corner-stone 
of the contributions of Jevons, Walras and Pareto. It is not surprising th a t a 
debate concerning determinateness o f utility was given higher priority among the 
first serious coordinated research work. In this debate, questions of cardinality 
and ordinality in utility  functions were discussed in detail. The work of Lange 
(1934, 1935), Phelps-Brown (1934), Allen (1935) and Bernandelli (1935), in the 
new journal of the Review o f Economic Studies, (first published in 1933), were 
among the most significant contributions. The Econom etrica and the  Review of
24Contributions of Cowles Commission for Research in Economics towards further develop­
ments of such coordinated research programmes should not be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, 
this Commission was established in Colorado in 1932, moved to Chicago in 1939 and to Yale 
(as Cowles Foundation) in 1955. Its main contributions in advancing quantitative methods in 
economics are summarised in the Report of Research Activities as follows: “The activity analy­
sis formulation of production and its relationship to the expanding body of techniques in linear 
programming became a major focus of research at Chicago period. The Walrasian model of 
competitive behaviour was examined with a new generality and precision, in the midst of an in­
creased concern with the study of interdependent economic units and in the context of a modern 
reformulation of welfare theory” [see Cowles Foundation (1983), p. 1].
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Economic Studies, were acting as continuous sources of encouragement for further 
research work in m athem atical economics.
Contributions of Leonid Kantorovich (1939) on organizing and planning of pro­
duction, Wassily Leontief (1941) on input-output analysis, Paul Samuelson (1947) 
on foundations of economic analysis, Tjalling Koopmans (1951) on activity  anal­
ysis of production and George Dantzig (1951) on simplex algorithm  are examples 
of the results obtained in the new optim istic early period of m odern m athem at­
ical economics. Further expansion in the literature encouraged the publication 
of m ore specialised journals in m athem atical economics: International Economic 
Review  in 1960, Journal o f Economic Theory in 1969, Journal o f Mathematical 
Economics in 1974 and Journal o f Economic Dynamics and Control in February 
1979 are the well-known examples which have stim ulated further research interests 
in the  subject.
A new generation of economists, therefore, emerged who were equipped with 
greater m athem atical knowledge and whose attitudes and tools of analysis were 
more statistical and m athem atical as compared with their predecessors. I con­
sider the above m entioned academic environment together w ith the a ttitu d e  and 
character of the new generation of economists, which have produced, in tu rn , a 
growth generating cycle in m athem atical economics, as the origin of the  new phase 
in m athem atical economics. We will discuss more on this point in section 1.4.2 
where m athem atics as an engine of inquiry in modern m athem atical economics is 
discussed.
Having established the im portance of coordinated research programm es and 
appropriate academic institutions in the initiation and advancement of m odern 
m athem atical economics, let us briefly examine the very im portan t topics of a tti­
tudes and lim itations in both classical and m odern m athem atical economics.
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1.4 C lassical vs M odern M athem atical Econom ics 
A ttitu d es and L im itations
W hat are the salient features of contemporary m athem atical economics which 
have m ade it distinctive from classical or traditional m athem atical economics? 
An answer to this question might provide an understanding of the fu ture direc­
tions in this subject; this, in tu rn , will partially identify th e  status of economic 
applications of optim al control theory in m athem atical economics. Historical anal­
ysis of m athem atical economics reveals th a t the attitudes of m athem atical and 
non-m athem atical economists towards the subject as well as their perceptions on 
the lim itations of m athem atical methods in economic analysis are the two im por­
tan t factors which have differentiated the old and new schools of m athem atical 
economics.
1.4.1 A ttitu d es
Recall th a t we have classified the pre-1930’s literature on m athem atical economics 
as classical and the  work done since the creation of the Econom etric Society to 
the present tim e as modern m athem atical economics. Classical m athem atical 
economists had, more or less, an inimical a ttitude towards non-m athem atical 
economists. This feature is basically absent among contem porary m athem atical 
economists because the num ber of those economists who do not believe in m ath ­
em atization of economics are either very limited or their influences in directing 
m ajor coordinated economic research programmes are marginal.
Let us s ta rt by considering the attitudes of classical m athem atical economists. 
Cournot (1838, p. 2 in the preface) held the view th a t there exists a strong 
prejudice among writers in political economy against m athem atical economics: 
“But the title  of this work [Researches into the Mathematical Principles o f the 
Theory o f Wealth] ... shows ... th a t I intend to apply to them  the forms and
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symbols of m athem atical analysis. This is a plan likely, I confess, to draw on 
me at the outset the  condem nation of theorists of repute. W ith  one accord they 
have set themselves against the  use of m athem atical forms and it will doubtless 
be difficult to overcome to-day a prejudice which thinkers, like Sm ith and other 
m ore m odern writers, have contributed to strengthen” .
Classical non-m athem atical economists on the other hand generally believed 
th a t an economist should be capable of explaining factual economic issues and 
should have a clear understanding of different economic doctrines. Under such 
circum stances, it is quite reasonable th a t classical writers in political economy 
showed no sym pathy with Cournot’s m athem atical economics when Cournot him ­
self rightly believed (1838, p. 3) th a t there was a wide gap between the  existing 
economic knowledge and practical issues in real economic life: “I believe th a t 
there is an immense step in passing from theory to  governmental applications; ... 
and I believe, if this essay is of any practical value, it will be chiefly in making 
clear how far we are from being able to solve, with full knowledge of the case, a 
m ultitude of questions which are boldly decided every day” . However, Cournot 
did not dem onstrate how m athem atical economists could possibly bridge this gap.
Jevons (1879, p. xxiii, 2nd edition) took a different unfriendly position against 
non-m athem atical classical economists. As a convinced m athem atical economist 
he argued th a t “ ... economists have long been m athem aticians w ithout being 
aware of the fact. The unfortunate result is th a t they have generally been bad 
m athem aticians and their works m ust fall” . His opposition to  non-m athem atical 
approach had developed to the extent th a t he ruled out the  possibility of any 
contributions from non-m athem atical school to his so-called pure or scientific eco­
nomics: “Instead of converting our present science of economics into an historical 
science, u tterly  destroying it in the process, I would perfect and develop what
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we already possess” (1879, p. 20). On the other hand, the stand  which non- 
m athem atical classical economists took on the new emerging science of economics 
was more logical and confined to the analysis of the usefulness and relevance of 
m athem atical economics. As will be discussed below and also in section 1.6, these 
two strong observations are still valid.
To the  extent th a t m athem atical m ethods are defined as the instrum ents 
of drawing necessary conclusions from given assumptions and conditions, there 
seemed to be no dispute on utilisation of m athem atical m ethods in economics 
where such applications were possible. Moreover, it was agreed th a t the utili­
sation of m athem atical symbols, operations and geometrical representations in 
economic reasoning would not only facilitate the exposition and generalization of 
problems but also rendered them  to greater precision of statem ents by avoiding 
vague argum entation. Conflicting views arose upon the proposition th a t whether 
the application of m athem atics to  economics could produce economic results which 
were previously unknown. For example, Jevons (1879), in appraising C ournot’s 
book wrote “... this investigation, presents a beautiful exam ple of m athem atical 
reasoning, in which knowledge is apparently evolved out of ignorance” (p. xxxi: 
preface to the 2nd edition).
Perhaps the strongest objection by classical economists to this line of argu­
m ent has been pu t forward by Cairnes (1875, preface): “Having weighted Profes­
sor Jevons’s argum ent to the best of my ability and so far as this is possible for 
one unversed in m athem atics, I still adhere to my original view. So far as I can 
see, economic tru th s are not discoverable through the instrum entality  of m athe­
matics. If this view be unsound, there is at hand an easy means of refutation- 
the production of an economic tru th , not before known, which has been thus ar­
rived at; but I am  not aware th a t up to the present any such evidence has been
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furnished of the efficiency of the m athem atical m ethod” .
Despite some elements of tru th  in Cairnes argument, advances in m odern 
m athem atical economics imply th a t the applications of m athem atical m ethods to 
economic analysis can provide some real economic contributions. Examples are 
linear program m ing in resource allocations and input-output models in planning. 
This point will be further examined in section 1.4.2.
The argum ent about whether m athem atical economics can play any crucial 
role in realization of the prim ary objectives of economics is a strong criticism 
against m athem atization of economics. This objection has been pu t forward ini­
tially by Wagner (1891, p. 327): “I do not believe th a t this mode of treating the 
subject has an independent value of its own for solving our problem s” . It is in ter­
esting to exam ine what were “our” problems. The ultim ate objective of classical 
economy was to explain the economic behaviour as observed in real economic life. 
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising th a t the classical m athem atical eco­
nomics, which was nothing more than  the calculus of pain and pleasure [Jevons 
(1871, preface)] did not receive a warm welcome by classical economists.
However, an im portant question is the relevance of modern m athem atical eco­
nomics in solving contem porary economic problems. The answer to  this question 
depends partly  upon the usefulness of m odern m athem atical economics and partly  
on the character o f contemporary economists. We will discuss the former in section 
1.7, bu t let us now examine the latter.
The average or expected a ttitude of economists changes from one generation 
to the other according to what is in fashion at the time. Young economists do 
not consciously choose their mode of economic training; they are simply born into 
a predeterm ined world of educational economic institutions and can only shape
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their education by selecting from a given list of economic subjects.
This explains why those who have established the foundations of m athem atical 
economics were not formally trained within the tradition of classical economics: 
Cournot (1838), a m athem atician; Jevons (1871), basically trained  in m athem at­
ics, logic and chemistry; Walras (1874), an engineer but self-taught in economics; 
Pareto (1896), an engineer; and Ramsey (1928) and von Neum ann (1944) lead­
ing m athem aticians. It took nearly two to  three generations from Jevons for the 
general a ttitudes of economists to move gradually away from classical political 
economy and become closer to the m athem atical approach in economic training. 
This was well predicted by Fisher when he wrote in 1891 (p. 119) th a t “It may 
not be rash to expect th a t the next generation of the theoretical (as distinct from 
historical) economists will have fitted themselves by m athem atical training for 
this mode of treating  their them e and th a t they will be such m en as by na tu ­
ral ap titude can so fit themselves” . I t follows th a t contem porary economists can 
challenge the  relevance and usefulness of one or two subjects in economics but 
cannot usually question the validity or relevance of the whole existing system of 
m athem atical economics because there does not exist an alternative system of 
acknowledged and academically approved economic knowledge.
1.4.2 L im ita tion s
Classical m athem atical economists generally accepted the existence of lim itations 
in applying m athem atical m ethods to economic analysis. M odern m athem atical 
economists do not usually share this reservation. Let us first briefly exam ine the 
perceptions of classical m athem atical economist on such lim itations. It seems 
th a t they basically approved only those m athem atical applications which led to 
results of value. Jevons (1879, p. xxiii) explains this very clearly: “It does not 
follow, of course, th a t to be explicitly m athem atical is to  ensure the attainm ent
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of tru th  and in such w riting as those of Canard and Whewell, we find plenty of 
symbols and equations w ith no result of value, owing to  the fact th a t they simply 
translated  into symbols the doctrines obtained, and erroneously obtained, w ithout 
their use” .25
Despite the  am biguity of the term  “result of value” , one can argue th a t the use 
of symbols and m athem atical operations in economic analysis can be justified on 
the ground th a t they lead to a be tte r exposition of economic issues which is itself 
a result of value. This view had been first expressed by Cournot (1838, p. 3): 
“The em ployment of m athem atical symbols is perfectly natura l when the relations 
between m agnitudes are under discussion; and even if they are not rigorously 
necessary, it would hardly be reasonable to  reject them , because they  are not 
equally fam iliar to  all readers and because they have sometimes been wrongly 
used, if they are able to facilitate the exposition of problem s” . However, unlike 
Jevons (1871, p. 3) who believed th a t political economy “m ust be m athem atical 
simply because it deals with quantities” , Cournot (1838, p. 5) allowed for topics 
in political economy which cannot be trea ted  mathem atically: “I have not set out 
to m ake a  com plete and dogmatic treatise on Political Economy; I have pu t aside 
questions, to which m athem atical analysis cannot apply” .
U nfortunately, Cournot did not define those economic problems which were not 
am enable to m athem atical treatm ents. Surprisingly, this problem  of profound sig­
nificance has not received much atten tion  during the past 160 years since Cournot. 
We will come back to  this problem in section 1.7.
Perhaps the best exposition on the lim itations of m athem atical economics 
among classical economists is given by Alfred Marshall. M arshall who was the
25Jevons has referred to the following work: Nicholas F. Canard (1801) and William Whewell 
(1829, 1831, 1850, 1875).
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Second W rangler in the M athem atical Tripos in 1865 when he was studying m athe­
m atics at Cambridge, believed th a t there is a tendency in m athem atical economics 
to em phasize those points which will fit easier into m athem atical methods. He 
strongly warned economists on this unbalanced trea tm ent of economic issues. In 
his Principles [(1890), pages 850-1] he wrote as follows: “And hence arises a ten­
dency towards assigning wrong proportions to economic forces; those elements 
being most emphasized which led themselves most easily to analytical methods 
... I t is a danger which more than  any other the economist m ust have in m ind at 
every turn . But to  avoid it altogether, would be to abandon the chief means of 
scientific progress” .
For M arshall, explicit and clear economic meaning together w ith a potentiality  
of explaining economic observations were the two conditions for successful applica­
tions of m athem atics to economics. Being very conservative in using m athem atical 
symbols in economic analysis, he wrote in 1906 th a t “I never read m athem atics 
now; in fact I have forgotten even how to integrate a good m any things. B ut I 
know I had a growing feeling in the la ter years of my work a t the  subject th a t a 
good m athem atical theorem  dealing w ith economic hypothesis was very unlikely 
to be good economics; and I went more and more on the rule - (1) Use m athe­
m atics as a short-hand language, ra ther than  as an engine of inquiry, (2) Keep 
to them  till you have done, (3) Translate into English, (4) Then illustrate by ex­
amples th a t are im portant in real life, (5) Burn the m athem atics, (6) If you can’t 
succeed in (4), burn  (3). This last I did often” (page 776, vol. 2, Notes). Let us 
now examine the lim itations of modern m athem atical economics in the  light of 
M arshall’s m ain condition.
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Can Mathematical Methods Discover Economic Truths?
The m ost controversial Issue in m athem atization of economics is w hether eco­
nomic tru th s are discoverable through the instrum entality  of m athem atics? Recall 
th a t M arshall held the view th a t m athem atics was only a short-hand language, 
and not an engine of inquiry. In this section we argue th a t in contrary to  M ar­
shall’s view, m athem atics can be an engine of inquiry in m odern m athem atical 
economics simply because there are economic questions which can only be an­
swered by specific m athem atical methods. This is where m athem atical m ethods 
can really contribute to economic analysis.
Some Nobel prizes are awarded in economics m ainly for dem onstrating how the 
applications of some m athem atical methods can provide useful economic results 
which otherwise could not have been obtained. For example, the first Nobel prize 
in economics was awarded to Ragnar Frisch and Jan  Tinbergen in 1969 for “having 
developed and applied dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes” . 
For the same reason, there are Nobel prizes in economics which are awarded to 
m athem aticians. Leonid Kantorovich, a Russian m athem atician, won the Nobel 
prize in economics in 1975 because he developed the m athem atical theory of linear 
program m ing and for applying it to  economic problems of optim um  allocation of 
resources. G erard Debreu, a French m athem atician, is another exam ple who 
won the Nobel prize in economics in 1983. In addition to contributions resulting 
from the direct applications of m athem atics to specific economic problem s, there 
are economic results whose discoveries are indirectly due to m athem atics. These 
results also signify the real contributions of m athem atical m ethods. Besides, the 
m athem atical approach to economic problems can basically give economists a 
precise view of the subject which can be conducive to economic discoveries of 
significant value.
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It is always easy and thus more common to start with some well-known m ath­
em atical m ethod and then look for an economic problem which can be fitted into 
its m athem atical structure. This approach is unlikely to  provide any significant 
economic result. On the other hand, there might exist some well-known economic 
problem s whose solutions necessarily require one or more of the  following condi­
tions: 1) fam iliarity of economists to some advanced m athem atical techniques, 2) 
further advances in some of the existing m athem atical m ethods, 3) discovery of 
some new m athem atical theorems and methods. In this approach, m athem atics 
can be the  engine of inquiry and its applications might lead to  real contributions.
Some economic examples for the three conditions listed above are as fol­
lows. Applications of optim al control theory to optim al allocation of economic 
resources over tim e is a good example for the first condition, von N eum ann’s m in­
imax theorem  (1944), which is the fundam ental result in the theory of zero-sum 
two-person games, or the K akutani’s generalization of the Brouw er’s fixed-point 
theorem  (1941), bo th  m otivated by problems in economic game theory, provide 
examples for the second condition. And finally, Kantorovich’s contribution to 
economics, m entioned earlier, is a clear example of the last condition. In fact, 
Kantorovich invented linear programming, the general m athem atics of finite sys­
tem s of linear inequalities, in order to  solve problems in optim um  allocation of 
resources. Since then, linear programm ing has been added to the literatu re  of ap­
plied m athem atics, in general and combinatoric analysis, in particular. Another 
exam ple for the last condition is the simplex m ethod in quadratic programm ing, 
invented by a m athem atician, Philip Wolfe (1959), in order to  solve problems in 
optim al investm ent decisions.
The invention of new m athem atical m ethods or proving some new theorem s for 
solving specific economic problems have led some writers to  the conclusion tha t
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it is not only m athem atics which has contributed to economic knowledge; contri­
butions of economics to m athem atics have also been significant. In this regard 
Debreu (1984) has wrongly concluded th a t examples such as von N eum ann’s min­
im ax theorem  or K akutani’s generalization of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem  in 
pure m athem atics discussed above, which were m otivated by economic problems, 
are real contributions of economics to  m athem atics.
The misleading conclusion of Debreu (1984) stems from the  fact th a t he does 
not recognize th e  existence of a conceptual asym m etry in the following two con­
cepts: “contributions of m athem atics to economics” and “contributions of eco­
nomics to  m athem atics” . The former is a real contribution: w ithout which eco­
nomic tru ths could not have been discovered; whereas in the la tter, an economic 
problem  acts only as a stim ulus to m athem atical discoveries and does not, in prin­
ciple, constitute a real contribution since this stimulus could have been originated 
from other non-economic sources or even from a pure m athem atical im agination.
A dm itting m athem atics as an engine of inquiry in economics m ight lead us 
to  a pessimistic view on future directions of economic analysis. M athem atical in­
novations for solving economic problems fall, by definition, w ithin the domain of 
the m athem atical profession whose contributions might generate a new round of 
interesting m athem atical problems which provide new grounds for further involve­
m ents of m athem aticians in economics. This will certainly influence the  direction 
of economic theorization by further widening the existing gap between theoretical 
economics and real economic life. As will be discussed below, the  present situation 
in economic literature which is characterized by too much m athem atics supports 
this view.
G rubel and Boland (1986) in an a ttitude  survey of Am erican economists and 
David Greenaway (1990) in the  same survey for British economists report th a t the
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dom inant view among economists is th a t there is too much m athem atics in pro­
fessional journals. More im portantly, the m ajority believe th a t higher knowledge 
of m athem atics does not necessarily imply better economics. Greenaway (1990) 
reports th a t 64.6 per cent of British economists have answered no to  th e  following 
question: “Does the  development of pure m athem atical skills leave the economists 
adequately prepared for work in government or industry?” The similar figure for 
American econom ists’ response as reported by Grubel and Boland (1986) is 61 
per cent. It is interesting th a t the percentages of economists who have answered 
yes to  the  above question are 16.7 per cent and 9 per cent among B ritish and 
American economists, respectively.
To com plete the mechanism of growth generating cycle in m odern m athem at­
ical economics, the institutional arrangem ents should also be taken into consider­
ation. The rapid pace of industrialization and economic growth in the 1950’s and 
1960’s and the increasing popularity of com puter programm ing in modelling and 
planning in industry and trade, produced a greater optim ism  in m athem atical 
economics and econometrics. The concomitant increasing involvements of m athe­
m atical economists and econometricians in governing bodies of academic research 
and training institutions as well as Governmental research departm ents have m ade 
it more convenient for m athem atical economists and econometricians not only to 
publish easier than  non-m athem atical economists but to obtain jobs more con­
veniently. This new institutional setting has produced higher incentives among 
young economic scholars to study m athem atically oriented economic studies, and 
will do so for the foreseeable future.
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1.5 T he R ocky Lane to  Successful Co-ordination: 
T he D evelopm ent of th e  R elationship  B etw een  
M athem atica l Econom ics and E conom etric
As discussed in the preceding section, the m ain objective of the Econom etric So­
ciety, created in 1930, was to establish a successful partnership between economic 
theory, m athem atical analysis and statistical methods. The co-ordinated research 
programm es recom mended by the Cowles Commission and fully discussed in the 
meetings of the Econometric Society, were seen as effective instrum ents for the 
realisation of this objective. An exam ination of the research work during the past 
65 years implies th a t establishing such a partnership has not been an easy task. 
The gap between m athem atical theories and statistical representations of the real 
world economic problems is still considerably wide. This problem  naturally  falls 
in the domain of the interplay between theory and observation (or m easurem ent) 
in quantitative economics which has a ttracted  a great deal of a tten tion  during the 
past 15 years.26
The point which concerns me in this section and which has not yet received 
proper attention in the literature, is the nature of the disparity between m athe­
m atical economics and econometrics in building up models for em pirical analysis. 
This will provide a background for the second Chapter (section 2.5) where a dis­
cussion of the  critique of macro-econometric models is presented in the light of 
the ongoing debates on the relationship between theory and observation. In this 
connection, the rational expectations hypothesis, time-inconsistency and the Lu­
cas critique together w ith the  potential contributions of optim isation models are 
also discussed in Chapter 2 (sections 2.7 and 2.8).
26Leamer (1983, 1987), McAleer, Pagan and Volker (1985), Hendry (1987), Sims (1980, 1982, 
1987), Morgan (1990), Wallis (1991), Pesaran and Smith (1995a, 1995b), among others, have 
addressed this issue extensively primarily from a methodological point of view.
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The controversial philosophical issues in economic theorisation and in par­
ticular the interesting points arising from the interplay of theory and observa­
tion are extensively discussed in the methodology of economics, for example, 
0 ’Brien(1991). Let us s ta rt from the least controversial issue by saying broadly 
th a t an economic theory is essentially a consistent set of reasoning which coher­
ently organises our a priori knowledge about an economic problem. The objective 
of the Cowles Commission’s co-ordinated research programm e in unifying the the­
ory and m easurem ent necessarily implied tha t such economic theories should be 
confirmed by data. This could best be done by designing a mathematical model 
which relates theoretical concepts to their associated observable counterparts. At 
this point, m athem atical economics can establish a link with econometrics. De­
spite the 65 years of m utual co-operation towards this objective, the history reveals 
an unhappy partnership.
At the root of the subject lies the traditional dichotomy between the functions 
of m athem atical economists and econometricians in building em pirical models, 
in which the former are supposed to supply a m athem atical model and the la t­
te r simply to estim ate its param eters. The estim ated param eters are then used 
for predicting endogenous variables which are of interest to policy-makers. The 
task of confronting theories w ith observations does not end with estim ation or 
prediction; testing and evaluation of theories are also expected in this practice. 
In other words, m athem atical economic theories, statistical techniques and data  
should necessarily be unified in an empirical model which can then be used for 
forecasting, policy and theoretical evaluations. It is the problems associated with 
such unification which have constituted the real im pedim ents in the development 
of a closer partnership between m athem atical economics and econometrics. Let 
us now exam ine the nature of these problems.
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Formal m athem atical economic models are conventionally supplied by m athe­
m atical economists who regard the coherence, rigour and generality (and not nec­
essarily the explanatory power) of the model as the criteria for evaluating a good 
economic model. Econometricians, who are generally concerned w ith statistical 
techniques and da ta  processing, value economic models by their ability to  explain 
historical observations of the real economic facts. The m ajor task of econometrics 
is, therefore, to transfer a m athem atical economic model into an em pirical model 
am enable to estim ation and prediction. To the extent th a t econometric mod­
els are at variance with m athem atical models the tensions between econometrics 
and m athem atical economics accumulate. Some of these tensions are unavoidable 
and some can be resolved by gaining more insight into the nature of such diver­
gence. It is fair for econometricians to m aintain tha t purely theoretical models 
in their general forms are inappropriate for empirical analysis. Econometricians, 
therefore, endure the painful experience of model specification in which the in­
clusion of new explanatory variables, functional forms of behavioural equations, 
statistical properties of disturbance term s, lag structure and dynam ic adjustm ent 
processes, expectation mechanisms, objective functions and the stochastic nature 
of behavioural equations as well as the measurement subsystem should all be fully 
examined.
M athem atical economists can express their discontent with the econometri­
cians’ choice of assumptions such as linearity in some essentially non-linear eco­
nomic dynamics, white noise processes for disturbance term s, quadratic perfor­
mance measures and with the lim itations of econometric techniques in handling 
some problems of vital economic im portance such as misspecification errors, the 
rational expectations, time-inconsistencies and estim ating the shadow prices (or 
costate variables) in dynamic intertem poral optim isations.27 Such a complex con­
27These shortcomings are discussed in Chapter 2.
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struct makes it extrem ely difficult, from a statistical point of view, to  test the 
validity of an econometric model. W hen an econometric model is rejected by 
historical data, it is difficult to identify whether the failure is a ttribu tab le  to the 
inherent inconsistency of the core theoretical model or to the auxiliary assump­
tions.
The errors associated with the economic data  used by econometricians in pa­
ram eter estim ations add a new dimension of tension between m athem atical eco­
nomics and econometrics. Except for special cases where precise direct observa­
tions are possible (such as prices and quantities in financial m arkets), the  m ajority 
of available data  which are compiled m ainly for adm inistrative or business pur­
poses (and not necessarily as a response to theoretical model requirem ents) are 
being seriously affected by measurem ent errors. Such errors, which are widely 
discussed in the  standard econometric literature, can best be classified as errors 
of aggregation, im putation and sampling. It is well-known th a t any aggregation 
(over tim e, products or individuals) necessarily involves a loss of inform ation. Im ­
putation of non-m arket activities cannot be performed w ithout considerable m ajor 
errors. Finally, sampling errors cannot be dealt with successfully unless the statis­
tics of the whole population become available. Under such circum stances, it is 
hard to accept the existence of a precise data  set which corresponds to  theoretical 
concepts such as capital, labour or interm ediate goods. The adverse effects of 
data  deficiency in econometric modelling are further exacerbated by the problems 
associated with measuring unobservable variables such as the general price level, 
the level of expectations or the expected inflation, which are usually of crucial 
im portance in m athem atical economic models.
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1.5.1 T h e Turning P oin t in  th e  R ocky Lane to  C o-ordination:  
T h e E m ergen ce o f A ltern a tiv e  S trateg ies
As discussed above, the Cowles Commission approach to the unification of eco­
nomic theory, statistical analysis and m athem atical modelling could lead to the 
rejection of all theories, thus rendering the practice of econometric modelling a 
tria l and error process. However, it was agreed until the 1970s th a t this approach, 
known today as the traditional strategy, was the proper way of doing empirical 
research work. The Cowles Commission’s approach was discarded by a number 
of prom inent econometricians and heavily criticised by most applied economists 
on the  basis of the predictive failures of the traditional economic modelling to­
gether w ith the aforementioned shortcomings as well as the Lucas critique (Lucas 
1976) th a t the policy invariant behavioural relations are inconsistent w ith dy­
nam ic optim isation.28 The rocky lane to successful co-ordination thus entered its 
second phase of development in the 1970s with the arrival of a num ber of rival 
approaches.
The rival approaches all shared the idea th a t the remarkable academic invest­
m ent in the formal econometric work, w ithin the Cowles Commission’s approach, 
had only marginal influence on the thinking about substantive questions in eco­
nomics in general and macro-econometric modelling in particular. However, these 
approaches differ in m any ways. At one extreme, Summers (1991, pp. 129-130) 
argues th a t “formal econometric work, where elaborate technique is used to  apply 
theory to  da ta  or isolate the direction of causal relationships when they are not 
obvious a priori, v irtually always fails ... Successful empirical research has been 
characterised by attem pts to gauge the strength of associations ra ther than  to 
estim ate structura l param eters, verbal characterisations of how causal relations 
m ight operate ra ther than  explicit m athem atical models and the skillful use of
28The Lucas critique, in the context of dynamic optimisation models, is discussed in Chapter 
two (sections 2.7 and 2.8).
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carefully chosen natura l experiments rather than  sophisticated statistical tech­
nique to achieve identification”. To prove his claims, Summers (1991, p. 130) 
invites the  reader to “try  and identify a single instance in which a ‘deep struc­
tu ral param eter’ has been estim ated in a way th a t has affected the profession’s 
beliefs about the nature of preferences of production technologies or to  identify a 
meaningful hypothesis about economic behaviour th a t has fallen into disrepute be­
cause of a formal statistical te s t” . Sum m ers’ strong criticism of the statistical and 
econometric approach to finding economic tru ths reminds us of Cairnes’ strong 
position against the  m athem atical approach to economic analysis expressed 116 
years earlier: “So far as I can see, economic tru ths are not discoverable through 
the instrum entality  of m athem atics. If this view be unsound, there is at hand an 
easy means of refutation- the production of an economic tru th , not before known, 
which has been thus arrived at; but I am not aware tha t up to the present any 
such evidence has been furnished of the efficiency of the m athem atical m ethods” 
(Cairnes, 1875, preface).
At the other extrem e, there are approaches which strongly advocate the athe- 
oretical data-based m ethods in applied economic research, most outstanding are 
the m ethods of Sims and Hendry. Sims (1980) argues th a t proper identification of 
the structu ral equations is impossible. The estim ation of reduced forms by vector 
autoregression (VAR) is the most th a t an applied econom etrician can hope for 
in practice. According to Hendry’s approach (Hendry 1982), known as the Error 
Correction Models (ECMs), econometric models are created as approxim ations 
to an inherently unknown data-generating process which has to  m eet predeter­
mined design criteria. Economic theory, data  and measurem ent systems are used 
in designing the criteria. Although the closest of all the alternative m ethods to 
the Cowles Commission’s approach to applied econometric analysis is the Hendry 
m ethod, closing the gap between theory-based and data-based econom etric ap­
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proaches cannot be easily achieved. We will discuss this point further in Chapter 
2 where Sm ith and Pesaran’s emphasis on the role of economic theory in the 
unification of theory and empirical work as well as the debate in itia ted  by the 
Economic Journal on this topic (November 1995) are critically examined.
The Cowles Commission’s traditional strategy and the  Econom etric Society 
have opened a new avenue of research work in applied econometric analysis since 
the 1930s. This tradition is now under heavy attack by a num ber of rival ap­
proaches. The fact th a t the role of economic theory is not yet very clear in this 
debate has m ade the choice between competing strategies a difficult task for ap­
plied econometricians. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, despite all the ambiguities, 
the benefits resulting from this debate have shed more light on the Cowles Com­
m ission’s aim of unifying theory, data  and measurement. We can now see better. 
We can see further.
1.6 Econom ic A pplications o f O ptim al Control 
T heory as an Illustration
In this section we concentrate only on modern optim al control theory. Discussions 
on economic applications of classical control theory are presented in the next chap­
ter. The symbolic b irth  of m odern control theory is the publication of Bellm an’s 
Dynamic Programming (1957) and Pontryagin’s M aximum Principle (1955-59, its 
English translation in 1962) both developed largely by the requirem ents of space 
technology.
The emergence of optim al control theory as a new and powerful m athem atical 
tool in pure and applied m athem atics took place during the period when m ath ­
em atical economics had been firmly established. There were not, therefore, in 
contrast to one or two generations earlier, any real and strong objections or re­
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sistance to applications of advanced m athem atical methods in economic analysis. 
In fact, further m athem atization of economics and utilisation of highly involved 
m athem atical apparatus were warmly welcomed.29
In general, one can argue tha t the following could have been regarded as nec­
essary conditions for successful application of optim al control theory to  economic 
analysis.
i ) The availability of interested m athem aticians or control theorists to in­
troduce the nature and significance of this new branch of m athem atics to the 
com m unity of m athem atical economists.
ii) The knowledge about the appropriate areas for economic applications of 
optim al control theory.
in’) An understanding of the im portance and lim itations of such applications.
The fulfilment of the above three conditions could have produced a growth 
generating cycle in economic applications of optim al control theory.
Interestingly enough, the first condition was fulfilled by a m athem atician  who 
was one of the two inventors of optim al control theory, i.e. R ichard Bellman. In 
the preface to his Dynamic Programming (1957) he clearly explained the m ethod 
and its im portance to  economic analysis. After defining the subject m a tter of dy­
namic program m ing as m athem atical theory of multi-stage decision processes, he 
wrote as follows: “The point we wish to make is th a t ... in economic, industrial, 
scientific and even political spheres, we are continually surrounded by m ulti-stage 
decision processes ... Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the economist, indus­
trialist and engineer, the problems th a t have arisen in recent years in economic, 
industrial and engineering fields are too vast in portent and extent to be trea ted  
in the haphazard fashion th a t was permissible in a more leisurely bygone era ...
29Historically, it is interesting to note that the strong belief in contributions of mathematical 
methods to economics led Walras, 80 years before the emergence of control theory as a discipline, 
to predict the possibility of controlling an economic system. See, footnote number 13, above.
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W hether [multi-stage decision processes] arise in the study of optim al inventory 
or stock control, or in an input-output analysis of a complex of interdependent 
industries ... or the study of logistics or investment policies ... they possess certain 
common thorny features which stretch the confines of conventional m athem atical 
theory. It follows th a t new m ethods m ust be devised to  m eet the challenge of 
these new problem s and to a m athem atician nothing could be more pleased” .
Bellman is perhaps the first m athem atician who has viewed economics from a 
state-space point of view in system theory. In the second paragraph of the  preface 
to his D ynamic Programming he stated  the  following: “Let us suppose th a t we 
have a physical system  S  whose state  at any tim e t is specified by a vector p. If 
we are in an optim istic fram e of mind we can visualise the com ponents of p  to be 
quite definite quantities such as Cartesian coordinates, or position and m om entum  
coordinates ... or if we are considering an economic system, supply and dem and, 
or stockpile and production capacities” .
According to  Bellman, optim al control theory, in the sense of dynam ic pro­
gram m ing, is one of the best examples in which pure m athem atics has been devel­
oped in response to the real economic (as well as engineering or non-engineering 
) problems. Under such circumstances, one should expect real contributions from 
applications of optim al control theory to  economics. Bellman, as a m athem ati­
cian, had a clear idea of the potential applications of his m ethod to economics. He 
has taken as his audience the following five groups: m athem aticians, economists, 
statisticians, engineers and operations analysts. While he recom m ended chapters 
1,2,3 and 9 of his book to engineer audiences, chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 were 
recom mended to  economists (ibid, preface, p. xv ii). However, he has forgotten 
to recom m end chapter 7 to economists also since this chapter, entitled  Bottleneck 
Problems, is concerned w ith a m ulti-stage production process involving auto, steel
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and tool industries.
Despite B ellm an’s efforts to  signify the im portance and relevance of dynam ic 
program m ing in solving economic decision problems, his m ethod did not a ttrac t 
the atten tion  of the community of economists at the time. This was m ainly due 
to  the  nature of early developments in dynamic programm ing which was heavily 
dependent on com putational algorithms and digital computers: “If we do not wish 
to suffer the usual atrophy of armchair philosophers, we m ust occasionally roll up 
our sleeves and do some spade-work. W ith the aid of dynam ic program m ing and 
digital com puters we can m ethodically engage in m athem atical experim entations” 
[Bellman and Dreyfus (1962), p. ix]. This reminds us of Cournot (1838, p. 1) 
who wrote nearly 125 years before Bellman about the im portance of m athem atical 
experim entations in economic reasoning: “ ... now the dem and is for so-called 
‘positive’ m a tte r ... such as will throw the light of experience on the  im portant 
questions which are being agitated before the country” .
Bellm an’s conceptualisation of economic applications of dynam ic program ­
ming fits much be tte r to an econometric model designed for com puting optim al 
economic policies rather than to m athem atical models aim ed at discovering the 
nature and characteristics of optim al policies. The inherent com putational diffi­
culties associated with the dynamic programming known as the curse o f dimen­
sionality together w ith the fact th a t econometric models of any practical value are 
usually m edium  to large scale, explain the fact th a t why the dynam ic program ­
ming did not receive a warm welcome during the early stages of economic appli­
cations of optim al control theory. Despite Bellm an’s emphasis on the  usefulness 
of the dynam ic programm ing in economic analysis, the above factors persuaded 
control theorists and economists to examine closely the alternative but m athe­
m atically more sophisticated m ethod of Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle which
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is the m odern version of the classical calculus of variations.
Applications of the classical calculus of variations to problems of economic 
depreciation [Hotelling (1925)], to economic studies in general [Evans (1928)], 
to  optim al savings [Ramsey (1928)] and to  the development of early models of 
economic growth [Solow (1956) and Swan (1956)] provided an appropriate back­
ground for a successful application of Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle to optim al 
economic growth. M athem atical potentials of the m axim um  principle in iden­
tifying the properties of optim al paths of state and control variables m ade this 
m ethod a high powered machinery in deriving the optim ality conditions in models 
of economic growth.
To dem onstrate the perfect com patibility of the m axim um  principle to  theories 
of optim al growth, Dorfman (1969) stated  th a t “optim al control theory is formally 
identical w ith capital theory, and th a t its main insights can be attained  by strictly 
economic reasoning” . To justify  this, Dorfman started  with a well-known problem 
in capital theory, i.e. a firm th a t wishes to maximise its to ta l profit over some 
period of tim e w ith a given initial stock of capital. The ra te  of profit per unit of 
tim e depends on the initial condition and the decision taken by the  firm. Max­
im ization of the to tal profit earned from initial date to some term inal date will 
be a function of the entire tim e path  of decision variables. Although the  firm is 
almost free to choose the tim e path  of policy variables it cannot arbitrarily  select 
the am ount of capital at each period since the la tter is a function of the policies 
taken earlier. The firm is thus facing a policy formulation problem  in a dynam ic 
context whose solution is best provided by the m axim um  principle. Using this 
economic example, Dorfman obtained the necessary optim ality  conditions in the 
m axim um  principle, which provided an interesting economic in terpreta tion  of op­
tim al control theory. This provides an excellent example of the real economic
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contribution of the  m axim um  principle.
As we will show in Chapter 2, optim al growth theory, as a discipline in m ath ­
em atical economics, could not have been developed w ithout direct applications 
of the m axim um  principle. This clearly dem onstrates the fact th a t optim al con­
trol as a mathematical method has significantly contributed to economic analysis. 
Moreover, we will show in Chapter 3 how the applications of the dynam ic program ­
ming and the  m axim um  principle can contribute to the literatu re  on consumer 
behaviour under liquidity constraints.
1,6.1 L im ita tion s o f E conom ic A p p lica tion s o f O p tim al 
C ontrol T h eory
The nature of economic problems whose solutions demand the application of op­
tim al control theory identifies the lim itations of such applications. As discussed 
earlier, whenever the solution of an economic problem motivates a researcher to 
find an appropriate m athem atical m ethod, results of value m ight be expected, 
but not vice-versa. Engineering optim al control theory has been developed in 
the 1950’s largely by the requirements of space technology. The potentiality  of 
this m ethod for physical systems and particularly for autom ation is remarkable. 
The fact th a t the  advances in optim al control theory have been m otivated by 
autom atic control of physical systems identifies the underlying lim itations in its 
economic applications.
If we broadly classify the literature in this field into two categories of m athe­
m atical and engineering optim al control theory, the potential economic contribu­
tions are expected to come from the former. Even centrally planned economies, 
who might theoretically adm it strict central economic controls, cannot rely on 
autom atic economic controls since the underlying economic models are in sharp 
contrast to  physical systems. An exam ination of the literature  in economic ap­
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plications of optim al control indicates th a t the engineering approach to  economic 
applications of optim al control aiming at autom atic design and com putations of 
optim al trajectories have been progressively replaced by m athem atical approach 
which aims at identifying economic optim ality conditions. Let us exam ine this 
point further.
The decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s were the active periods in applications of 
optim al control to models of optim al growth as well as to  econometric models. The 
author has reported elsewhere [Derakhshan (1978)] tha t during these two decades 
the num ber of papers on economic applications of optim al control, published 
mainly in engineering journals, were 347 as compared with 400 such papers which 
appeared in different journals in economics. The aim of a considerable num ber of 
papers published in engineering journals was to use the idea of au tom atic control 
in modelling industries (or the macroeconomy) in order to com pute the  optim al 
sta te  and control trajectories. This situation has considerably changed during the 
past decade.
Many leading engineering journals such as Automatica, IE E E  Transactions 
on Autom atic Control, International Journal o f Control, International Journal 
o f System s Sciences, S IA M  Journal o f Control, among the 38 engineering and 
m athem atical journals reviewed in Derakhshan (1978), once very active in pub­
lishing papers on economic applications of control theory, have either completely 
abandoned or rarely publish such work. Moreover, a careful inspection of pa­
pers published in the Journal o f Economic Dynamics and Control,30 the new
30In 1978, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) decided to discontinue pub­
lications of the Annals of Economic and Social Measurement which usually published selected 
papers from conferences and annual meetings on economic applications of optimal control the­
ory. Shortly thereafter, North-Holland Publishing Company agreed to the establishment of the 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control to continue the publication of papers on economic 
applications of optimal control in a wider context. At the same time, the Society for Economic 
Dynamics and Control was organised to promote and sponsor international conferences and 
research projects in this field. The first issue of this journal appeared in February 1979.
72
specialised journal on theoretical and applied work on economic applications of 
control theory, reveals the fact th a t almost all the research work published in 
this journal during the last ten years have been more theoretical in natu re w ith 
no serious attem pts in com putations of optim al economic trajectories w ithin an 
autom atic control framework.
1.7 T he Logic o f A bstraction: The Origin o f  Lim ­
itations in M athem atization  o f E conom ics and  
its Im plications for O ptim al C ontrol A pplica­
tions
We discussed in sections 1.4.2 and 1.6.1 the lim itations of m athem atical economics 
in general and economic applications of optim al control theory as an example. In 
this section, we examine the origin and nature of such lim itations. Recall tha t 
M arshall (1890) warned economists of the danger of an unbalanced trea tm ent of 
economic issues by a m athem atical approach on the ground th a t those economic 
elements being m ost emphasized by m athem atical economists which usually led 
themselves more easily to m athem atical methods (see section 1.4.2). M arshall’s 
recom m endation is rather vague and cannot constitute a program m e of achieving 
higher degrees of precision in theorization of m athem atical economics. A question 
of prim e theoretical im portance is what economists should do to avoid this dan­
ger? We can put this question alternatively as follows: If economic applications 
of engineering control theory have not been promising due to the  underlying dif­
ferences between physical and economic systems, why have m athem atical theories 
of control for social systems in general and for economic system s in particular not 
yet been developed? To what extent this has been due to the  fact th a t m ath ­
em aticians were not well acquainted with social or economic sciences or social 
scientists were not good m athem aticians? Our analysis in previous sections im ­
plies th a t none of these can provide a satisfactory answer. It seems th a t the logic
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of abstraction, in methodology of economic theorization m ust play the key role.
To avoid unnecessary involvements in methodological issues which are beyond 
the scope of present work, we confine the argum ent to very simple heuristic as­
sertions. W ithout going into details of defining m athem atical reasoning, it is 
easy to  see th a t m athem atical machinery is a system of logical reasoning based 
on abstract notions. No single topic in economics can be trea ted  m athem atically 
w ithout first being reduced to abstract and narrow concepts and then being fed 
into the  m athem atical machinery in order to infer necessary logical conclusions. 
Since economic input to m athem atical machinery is abstract, the  output will also 
become abstract.
U nder w hat conditions can one obtain economic results of any significant value 
using m athem atical reasoning? To answer this question, I first assume th a t the 
value of a result depends on its explanatory power: either being useful in explain­
ing some other unknown theoretical economic facts, or being able to explain a real 
world economic observation. The former is a contribution to pure or m athem atical 
economics and the la tte r constitutes contributions to applied economics.
An exam ination of the classical work on m athem atical economics (Cournot, 
Jevons, Walras and Pareto), reveals the fact th a t their u ltim ate goals were to 
discover the dynamics of “pure economics55. However, they had some reservations 
on the unconstrained advances in pure or m athem atical economics. If one favours 
unbounded developments in m athem atical economics, as m any of the contem po­
rary m athem atical economists do, there would be endlessly fascinating theoretical 
journeys in m athem atical economics w ith no necessarily direct references to real 
world economic issues. An inspection of articles published in the specialised Jour­
nal o f Mathematical Economics m ight support this hypothesis.
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The m ain task is, therefore, to identify the conditions under which m athem a- 
tization of economics can lead to results of significant value in explaining real 
world economic issues. We claim th a t the methodology employed in abstracting 
notions from real world economic life can, in principle, provide an answer. We 
know th a t a real economic system cannot be studied in isolation of the related 
historical, political, sociological and cultural systems. The a ttem pts by Cournot, 
Jevons and W alras in creating m athem atical economics to study economics in iso­
lation of other related systems, were the first m ajor move in a wrong direction in 
the process of abstraction. Further, abstractions within m athem atical economics, 
together w ith m ore simplified assumptions which were m ade to facilitate the ap­
plications of more advanced m athem atical methods, have produced the existing 
rich and yet abstract, literature in m athem atical economics.
The origin of this unfortunate outcome lies in the erroneous m ethod of abstrac­
tion employed by classical m athem atical economists. Their m ethod of abstraction 
was nothing more than a simple division of multi-dimensional political economy 
into different disciplines: “Political economy is in a chaotic sta te  at present, be­
cause there is need for subdividing a too extensive sphere of knowledge” [Jevons 
(1871), p. 20]. It seems unlikely th a t the results obtained from the behaviour of 
a fragm ented part of a multi-dimensional political economy can tru ly  represent 
the behaviour of the system as a whole. The results obtained in one-dimensional 
m athem atical economics are valid only within its own domain and cannot by itself 
provide results of value for a real multi-dimensional world of economic life. The 
following example might clarify this point.
Consider a sphere in a three dimensional space. One can study this object 
by examining the properties of its different fragmented parts. Evidently, the 
results obtained in this way cannot provide an understanding of the properties
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of the  sphere. A lternatively, one can reduce, or project, the sphere on each of 
the three two-dimensional planes. The resulting circles are the reduced versions 
of the sphere; and from the properties of circles one can infer the properties of 
sphere as long as the interrelationships among projected circles from one hand 
and the relationship between projected circles and the sphere on the  other hand 
are known. A proper m ethod of abstraction should therefore reduce complexities 
while preserving the underlying properties of relations.
W hat would be the implications of the above argum ent for m athem atical eco­
nomics in general and optim al control applications in particular? In the absence 
of a well-defined m ethod of abstraction, one can claim th a t applications of m ath­
em atical m ethods to economic analysis are most promising in those areas where 
the abstract economic notions, to be used in m athem atical machinery, consti­
tu te  close approxim ations to economic realities. In these cases, most likely to 
be found in technical questions in microeconomics, the effects of the underly­
ing non-economical factors, such as political, cultural, and historical elements, 
are minimal. Formulations of efficient resource allocation for which Kantorovich 
(1939) developed the m ethod of linear programming, or the in ter-industry  models 
for which Leontief (1941) invented the input-output technique, fall w ithin this 
category. This explains why these examples are always referred to as successful 
applications of m athem atics to economics.
Using the above criterion, one can argue tha t the applications of optim al con­
trol theory to economic policy formulations, particularly a t macro-level, cannot be 
very successful. This is due to the nature of policy oriented econom etric models 
as well as the properties of optim al control methods. A useful macro-econometric 
model is usually a non-linear medium  to large scale model, whereas optim al con­
trol m ethods, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, are well developed for linear
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models of a small size. Moreover, analytical solutions in linear systems exist for 
optim al control paths when the objective function is quadratic, whereas this class 
of objective functions does not satisfactorily explain economic realities since it 
fails to  differentiate positive and negative deviations from economic targets. De­
spite the current validity of these objections, one can tru ly  argue th a t these are 
technical problems in nature and advances in econometric modelling and control 
techniques are expected to relax them  in due course.
There remains another more serious technical barrier to the applications of 
optim al control theory to economic policy formulations. Recall th a t due to the 
specification errors and errors of approximations inherent in econometric models, 
simulations with these models are usually adjusted by experts5 guess and round 
table discussions before practical policy formulations are recommended. We will 
discuss in C hapter 2 th a t the nature of autom atic simulations and forecasting 
in feedback loops in optim al control algorithms do not usually provide an op­
portunity  for experts5 guesses or qualitative analysis which lead to quantitative 
adjustm ents. This explains why the high optim ism  in building up optim al macro­
econometric control models in the early 1970’s has now significantly decreased. In 
fact, the few research work done since the 19705s on optim al control applications 
in macro-econometric models have been carried out mainly for an exam ination of 
properties of models and the relations between alternative policy objectives rather 
than  for deriving policy recom m endations.31
Problem s associated with the rational expectations in consumers’ as well as 
producers’ behaviour will add a new dimension of difficulties in economic appli­
31 For the case of UK, see Melliss (1984) who has reported some experiments with optimal 
control on the Treasury Model. Work is also done by PROPE team (Programme of Research into 
Optimal Policy Evaluation) at Imperial College. For example, see Currie and Karakitsos (1981) 
and Brooks, Henry and Karakitsos (1983) on NIESR model. See, also Artis and Karakitsos 
(1982) and Henry, Karakitsos and Savage (1982). Van Der Pleog (1982) reports his control 
experiments with Cambridge growth project model.
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cations of optim al control theory.32 Moreover, if we take into account th a t the 
underlying econometric model cannot capture, due to the nature of abstractions 
in m athem atical economics, the effects of existing qualitative feedbacks between 
G overnm ent’s structure , producers, consumers, financial institutions, legal sys­
tem s, etc., w ithin a socio-cultural and political environm ent, then the  approxima- 
tion error in the underlying m athem atical model becomes so severe which makes 
the num erical optim ization totally  unreliable.
On the basis of s tructura l errors of approximations in m athem atical modelling 
of the economy and the  nature of optim al control m ethods discussed above, the 
real contributions of optim al control theory in economic analysis are expected to 
be in m athem atical economics where it can freely use abstract notions in order 
to discover the behavioural optim ality conditions. By applying optim al control 
theory to determ inistic and stochastic consumption behaviour of an individual 
under liquidity constraints, I have shown in C hapter 3 th a t significant new results 
on optim al behaviour of consumers can be derived. And, finally, applications of 
optim al control theory to  dynam ic Leontief models in C hapter 4 have produced 
new interesting results which further support the hypothesis developed in this 
chapter.
1.8 Sum m ary and C oncluding R em arks
The analysis of the origin and lim itations of m athem atical economics can illumi­
nate the nature and boundaries of economic applications of optim al control. An 
historical approach has been adopted in this chapter while a ttem pts are m ade to 
avoid methodological issues.
The nature and lim itations of m athem atical economics are exam ined in term s
32See Chapter 2, Sections 2.8 and 2.9.
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of what I have classified as classical and modern m athem atical economics. The 
origin and sources of classical m athem atical economics are studied in the light 
of the following questions: 1) W hy none of the work on m athem atical economics 
published before Cournot was given the distinction of being the  beginning of 
m athem atical economics? 2) W hy C ournot’s work was to tally  forgotten for over 
30 years until Jevons (1871) revived it? 3) W hy Jevons greatly esteem ed C ournot’s 
contribution while not being able to understand him thoroughly? 4) W hy m asters 
of classical economics did not become interested in m athem atical economics? To 
answer these questions, four hypotheses are critically exam ined before I present 
my own hypothesis.
D ebreu’s incidentality hypothesis of early developments in m athem atical eco­
nomics, which has been shared by some economic historians like Robertson (1949), 
Theocharis (1983) and Gherity (1990), is found to be inadequate since it has failed 
to be consistent w ith the views clearly expressed by pioneers of classical m ath­
em atical economics such as Cournot, Jevons and Walras. Moreover, D ebreu’s 
argum entation in supporting his hypothesis has happened to  include a num ber of 
erroneous historical records.
As regards why the early developments in m athem atical economics were totally 
ignored by classical economists, Cournot’s hypothesis (1838), which is supported 
by Fisher (1891), is examined. According to this hypothesis there are two pos­
sible explanations: a) erroneous presentations of m athem atical economics and b) 
the poor m athem atical knowledge among classical economists. We have found 
evidence contrary to this hypothesis.
W alras’s hypothesis, i.e. the “narrowness of ideas” , which gave much em pha­
sis on inductive reasoning in economics cannot be accepted on the ground th a t 
the revival of m athem atical economics by Jevons, Walras and Pareto  was not
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accompanied, by any serious interest in measurements and experim entations in 
economic analysis. We have shown th a t W alras’s own work can be regarded as 
contributions to deductive reasoning with the effect of widening the  gap between 
pure theorization and economic experim entation.
According to  the hypothesis of von Neumann and M orgenstern (1944), the 
“unfavourable circum stances” resulting from the following factors produced the 
general lack of interest on m athem atical economics among classical economists: 
the vagueness of basic economic concepts; the inadequate em pirical economic 
facts; and lim itations in m athem atical trea tm ent of hum an behaviour. Despite the 
fact th a t these factors are individually true, the lack of interest in m athem atical 
economics has had nothing to do w ith the combination of these factors. On 
the contrary, it is shown th a t von Neumann and M orgenstern’s argum ent will 
direct us to the conclusion th a t real developments in m athem atical economics 
necessarily require discoveries of new m athem atical m ethods for social sciences; 
and until then the science of economics can provide no recom m endation for factual 
economic managem ent.
Our hypothesis of one-dimensionalisation of economic analysis is discussed 
in section 1.2.5. According to this hypothesis, classical m athem atical economics 
emerged in response to a growing desire for one-dimensionalisation of economic 
analysis which was equivalent to reduction of classical political economy to a 
mechanical economic science. Advances in classical and M arxian economics had 
produced a sta te  of m ulti-dim ensionality in economic analysis in which economic 
issues were studied in connection with historical, political, social, and legal sys­
tems. “Mechanical-scientific” approach resulting from the rapid advances in phys­
ical sciences during the 19th century and the “non-political” approach resulting 
from reactions to rapid advances in M arxism are considered in this chapter to
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be the m ain in terrelated  responses to such environment of m ultidim ensionality in 
economic analysis.
In the analysis of m athem atical economics and the form ation of mechanical 
economic science, in section 1.2.5, we have examined the following two topics: 
the natu re of classical m athem atical economics, and m athem atical economics as 
a rem edy to m ulti-dimensional political economy. The argum ent in this section 
is carried out w ith direct reference to the work of Cournot, Jevons and Walras. 
It is shown th a t a successful diffusion of Jevons’s and W alras’s m athem atical 
economics necessarily required a revival of Cournot (1838) together w ith the 38 
work published on m athem atical economics before Cournot, i.e. during the period 
1711-1838 and the 62 such work published from Cournot to  Jevons. This could 
have established an army of supportive literature for the new discipline of m ath ­
em atical economics. It is not, therefore, surprising tha t Jevons praised Cournot 
w ithout fully understanding him.
M athem atical economics as a response to M arxian economics is another hy­
pothesis which I have exam ined in section 1.2.5. This hypothesis has emerged 
from the  chronological coincidence of proliferation of M arxian literatu re  and the 
emergence of m athem atical economics from one hand and the impassive and neg­
ative a ttitudes of pioneers of m athem atical economics towards contributions in 
M arxian economics. We have shown th a t the subdivisionism, so strongly ad­
vocated by Jevons and Walras, as a remedy to  the so-called “chaotic sta te  of 
m ulti-dim ensionality” in economics, was successful in making M arxian m achin­
ery futile or irrelevant w ithin the context of pure or m athem atical economics. 
By concentrating only on the economic dimension, and ignoring the feedback 
mechanism and structura l dependencies with political, historical, legal and social 
aspects, m athem atical economics necessarily depleted the real content of funda­
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m ental economic concepts and thus downgraded them  to abstract notions suitable 
for m athem atical m anipulation.
On the basis of argum ents presented in section 1.2.5, we have not been able to 
accept the hypothesis th a t m athem atical economics has emerged as a response to 
M arxism. However, the fact of the  m atter is th a t the structure and methodology 
of m athem atical economics made it possible to leave the whole body of M arxian 
economics to one side. This is exactly what Jevons and Walras and m ost of their 
disciples, have effectively done: despite having long discussions on sensitive issues 
like “value” , they were successful in managing their argum ents w ithout even a 
single reference to Marx or his work on this topic.
Having exam ined the nature and origin of classical m athem atical economics, 
we have then analysed the origin and formation of m odern m athem atical eco­
nomics in section 1.3, We could not identify a course of continual developments 
in m athem atical economics from the tim e of Pareto (1897) and M arshall (1890) to 
the 1930’s. Different individual contributions can be considered either as a ttem pts 
to reorganise and consolidate previous m athem atical trea tm ents of economics or 
to provide new and comprehensive reports on the significance of the already known 
results. Bowley, Evans and Wicksell are studied in this connection. It seems tha t 
during this period the community of economists had rem ained faithful to their 
non-m athem atical M arshallian type economic analysis.
According to Debreu (1986), among others, the publication of The Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour by von Neumann and M orgenstern in 1944 
marks the beginning of modern m athem atical economics since this book induced 
a new level of logical rigour in economic reasoning and form ulated, for the first 
tim e, a new m athem atical m ethod for economic analysis, i.e. the m athem atical 
theory of games of strategy. We have refuted this hypothesis in section 1.3.1.
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We have proposed the hypothesis of coordinated research programmes as the 
origin of m odern m athem atical economics. In section 1.3.2 we have first estab­
lished the  absence of any coordinated research work in m athem atical economics 
prior to  the 1930’s. I have claimed th a t the creation of the Econometric Society 
on December 29, 1930 and the Cowles Commission fo r Research in Economics in 
1932, w ith the prim e objectives of unifying economic theory, m athem atical analy­
sis, and statistics and prom oting and encouraging research work in this direction, 
have m arked the beginning of modern m athem atical economics. It was clearly 
recognised by the Econometric Society tha t the m utual penetration of quanti­
ta tive economic theory and statistical observations, can profoundly change the 
tradition of economic theorization in classical m athem atical economics.
To comprehend the salient features of m odern m athem atical economics, a com­
parative analysis of classical and modern m athem atical economics is presented in 
section 1.4. In this regard, the a ttitudes of m athem atical economists towards 
non-m athem atical economists and their perceptions on the lim itations of m ath- 
em atization of economics are examined.
An exam ination of classical contributions in m athem atical economics reveals 
the fact th a t classical m athem atical economists had, more or less, an inimical a tti­
tude towards non-m athem atical classical economists. On the other hand, masters 
of classical political economy usually expressed their scepticism on m athem ati­
cal economics on the ground tha t either economic tru ths cannot be discovered 
through the instrum entality  of m athem atics, or the subject m a tte r of m athem ati­
cal economics does not possess an independent value of its own for solving factual 
economic issues. However, this feature is shown to  be basically absent among con­
tem porary m athem atical economists. In fact, m athem atical economics no longer 
fights for the right to live, it dictates the survival conditions of other disciplines
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in economic theorization.
We have discussed in section 1.4.2 th a t classical m athem atical economists gen­
erally accepted the  view th a t to be explicitly m athem atical does not ensure the 
a tta inm ent of economic tru ths; only those m athem atical applications are admissi­
ble which produce results of value. Despite the ambiguity of the  term  “results of 
value” , we have shown a wide range of diversities among classical m athem atical 
and non-m athem atical economists on the concepts of “lim itations” and “results 
of value” in economic applications of m athem atical m ethods.
In contrast to M arshall’s view th a t m athem atics is not an engine of inquiry 
bu t is only a short-hand language, we have established in section 1.4.2 th a t m ath ­
em atics has proved to be an engine of inquiry in modern m athem atical economics 
since there are economic questions which can only be attended by specific m ath ­
em atical methods. We have tried in this section to identify the conditions under 
which m athem atical methods can really contribute to economic analysis. Some 
w riters, like Debreu, has exaggerated the contributions of m athem atical m ethods 
to economics to the extent th a t contributions of economics to  m athem atics have 
also been regarded as significant. We have shown th a t D ebreu’s hypothesis can 
be refuted.
An exam ination of the research work during the past 65 years reveals the fact 
th a t the efforts of the Econometric Society and the Cowles Commission to estab­
lish a successful partnership between economic theory, m athem atical analysis and 
statistical m ethods have not been very successful. The gap between m athem at­
ical theories and statistical representations of the real world economic problems 
is still wide. Section 1.5 examines the underlying factors in the failure of design­
ing a m athem atical model which relates theoretical concepts to  their associated 
observable counterparts. It is shown th a t when an econometric model is rejected
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by historical data , it is difficult to identify whether the failure is attribu tab le 
to the inherent inconsistency of the core theoretical model or to  the auxiliary 
assumptions.
Section 1.5.1 examines the emergence of alternative strategies, i.e. theory- 
based and data-based econometric approaches, to the Cowles Commission’s tra ­
ditional approach to economic modelling. The relationship between theory and 
observation is further discussed in C hapter 2 (section 2.5) where Sm ith and Pe- 
saran’s emphasis on the role of economic theory in unification of theory and em­
pirical work as well as the debate in itia ted  by the Economic Journal on this 
issue are critically studied. Section 1.5.1 concludes th a t the Cowles Commission’s 
traditional strategy has opened a new avenue of research work in applied econo­
m etric analysis since the  1930’s. The ambiguities of the role of economic theory 
in the relationship between theory and observation has m ade the  choice between 
the com peting strategies a difficult task for applied econometricians. However, 
the Cowles Commission’s approach has significantly benefited from the  ongoing 
debate on alternative strategies.
The analysis of the origin and lim itations of m athem atical economics presented 
in sections 1.2 to 1.4 and the problems associated with the development of the re­
lationship between m athem atical economics and econometrics discussed in section 
1.5 constitu te the  analytical framework for our discussion in section 1.6 on eco­
nomic applications of optim al control theory as a m athem atical m ethod. We have 
shown in this section th a t all the possible conducive factors in such applications 
were historically available. By the late 1950’s and early 1960’s m odern m athem at­
ical economics was firmly established in the community of economists and further 
m athem atization of economics and utilisation of more advanced m athem atical 
techniques were generally recommended. Bellman himself explained the relevance
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and significance of his dynamic programm ing applications to  economic analysis 
when he announced his powerful optim al control m ethod to  the  com m unity of 
m athem aticians and control theorists.
Advances in theoretical economic growth in the 1950’s and the  com patibility of 
growth models w ith optim al control applications made models of economic growth 
an appropriate field of economic control applications. It is shown in section 1.5 
th a t the weakness and shortcomings of the dynamic programm ing applications to 
economic growth models in the 1960’s and 1970’s do not follow from theoretical 
or conceptual lim itations; the inherent com putational difficulties associated with 
the dynam ic programm ing explains such partial failures. We have shown th a t 
Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle was proved to be more useful in identifying the 
properties of optim al trajectories in growth models. As we will discuss in C hapter 
2, contributions of Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle in the form ation of optim al 
economic growth theory is profoundly significant. This dem onstrates the real 
contribution of optim al control as a mathematical method in advancing economic 
analysis.
Lim itations of economic applications of optim al control theory as a m athe­
m atical m ethod is presented in section 1.6.1. We have argued th a t whenever the 
solution of an economic problem has m otivated a researcher to find an appropri­
ate m athem atical m ethod, useful results would have been expected. The fact th a t 
advances in optim al control theory have been m otivated by autom atic control of 
physical systems identifies the underlying lim itations in its economic applications. 
We have dem onstrated th a t the engineering approach to economic applications of 
optim al control aiming at autom atic design and com putations of optim al tra jec­
tories have been progressively replaced by the mathematical approach which aims 
at identifying economic optim ality conditions.
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It is argued in section 1.7 tha t the origin of partial failure in economic appli­
cations of optim al control theory lies in the erroneous m ethod of abstraction in 
m athem atical economics. Economic systems are more complex than  physical sys­
tem s since they are inter-related to social, historical, legal and political systems. 
Since m athem atical machinery is a system of logical reasoning based on abstract 
notions, any applications of optim al control theory requires the abstract concepts 
derived bo th  from economic models to be controlled and from the objective func­
tions to  be maximised. A proper m ethod of abstraction should, therefore, reduce 
complexities while preserving the underlying properties of relations between dif­
ferent subsystems. In the absence of a m athem atical m ethod ensuring the  above 
criterion, we have shown in section 1.7 th a t the applications of optim al control 
theory to  economic policy formulations are most promising in those areas where 
the abstract economic notions, to  be used in m athem atical machinery, constitute 
close approxim ations to  economic realities.
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Chapter Two
Control Theory and Economic Policy 
Optimisation: Developments, 
Challenges and Prospects
2.1 Introduction
On 18 July 1951, an informal evening session took place during the Conference 
on A utom atic Control at the College of Aeronautics, Cranfield. The purpose of 
this session was to bring to  the attention of the conference the  analogy between 
problems arising in stabilising an economic system and those of physical systems; 
w ith the im plication tha t communities of economists and engineers could bene­
fit from their respective specialisations [see Tustin(1952)]. Richard Stone from 
Cambridge opened the session with a lecture in which he referred to  the use 
of electrical analogues in interpreting Leontief transaction m atrices and demon­
strated  the sim ilarity of Kirchhoff’s first law to the accountancy relationships for 
a basic unit. Tustin, Professor of electrical engineering at the University of Birm ­
ingham, showed how dynam ic economic models being used by econometricians 
corresponded precisely with the engineer’s scheme o f dependence. He in terpreted 
the Keynesian economic system  in term s of a closed sequence w ith the m ultiplier 
relationship as the effect of a feedback. The session concluded th a t economists 
might profit from the work of control engineers in making an economic system 
work as a regulator to m aintain full employment w ithout inflation; and th a t the 
cooperation of control engineers and economists would be both  practical and use­
ful.
Twenty-seven years later (1951-1978) and after the publication of about 1400 
research work on applications of systems and control theory to economic analysis 
[see D erakhshan (1978)], the Committee on Policy Optimization  chaired by Pro­
fessor Ball, of the London Business School, published their report in M arch 1978, 
the purpose of which was
...to consider the present state o f the development o f optimal con­
trol techniques as applied to macro-economic policy. To make rec­
ommendations concerning the feasibility and value o f applying these 
techniques within Her M ajesty’s Treasury.33
T he C om m ittee concluded th a t
the application o f optimal control to the analysis o f economic policy is 
feasible and, applied at working level to the generation o f simulations 
and as a means o f testing the properties o f economic models, it is 
likely to be o f value. We are not, however, able to say that this is the 
single most important priority in the development o f modelling and 
forecasting practice . 34
Developments of control theory applications to economic analysis thereafter, 
i.e. during the period of 1978-1996, has not refuted the prediction m ade by B all’s 
report bu t at the same tim e has opened new promising avenues of research work 
in this field resulting from advances in theoretical economics such as the  rational 
expectations hypothesis. Our objectives in this chapter are: z) to explain the 
evolution of the m ainstream  applications of control theory to economic policy 
optim ization and to examine its sources and the underlying factors at work in
33See Ball (1978), p. 1.
34See Ball (1978), p. 113.
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such developments; ii) to  identify the most successful areas of control theory 
applications in the field of economic policy optimization; and in )  to provide a basis 
for analyzing the lim itations in such applications and the prospects for further 
research. We will constrain our study to applications of control theory to economic 
modelling and policy optim ization processes.
Most definitions of economics share the idea th a t economic analysis deals w ith 
the allocation of given means for the optim um  satisfaction of given ends. In this 
sense, an economic system can be regarded as a closed system  w ith given means 
defined as a bounded control space and satisfaction represented by a performance 
criterion. From a m athem atical point of view, the m ethod of optim al control 
can, in principle, effectively solve this problem. More specifically, optim al growth 
theories as well as stabilisation policies possess the characteristics which make the 
application of optim al control theory more demanding. O ptim al growth theory 
is concerned with the optim al choice among alternative trajectories along which 
an economic system can be transform ed from a given initial position to  a desired 
sta te  a t the end of a specified (or unspecified) horizon, where each trajectory  
is generated by applying a set of feasible controls. The theory of stabilisation 
policy deals w ith government actions in dampening unwanted fluctuations and 
at the same tim e driving an economic system along a desired path. According 
to modern optim al control theory, an admissible stabilising control should pos­
sess an optimising character. This has m ade the application of m odern optim al 
control theory to economic growth and planning even more productive, for an eco­
nomic stabilisation program m e with no optim ality condition m ay not guarantee 
an optim um  design for an economic system.
The prim e objective of this chapter is not to review the literature on economic 
applications of control theory. As m entioned above, our aim is to exam ine the
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incentives, achievements, failures and perspectives in cooperation between the two 
disciplines of control theory and optim al economic policy form ulation. We hope 
th a t the  m aterial presented in this chapter can basically answer the following ques­
tions: How did control engineering emerge as a m athem atical tool in the  domain 
of economic policy design? W hat role has been played by theoretical advances 
in economic optim ization in such developments? Has control theory been suc­
cessful in contributing towards the theoretical basis in optim al economic policies? 
W hat have been the m ost significant contributions of control theory applications 
in the theory and practice of economic policy optimization? Has control theory 
proved to be of any profound significance beyond being an engineering tool in 
the econom ist’s work-box? W hat have been the factors responsible for the failed 
integration of control engineering in the theory of economic policies despite 45 
years of continuous research work and cooperation between control theorists and 
economists? W here have the applications of control theory failed and why? Are 
these failures am enable to technical solutions or they are deeply rooted in more 
fundam ental theoretical differences existing between physical and economic sys­
tems? And finally, what are the most promising fields of fu ture research work in 
this area?
O ptim al control theory is basically a m athem atical construction whose capac­
ity to solve problems in economic policy optim ization depends on its m athem atical 
properties. Our methodology in analyzing the above m entioned questions is to 
exam ine the developmental pattern  of economic control applications with refer­
ence to the m athem atical structure of control theory. We try  to  identify those 
properties which have led (or will lead) to conceptual and practical contributions 
in economic policy optim isation.
Section 2 . 2  explains how, in the 1930’s and 1940’s, classical control theory was
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introduced to the communities of economists interested in policy recom mendations 
for economic stabilisation. In section 2.3, we discuss how the 1950’s advances in 
control theory, known as modern optimal control, solved many problems in optim al 
economic growth theory -an active and rapidly expanding branch of economics in 
the 1960’s. The contributions of control theory to econometrics in the form of 
estim ation and com putation of optim al economic state and control trajectories 
-a popular field of research in the 1970’s- are also discussed in section 2.3. In 
the la te  1970’s the  entire land of basic optim al control theory were known to the 
com munity of m athem atical economists and econometricians. In this regard, an 
exam ination of stochastic and adaptive control theory and their applications to 
economic policy optim isation is presented in section 2.4.
The question we posed in Chapter one (section 1.3.3) th a t what has been 
gained by the Cowles Commission’s programm e on unifying m athem atical eco­
nomic theory and m easurem ent system has received wide a tten tion  during the 
past 1 0  years especially with regard to the macro-econometric modelling and ad­
vances in dynam ic optim isation of the behaviour of a representative economic 
agent. Section 2.5 examines the core of the argument in this field. The analysis of 
the origin of the gap between data-instigated and theory-based econom etric m od­
els are also discussed and the role of dynamic optimising models together w ith a 
critical exam ination of the attem pts to  bridge this gap are examined. A critical 
analysis of Sm ith and Pesaran’s contribution, i.e. the im portance of economic 
theory in tightening the link between theory and empirical work in optimising 
models is also included in this section.
The rational expectations hypothesis which significantly changed the way in 
which economic policies were perceived, provided a strong criticism of the applica­
tion of control theory to economic policy optimisation. Economic agents respond
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usually not to the signals which are mechanically generated by the controller in 
an engineering type environment but to  their own expectations of economic sta te  
variables. Rational forward-looking expectations, in contrast to  the case where 
expectations are functions of the past behaviour, make serious difficulties in stan­
dard form ulation of policy optimisation. Policies which are believed to be optim al 
ad hoc will become sub-optim al upon realization. This problem  suggests the u til­
isation of dynam ic game theory between the controller and the agent. Section 2 . 6  
considers the role of the rational expectations, the Lucas critique and the policy 
ineffectiveness debate in economic applications of optimal control theory.
Since the standard  dynamic programming does not accom m odate the im pact 
of future policies on current values of sta te  variable, the principle of optim ality  
breaks down for optim al control of non-causal or forward-looking models in which 
current sta te  variables depend on the anticipated future states. Section 2.7 ex­
amines the very im portant problem of time-inconsistency in the optim al control 
of macro-econometric models with rational expectations. This section also con­
siders the im pact of reputation and the stochastic environment on the problem of 
inconsistency in dynamic choice. The interesting question of how can the recent 
developments in optim al control of macroeconomic models w ith forward-looking 
expectations contribute to  the practice of econometric model building is another 
topic which is discussed in section 2.7. And finally, section 2 . 8  provides a sum m ary 
and a brief concluding remarks.
2.2 T he Beginning: C lassical C ontrol T heory
and Econom ic Stabilisation
From a m athem atical point of view, the optim um  regulation of an economic sys­
tem  towards attain ing a desired objective falls within the dom ain of dynamic 
optim ization, for the solution implies choosing the best com bination of admissible
93
instrum ents and applying them  with the optim um  solutions of tim ing and dosage. 
In this regard, control theory can be considered as the m ost advanced available 
m ethod in optim ization of a system ’s behaviour. Our starting  point is to examine 
economic optim ization problems prior to  the classical and m odern control theory 
applications.
We might refer to Ramsey (1928) as the first significant work which has applied 
the classical Euler-Lagrange m ethod to  solve an economic optim ization problem. 
The question for Ramsey was how much of its income should a nation save? To 
answer this question a utility  function was assumed and the application of Euler- 
Lagrange m ethod produced the following simple rule: the ra te  of saving m ultiplied 
by the marginal u tility  of money should always be equal to the  am ount by which 
the to tal net ra te  of enjoyment of u tility  falls short of the  m axim um  possible 
ra te  of enjoyment. Further advances in economic optim isation followed by the 
realization th a t a given required commodity bill can be produced by more than 
one process. It is exactly this element of choice between different processes, by 
which a required output level can be achieved, th a t has dom inated the pa ttern  of 
development in economic optim ization problems.
The initial a ttem pts to form ulate the problem of choice in the dynamics of eco­
nomic production were A Model o f General Equilibrium  by von Neum ann (1938) 
and M athematical Methods in the Organizing and Planning o f Production by Kan­
torovich (1939). von Neumann considered a typical economic system  in which 
goods are produced not only from natural factors o f production, bu t in the first 
place, from each other. There may also be more technically possible processes 
of production than  goods. The problem for von Neumann was to  identify which 
processes will actually be used and which will not, i.e. being unprofitable. Solving 
such a problem  will lead to a system of inequalities whose unique solution is not
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evident. The m athem atical proof is possible only by means of a generalization of 
Brouwer’s Fixed-Point Theorem, i.e. by the use of fundam ental topological facts.
K antorovich form ulated a different problem but in the same context, i.e. 
achieving the highest possible production on the basis of the optim um  utilisation 
of the existing reserves of industry, m aterials, labour and equipm ents. Increasing 
the efficiency of an enterprise or of the whole branch of an industry, can well be 
achieved by optim ising production planning. The most im portant factor is consid­
ered to be the optim um  distribution of the machine work and the  best utilisation 
of raw m aterials, transportations and so on, which will lead to the form ulation 
of the  economic problem  as an extrem al problem in the field of m athem atical 
programm ing.
In the  1930’s, when the underlying theory of servo-mechanism in engineering 
was being established and when the discussions in term s of self-regulating systems 
and autom atic stabilisation were in fashion, some economists began to  study 
economic problem s, such as cyclical behaviour and oscillations, in the context 
of self-regulating systems. The work of Frisch (1933) and Kalecld (1935) fall in 
this category. Most writers in this era, for example Keynes (1936), concluded tha t 
there is no tendency inherent in a capitalist economic system to generate stability 
and full employment; thus a control action in the form of government economic 
policies was necessary.
The work of Goodwin (1951a,1951b), Cooper (1951), Simon (1952), Tustin 
(1952) and Phillips (1954) m ark the direct applications of classical control theory 
to economic analysis. Goodwin dem onstrated tha t a servo-mechanism system 
regulates its behaviour by its own behaviour in the light of its objective. This 
explains why, for example, a hum an being usually succeeds in a com plicated 
operation of picking up an object by minimising the distance between hand and
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object (a tracking problem ). The work of Goodwin (1951) is of special im portance 
as it is the earliest a ttem pt in which an error activated feedback is applied to the 
analysis of m arket behaviour and business cycles. The applicability of a servo­
m echanism to  the  theory of firm has been discussed by Cooper (1951). Simon 
(1952) studied very carefully the problem of controlling the ra te  of production 
on a single product in term s of servo-mechanism theory. He used the Laplace 
transform ation m ethod to examine the stability and the steady-state behaviour 
of his production control system. Tustin, who was an engineer, analysed the 
Keynesian model by control system theory and used the Nyquist criterion, Fourier 
analysis and Laplace transform ation from control theory to  analyse the  possibility 
of stabilising the economy.
The work of Phillips (1954) was also concerned with the stabilisation of a closed 
economy. The government was seen as the main stabiliser, and three types of sta­
bilisation policies were used. These policies, taken from control theory, were the 
proportional, integral and proportional plus integral techniques. He was specifi­
cally concerned w ith the question of to what extent government expenditures can 
be used as a controller to  drive the economy along a desired trajectory, and in 
particular, to offset a deficiency in private demand while avoiding undesired fluc­
tuations in output. Using the principles of servo-mechanism and feedback control 
theory, he dem onstrated th a t in the usual multiplier-accelerator model, the time- 
path  stability of the stabiliser (government expenditures in his example) differs 
for different types of economic policies. In Phillips’ analysis, the  full employment 
level of aggregate output is taken as the desired target, the deviations from which 
are penalised by public expenditures in the form of addition or subtraction of gov­
ernm ent dem and from aggregate private consumption and investm ent. Phillips’ 
work played an im portant role in presenting the concept of stability  from classical 
control theory to the community of economists interested in finding conditions
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under which unwanted oscillations in an economic system, like those existing in 
the great depression of 1933, could be avoided.
2.3 T he Early A pplications o f M odern C ontrol 
T heory to  O ptim al Econom ic Policies
W hilst contributing to economic stabilisation policies, control theory was itself 
on the way towards a great advancement. Problems of regulating and controlling 
physical systems received considerable attention from m athem aticians and control 
engineers following the World War II. Many ideas which had been developed in 
the eighteenth centuries by m athem aticians, such as Euler and Lagrange, which 
formed the underlying m athem atics now known as the calculus of variations, were 
used extensively to develop a system atic solution to the optim ization problem. 
Moreover, the discovery of Hamiltonian formulation of variational problem s in the 
nineteenth century proved to  be very helpful to control engineers in form ulating 
their problems.
The reorientation of the calculus of variations prom pted largely by the re­
quirem ents of space technology and the strong com petition between the US and 
the ex-USSR in the field of space engineering in the 1960’s. The work of Russian 
m athem atician Pontryagin and his associates which appeared in the 1955-59 and 
in an English translation in 1962, known as the maximum principle, was a m ajor 
breakthrough towards m odern control theory. Bellm an’s contributions (1953 and 
1957) to theories of m ulti-stage decision processes, known as the dynamic pro­
gramming, which is based on the appealing concept of the principle o f optimality, 
solved m any control and system optim ization problems in the late fifties and early 
sixties. These developments together with the advances in systems theory, par­
ticularly the state-space representations of systems [see Zadeh (1963)] and the 
related concepts of controllability and observability of systems, have established
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w hat is now known as m odern control theory.
In what follows, the application of modern optim al control to optim ality  con­
ditions in models of economic growth is presented in section 2.3.1. The inter­
action between engineering control theory and econometrics is studied is section 
2.3.2 where the contributions of control engineers as well as of control engineer­
ing institu tions to advance the applications of modern optim al control theory to 
economic policy optim isation are examined.
2.3.1 O p tim ality  C ond itions in  M odels o f  E conom ic G row th
The developments of theories of economic growth paved the  way for economic 
applications of optim al control. Historically, the revival of interest in growth 
theories can be traced back to the period of reconstruction efforts after the  Second 
World War as well as to the strong com petition between industrialised countries 
to a tta in  higher rates of economic growth. The formulation of highly aggregated 
models of economic growth reached its turning point in the work of Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956). These models were able to generate the com plete tim e path  of 
each variable in the model given their initial values. The saving ratio  s(t) and the 
ra te  of population growth 7 (t), played im portant roles in th e  dynamics of these 
models since solutions to tim e paths of other variables were dependent on their 
values. By the end of 1950’s it was realized th a t government policies can influence 
these param eters, thus generating different tim e paths for economic s ta te  variables 
corresponding to different values of s(t) and 7 (t). The question arose as to  what 
were the best or optim um  values of s(t)  and 7 (t) which could lead to  the  desired 
feasible trajectories?
An optim ality criterion was required to define the optim um  values of param ­
eters and the optim al trajectories. Soon it was agreed th a t the m axim ization of 
the integral of the utility  derived from consumption per capita can be used as an
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optim ality  criterion (or objective function). Thus
J =  /  U{[1 — s ( t) ] Y ( t) ,t}d t ,  (2 .1 )
J 0
where U is the u tility  derived from consumption and Y (t ) is income.
The equation of motion, or system dynamics, used within this framework was 
usually of the following structure,
K {t)  =  3 F [K (t)\ -  S K ( i ), (2.2)
where K (t)  is the  capital stock and £ is the rate of depreciation. Since output 
is assumed to be T (i)  — F[AT(t)], the objective function (2 .2 ) can be w ritten in 
term s of K (t)  and s(i) as follows,
J  =  /  */{[l -  s(i)]F[A"(i)]} dt. (2.3)
Generalization of equation (2 .1 ) is
J =  f T a (t)U [C (t)]dt, (2.4)Jo
where a  is a bounded non-negative and continuous real discounting factor and U 
is a concave real function.
Studies in capital theory in growth economics, which dom inated economic lit­
erature in the 1950’s, was formally regarded as a problem in the calculus of vari­
ations as early as the 1930’s [see Joan Robinson (1956)]. Applications of optim al 
control profoundly transform ed capital theory to the extent th a t “it rechristened
growth theory and has come to grips with numerous im portan t practical and
theoretical issues th a t previously could not even be form ulated” ,35
Since equations of motion in optim al growth theory were usually expressed 
in term s of differential equations, the m axim um  principle was regarded as the
35See Dorfman (1969), page 817.
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most efficient way of deriving the optim al conditions of tim e paths for economic 
sta te  and control variables. In the early 1960’s the com m unity of m athem at­
ical economists were familiar w ith Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle. W ith  the 
well-developed literatu re  in growth economics, the 1960’s was the  decade of appli­
cations of the m axim um  principle to theories of growth and stabilisation. W ithin 
this framework, the objectives of m ost research work in this period were to prove 
the existence of an optim al plan [Yaari (1964)], to provide economic in terpreta­
tion of the  m axim um  principle [see Dorfman (1969)] and a careful exam ination of 
optim ality  conditions in models of economic growth using control techniques [see, 
for example, Shell (1967), Burm eister and Dobell (1970) and Foley and Sidrauski
(1971)]. The analytical framework was usually the m axim ization of a u tility  func­
tion subject to  some constraints. For m athem atical conveniences, there were only 
a very lim ited num ber of control variables such as government investm ent expen­
ditures and the ra te  of interest. By applying Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle 
the optim al paths for sta te  variables were derived. For the m ost part, only the 
qualitative properties of these trajectories were analysed and no a ttem p ts at com­
putation of optim al trajectories were made. Phase-diagram  analysis was common 
and the planning horizon was taken to  be either finite or infinite.
Bellm an’s dynam ic program m ing which appeared in the 1950’s, did not strongly 
influence the com munity of m athem atical economists until the late 1960’s. This 
could have been partially due to the following two factors.
i ) In the 1950’s m athem atical economists were fully aware of Ram sey’s work 
and Ramsey-type models. The necessary conditions of optim ality, given by Pon­
tryagin’s m axim um  principle, was an ideal technique for generating the optim al 
paths of economic variables. However, in Ramsey-type models, optim al solutions 
were obtained by classical techniques of Euler-Lagrange equations. Pontryagin’s
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m axim um  principle, therefore, was considered as a straightforward and more ef­
fective technique for the analysis of optim al growth problems.
ii) The m ain objective of most m athem atical economists during this period 
was m athem atical formulations of economic optim ization problems as well as ana­
lyzing the properties of optim al paths of economic variables ra ther than  numerical 
solutions in the form of computing optim al trajectories. Pontryagin’s maxim um  
principle served be tte r towards achieving this objective as com pared w ith Bell­
m an’s dynam ic programm ing which was more oriented towards the  com putation 
of optim al control solutions.
The above argum ent might explain why the successful applications of the dy­
nam ic programm ing to the analysis of optim ality conditions in economic behaviour 
appeared rather late. The two earliest interesting work on economic applicabili­
ties of dynam ic programm ing were Simon (1956) and Radner (1967). The former 
proved the certainty equivalent control problem in optim al growth models with 
a quadratic objective function and linear dynamics, while the  la tte r successfully 
form ulated optim al economic growth in term s of the functional equation approach 
in the  dynam ic programming.
U ncertainties in optim al growth models make the com putations of optim al 
trajectories for non-linear models extrem ely complicated. Simon (1956) demon­
strated , for the first tim e, th a t in the case of a quadratic objective function and 
a linear model w ith uncertainty, the determ ination of optim al strategies becomes 
very simple. In this class of problems the “uncertain” fu ture values of variables 
can be replaced by their unconditional expectations, thus reducing the stochastic 
problem to a determ inistic one.
Using a welfare function, which measured the m axim um  to tal discounted util­
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ity th a t can be achieved starting from a given initial state of the economy, Radner 
(1967) dem onstrated the properties of its continuity and concavity. He studied 
this problem  for both  a finite and an infinite planning horizon and showed how 
the application of the dynamic programming is superior to  the m axim um  prin­
ciple w ith regard to the num ber of constraints involved. A lthough the basic 
shortcoming of the dynamic programm ing was its com putational difficulties when 
applied to large non-linear models, for models of small dimensions this technique 
could effectively trea t sta te  and control constraints. Randner used the concept 
of ‘production correspondence which gives, for each state of the  economy, a set of 
alternative states to which the  economy can move in the next period. This is ex­
actly the production possibilities of an economy expressed in term s of the dynamic 
program m ing formulations.
Samuelson (1969) and M erton (1969) can be considered as the m ost success­
ful early applications of the dynamic programming to optim um  economic policy 
making problems. Using a welfare function with discounted utility, Samuelson (for 
discrete case) and M erton (for continuous case) dem onstrated how the dynam ic 
program m ing can be utilised in determ ining the optimal consum ption behaviour 
of an individual who is facing a portfolio selection. Assuming W (t)  as to ta l wealth 
at tim e t  and C (t)  as consumption per unit of tim e at tim e t, M erton used the
following objective function and the equation of motion for the continuous case,
rp
J =  f  e -piU [C (t)]dt, (2.5)
Jo
C{t) =  rW (t)  -  W'(t), (2.6)
where r  is the exogenously given rate  of yield. Similar equations for discrete tim e 
models were developed by Samuelson, as follows,
J  = ' £ ( l  + p ) - ‘U (C l), (2.7)
t= 0
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and
Ci = W t -  f f t l .  (2.8
1 +  r
Using a recurrence functional equation, Samuelson derived the  optim ality  condi­
tion for portfolio selections.
The subsequent research work in the dynamic program m ing applications to 
models of economic growth in this decade were m ainly directed towards demon­
strating th a t the results obtained by the maximum principle applications were 
equally obtainable by applying the dynamic programming technique [see, for ex­
ample, Intriligator (1971)].
2.3 .2  E n gin eerin g  C ontrol T heory and E con om etrics
By th e  early 1970’s econometricians had started  to apply control techniques to 
more complex m ulti-sta te and m ulti-control economic systems. Soon it was fully 
understood th a t further developments in this area should go beyond the appli­
cations of the m axim um  principle or the dynamic programm ing to  simple deter­
m inistic linear econometric models. The objective of most econom etricians was 
to apply the recent advances in modern control theory, such as stochastic optim al 
control, optim al estim ation and Kalm an filters, adaptive controls and various com­
putational algorithm s such as conjugate gradient and Newton-Raphson m ethods, 
to  optim al economic trajectory  com putations.
W ith  their strong background in stochastic processes and estim ation methods 
and their experiences in working with relatively large systems of simultaneous 
equations, econometricians were expected to contribute profoundly to  the estim a­
tion and com putations of optim al economic trajectories in dynam ic optim ization 
of economic systems. Fortunately, the  following developments greatly assisted the 
com munity of econometricians towards these contributions.
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1. Contributions of Control Engineers and Control Theorists
A num ber of m odern control engineers and control theorists developed an interest 
in economic modelling, in general and econometrics, in particular. We s ta rt w ith 
Pindyck (1971). He provided a complete dem onstration of the application of 
discrete-tim e Pontryagin’s maxim um  principle in computing the optim al sta te  
and control trajectories for a small determ inistic linear model of the post-Korean 
US economy.
Pindyck’s work, originally his Ph.D thesis at M .I.T in 1971, which was then 
published in 1973, significantly influenced the direction of subsequent research 
work in econometric applications of optim al control theory. He trea ted  economic 
stabilisation policies as a tracking problem in optim al control theory in which the 
objective of optim ization was to  track the desired (nominal) sta te  and the desired 
control paths. The model included several basic macroeconomic sta te  variables 
such as consumption, investm ent, GNP, interest rate, price level, wages and un­
employment. The policy or control variables were the money supply, government 
spending and taxes. Fiscal policies were provided for through exogenous govern­
ment expenditures as well as surtax and the m onetary policy was realized in the 
money supply. By defining new state  variables to replace those with lags greater 
than  one period and adding their definitional equations to the model, he repre­
sented his model in state space form at before applying Pontryagin’s maxim um  
principle to obtain optimal economic strategies.
His model, in term s of linear difference equations and in sta te  space form at, 
is given by
Yt+1 — Yt = AYt +  BU t +  C Z U (2.9)
with the given initial condition Vo. Yt is an n-dimensional s ta te  vector at tim e t, Ut 
is an m-dimensional control vector and an r-dim ensional vector representing
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exogenous variables which, are known for all t but cannot be controlled by the 
optim ization process. A, B  and C  are the relevant matrices which identify the 
equation of m otion (2.9).
Let Y f  and U f stand for the desired or nominal sta te  and control vectors, 
respectively, th a t we wish to track. These were assumed to  be specified over 
the entire planning horizon. The question is to track the  desired sta te  and the 
desired control trajectories subject to a quadratic objective function, or cost func­
tion, sta ted  below and also subject to  a set of constraints imposed by the linear 
economic system  given by equation (2.9). The objective function is given by
j  =  \  E  p ;  -  Y*)'Q(Yt -  Y* ) +  (.Ut -  Uf)'R{Ut -  Uf)}, (2.10)
Z f = 0
where Q is an n  x n positive semi-definite m atrix  and R  is an m x m  positive 
definite m a trix . 36 Matrices Q and R  enable the policy-maker to  penalise the 
deviations of sta te  and control variables from their desired trajectories.
The problem is to  find an optim al control sequence {/7topi, i =  0 ,1, - - -, T1 — 1 } 
which minimises the objective function (2 .1 0 ) subject to the linear dynam ic system 
equation (2.9). Both Q and R  are usually diagonal m atrices and their elements 
give the relative costs of deviating from the nominal paths of each sta te  and con­
trol variables; for example, the cost of deviating from the desired unem ployment 
relative to  the cost of deviating from the desired value of inflation. Similarly, the 
elements of R  give the relative costs of deviating from the desired paths of control 
variables; for instance, the cost involved in m anipulating tax  rates as compared 
to th a t of the money supply. Q and R  can be time-varying which indicate the 
ranking variations of policy-makers on the relative im portance of deviations over 
time. There are a num ber of problems with quadratic objective functions , 37 but
36R  is positive definite because the optimal solution for state and control variables includes 
RT1.
37The very arbitrariness of weighting matrices can be regarded as the main shortcoming of
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their significance is the m athem atical property known as the certainty equivalence 
discussed earlier, th a t linear systems with quadratic perform ance functions pro­
duce control laws which are linear and thus com putationally tractable. Relying 
on this property, Pindyck did not consider the effects of additive random  term s 
in the optim ization process.
It can be shown38 th a t the optim al control law for the linear system  (2.9) with 
quadratic objective function (2.10), used by Pindyck, is as follows,
=  _ ( f l  +  B '§ t+ iB )~ xB '$ t+ i{I  +  A )Y t°pt+
(R + B'$t+lB)-1B'<l>t+lB R -1B'et+, -  R - l B'et+1-
(.R +  B'^n l B ) - l B'^t+l(BUf  +  CZt) +  Uf,  (2.11)
where Y°  and Uf are the optimal values of state variables and the desired values
of control variables. $  can be obtained from the so-called m atrix Riccati equation 
as follows,
=  Q +  ( /  4- A ) ' [ $ * + 1  -  § t+iB (R  +  B 'Q t+ iB y 'B 'Q t+ iK l  +  A), (2 .1 2 )
The values of 0  can be obtained from the following tracking equation,
©t = - ( /  + A )’[$t+1 -  $ i+iB(R + Bl$ t+1B)-1B'$t+1]BR-1B,e t+1+
(2.13)
objective functions in an economic control problem. It may be impossible to reduce the complex 
process of ranking economic priorities into a relatively straight-forward exercise of determining 
elements of weighting matrices. Moreover, there exists irreconcilable differences in opinions in 
political life which cannot directly be manifested in these matrices. For quadratic objective 
functions, however, the main shortcoming is that, these functions, as far as the penalization 
are concerned, cannot differentiate between the directions of deviations of optimal from desired 
values. Although such differentiation, in an engineering application, is not usually important, 
it is a decisive issue whether, for example, unemployment or inflation targets are over-or under­
reached. Despite the fact that nonquadratic objective functions are better alternatives in for­
mulating economic policies and priorities, theories and algorithms for this class of objective 
functions are not well-developed.
38See, for example, Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972).
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W ith the  boundary conditions
=  <9, (2-14)
and
©T =  - QYt , (2.15)
the values of $  and 0  can be com puted by solving the m atrix  Riccati equation 
(2.12) and the tracking equation (2.13) backward in time.
To sum m arise the optim al policy com putations in P indyck’s type model, we 
s ta rt by identifying matrices A, B  and C  in the equation of m otion and the 
weighting m atrices Q and R  in the objective function. Once the desired values 
of s ta te  and control variables, Ytd and U f, are known, the backward solutions
of equations (2.12) and (2.13), the m atrix  Riccati and the tracking equations,
together w ith the boundary conditions (2.14) and (2.15), will produce the values 
of <&t and Qt . Using the initial sta te  of the economy, Y0, we can com pute the 
optim al control for period 0, i.e. UoPt, from equation (2.11). Y °pt can be obtained 
from equation (2.9) using Uo>i. Use Y °pi in equation (2 .1 1 ) to  com pute Ufpt 
which, by using equation (2.9), gives . We can continue this process until the 
entire sequence of optim al policies t =  0 , 1 , - - -, T1 — 1 } are determ ined.
O ptim al s ta te  variables { Y ^ ,  t =  1 , 2 , - - - , T }  will accordingly be com puted 
from equation (2.9).
Pindyck performed several experiments using different objective functions with 
different weighting m atrices. Changing the elements of weighting m atrices pro­
vided more insight into the trade-offs inherent in policy formulations. Such ex­
perim ents dem onstrated th a t optim al control of economic models as a tracking 
problem is valuable both as a tool for policy planning and as a m ethod of analyzing 
the dynam ic properties of economic models.
Following Pindyck, a num ber of researchers w ith engineering and m athem ati­
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cal backgrounds worked on similar models. The earliest examples are Paryani
(1972) and Erickson and Norton (1973). The determ inistic economic control 
problem  in its general form, i.e. a non-linear dynamic economic model w ith a 
nonquadratic objective function has also been studied by a num ber of control en­
gineers. More specifically, a determ inistic non-linear economic control system  can 
be modelled as
Yt+1 = f[Y t ,U u t}.
The problem  is to find an optim al closed loop policy sequence of the form
U°*[Yu t], i  =  1 ,
which minimises the objective function
j = ^ m + i , u t , t] + p (Y T).
t=o
In this regard, the earliest control engineers who attem pted  this class of problems 
were Norman and Norman (1973) and Athans et al (1975).
Contributions of control engineers in applying stochastic control theory to  op­
tim um  economic policy design will be discussed in section (2.4). To com plete this 
section, we m ention th a t the following early contributions were quite influential 
in subsequent research work in this field: Upadhyay (1973) successfully applied 
adaptive control theory to P indyck’s model; Dyukalove (1975) analysed a num ber 
of interesting optim ality features in linear dynamic economic planning models; 
Kendrick (1976) and Tse (1975) significantly contributed to  stochastic and adap­
tive control of linear and non-linear economic models; and finally, Chow (1975) 
and Aoki (1976), the two well-known control theorists, applied a num ber of im por­
tan t concepts, techniques, and theories of modern determ inistic, stochastic and 
adaptive optim al control to economic analysis and profoundly contributed to this 
field.
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2. Contributions of Control Engineering Institutions
As early as the 1970’s, the well-known control engineering societies such as the 
Institu te  of Electrical and Electronic Engineers IE E E  and the International Fed­
eration of A utom atic Control IFAC', became interested in control of economic 
systems and included the relevant research work in their journals and confer­
ences. Examples of such conferences in the 1970’s include: the IE E E  Conferences 
on Decision and Control; Joint A utom atic Control Conferences; Conferences on 
Dynamic Modelling and Control of National Economies; and IE E E  Conferences 
on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. Although certain control engineering jour­
nals, such as IE E E  Transactions on Automatic Control, Autom atica ; International 
Journal o f System  Science; IE E E  Transactions on Systems, M an and Cybernet­
ics', Autom ation and Remote Control, were not widely enough read by economists, 
there is no doubt th a t the great many articles of high quality published in them  
during this decade have m ade a significant contribution in generating and en­
couraging interests among control engineers towards optim al control of economic 
system s .39
During the 1970’s, conferences organised by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research [see N B E R  (1972-76)], the Social Science Research Council (1972) and 
the USSR Academy of Sciences Central M athem atical Economics Institu te  (1971, 
1974), have all been particularly useful in fostering a hospitable environm ent for 
co-operation between control engineers and economists. Furtherm ore, the  pub­
lications of specialised journals such as Economic Computations and Economic 
Cybernetics Studies and Research and Journal o f Economic D ynamics and Con­
trol, in this period, have also been enriching.
39For a list of 347 such work during this period, see Derakhshan(1978).
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2.4 S tochastic  and A daptive Control A pplica­
tions to  E conom ic P olicy  O ptim isation
In previous sections, we discussed the early efforts of economists and control 
engineers to  apply determ inistic control theory to optimal economic policy for­
mulations. This section considers how stochastic and adaptive control theories 
were used to  form ulate the same problem.
2.4.1 S to ch a stic  C ontrol A p p lica tion s
The stochastic control trea tm ent of economic systems can be viewed in at least 
two different categories: economic models with uncertainties in their system ’s 
dynamics (equations of motion) and those which also contain m easurem ent er­
rors. Both categories might be represented by linear or non-linear systems with 
quadratic or nonquadratic objective functions.
Controlling a discrete-tim e linear system with i) uncertainties in its dynamics, 
i i ) the presence of m easurem ent errors and Hi) a quadratic objective function can 
be modelled as follows. Find a policy sequence {U°pt, t = 0 ,1 ,2 , • • •, T  — 1} to 
minimise
J  = E  [ ( Y T - Y ^ y S iY T - Y ^  + ^ i Y t - Y ^ Q ^ Y t - Y ^ T ^ i - U t Y M U t - U f ) } ,
t=0 f=0
(2.16)
subject to the linear stochastic model presented in the following sta te  space form at
Yt+1 = A Yt + BUt + iu (2-17)
and the m easurem ent subsystem,
Zt ~  DYt (2.18)
where Z t is j - dimensional observation vector, ( t and u t are n- and j-dim ensional
system and m easurem ent noise processes with zero mean and covariance m atrices
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H and ft, respectively. All other term s are defined earlier. In this class of prob­
lems, it is assumed th a t the  sta te  of the economy is observed through a stochastic 
m easurem ent subsystem. There exists two sources of uncertainties: additive noise 
ft in the state  space representation of the economic model and additive measure­
m ent noise in the  m easurem ent sub-system. We are now faced w ith a more 
com plicated problem , as compared w ith the determ inistic case, bu t it is a more 
realistic one.
The certainty equivalence theorem  of Simon (1956) and Theil (1957, 1964) can 
easily be applied to  the  class of linear systems represented by equations (2.17) and 
(2.18) and quadratic objective function (2.16). Among the earliest a ttem pts to 
solve this problem  are Chow (1972), Brito and Hester (1974), Bray (1974) and 
Phelps and Taylor (1975). A system atic analysis of non-linear economic models 
with additive noise and quadratic performance measure is discussed for the first 
tim e by Garbade (1975).
Contributions of W estcott and Wall (1976) to stochastic policy optim ization 
of economic systems, published in an engineering journal called Autom atica , sig­
nificantly influenced the subsequent direction of research work in economic appli­
cations of stochastic control theory. They used a linear stochastic control model 
together w ith a quadratic performance measure and a Gaussian distribution of 
disturbances. The model was designed to  obtain optim al economic strategies for 
the four m ajor problems confronting the UK policy-makers, i.e. the behaviour of 
unem ployment, price and wage inflation, the balance of paym ents, and economic 
growth. There were th irteen  behavioural equations estim ated using quarterly  data  
over the period 1955-1973, specifying the  behaviour of unem ploym ent, employ­
m ent, private investm ent, stock building, private consumption, consumer price 
index at factor cost, wages, profits, real exports, real im ports, export price index,
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im port price index and factor cost adjustm ents. There were th irteen  definitional 
equations in the  model. The param eters were estim ated by a dynam ic generaliza­
tion of simultaneous m ultivariate maxim um  likelihood estim ators in conjunction 
with residual correlation diagnosis.
The estim ated model is then converted to an equivalent sta te  space form at 
to apply the technique of stochastic optim al control. A m inim al realization pro­
cedure, developed by Prescott and Wall (1973), was used to obtain the minimal 
sta te  space dimension. The standard approach of making one sta te  for each 
lagged variables, as has been used by Pindyck’s control model discussed in equa­
tion (2.9)], is avoided here, otherwise a model of 46 state  variables as compared 
to only 29 variables would have been obtained. The behavioural equations were 
expressed in term s of growth rates which is equivalent to the  first difference in 
natural logarithm s.
The model in its polynomial structural form and in their own notations is as 
follows.
A0Yk =  J2 A iL%  + BiVUk + E  CiUek+
1 0  0
+  E r <£<“ t. (2-19)
0 0
and
%k =  JiYk 4* JiUk T  JsGk' (2.20)
L  is the  lag operator where L3X k  =  X k - j  and Yk is an /-vector of endogenous 
variables, Uk is an ra-vector of instrum ents or control variables, e* is an m j-vector 
of exogenous variables, Zk is an m 2-vector of definitional variables or identities, 
LOk is an /-vector of residual variables or stochastic disturbances and the  m atrices 
A,, Bi, C{, At and T,- are all real. The disturbance vector u)k is assumed to 
have a Gaussian distribution. It is also assumed th a t the objective function can 
sufficiently be approxim ated by the expected value of a quadratic function in term s
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of the deviations of sta te  and control variables from their desired trajectories. In
their notation, the  objective function is given by 
i N - 1
W = -E {W ^ L lSYN+W'NL28UN+Y^[WkAm+MU\tC8Yk+5U'kBUk]}, (2.21)
z j
where L2 and B  are m  x  m  sym m etric positive definite m atrices and L \ and A  
are I x I sym m etric positive semi-definite matrices. The deviations 1 <
k < N }  and {5Uk; 1 <  k  <  N }  are taken with respect to  the nom inal sta te
and nom inal control trajectories. The problem is to find a sequence of control 
variables to  minimise the objective function, W , subject to  th e  linear economic 
model [equations (2.19) and (2.20)].
O ptim al policy experim ents were carried out for 20 quarters. The m ain ob­
jective was to  dem onstrate which instrum ents were most effective in achieving a 
given target or policy goal. For example, should only the  foreign exchange rate  
be used to  balance trade, or should fiscal policies be applied instead or as well. 
The equivalently im portant problem was how to coordinate instrum ents in order 
to achieve simultaneously a given com bination of policy goals, which might in­
volve problems in optim ization under conflicting objectives. W ith  regard to  the 
first problem , the elements of weighting matrices in the objective function can be 
m anipulated to  identify which control variables are the m ost suitable in reach­
ing a specific economic objective. W estcott and W all’s experim ents dem onstrated 
th a t fiscal policies, such as public investment and social expenditures, were active 
instrum ents in both  balancing the trade and stim ulating growth.
2.4 .2  A d a p tiv e  C ontrol A p p lica tion s
A new extension within the framework of optim al control of stochastic dynam ic 
economic models has been achieved by introducing uncertainties in the  system ’s 
param eters. This branch of stochastic control is also known as adaptive, self- 
organizing, self-optimising, self-regulating and learning system . In this case,
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stochastic sta te  space representation of systems, i.e. equation (2.17), will become
Yt+1 =  A(i>, t)Yt +  B(j>,t)Ut +  $t, (2.22)
where A(- • •) and B (' • •) are n  x n and n x m  state transition and driving m atrices, 
respectively, ip is a fixed unknown /-dimensional vector taking values in param eter 
space W. is an n-dimensional system dynamic disturbance vector. We can also 
assume th a t some or all of the endogenous variables in the economic model are 
not available for exact m easurement. A sub-system for m easurem ents in which 
the observations are assumed to be linear functions of endogenous variables w ith 
additive random  disturbances will follow,
%t = 0(ip , t)Yt +  tot, (2.23)
where Z t is a j-dim ensional observation vector and cot is a ’^-dimensional m ea­
surem ent noise process. and w* are assumed to be independent Gaussian noise 
w ith zero means and covariance m atrices H and 0 , respectively. The objective 
function is assumed to be quadratic and additive in state and control as expressed 
by equation (2.16). The feedback control £/*, at any tim e t, is assumed to  be a 
function of the observation, i.e. the sta te  measurement history. If we define
Vt — {Zo, Z \, ■ ■ •, Z t},
then
Ut = h{Vt) t / =  0,1, • ■ •, T  — 1. (2.24)
The adaptive control of a linear economic model w ith unknown param eters 
is to find the  optim al economic decision sequence {Ut, t =  0 ,1 ,2 , • • •, T  — 1} 
which yields the m inim um  value to the objective function defined by equation
(2.16) subject to the economic model and the m easurem ent sub-system specified 
by equations (2.22) and (2.23), respectively. In this class of problems, the ac­
curacy of the estim ation is a function of the control action while the quality of
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control will depend upon the degree of accuracy by which the  economic model is 
estim ated. The controller m ust, therefore, compromise between estim ation and 
control. This problem  is usually referred to as the dual control problem. The 
uncertain param eters are usually regarded as additional s ta te  variables. Such 
trea tm ent of param etric uncertainties translates most linear econom etric models 
into essentially a problem in non-linear stochastic control theory and thus takes 
the econometricians into the realm of non-linear estim ation theory. The Bayesian 
approach has the  potential to  solve this class of problems where there exists a 
priori knowledge about probabilities of the unknown param eters.
Amongst the most successful early applications of adaptive control to eco­
nomic policy design problems are Chow (1973), Upadhyay (1973), Kendrick and 
M ajors (1974) and Turnovsky (1975). Upadhyay (1973) applied the m ethod of 
adaptive control to the recursive linear difference equation m odel of the US econ­
omy developed by Pindyck. As discussed in section (2.3.2), the  Pindyck model 
was a determ inistic optim al control of a linear system w ith a quadratic objective 
function. Upadhyay extended Pindyck’s model by making the param eters of the 
model as random  variables with assumed statistics. He form ulated the sim ulta­
neous estim ation and control of P indyck’s model, and showed th a t the  unknown 
param eters in the model can be identified while simultaneously controlling the 
economy. His results indicate the advantages of applying adaptive control tech­
niques to economic modelling and control. Using the average value of the  objective 
function as a m easure of comparison, he dem onstrated th a t the  adaptive control 
scheme is “b e tte r” , i.e. yields smaller value of the objective function as compared 
to the optim al determ inistic control approach.
The increasing fam iliarity of economists with modern control theory and their 
improved cooperations w ith control theorists in the 1970’s resulted in a  sta te  of
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self-confidence in the literature on economic control applications. However, hav­
ing experienced the so-called rational expectations revolution, the com m unity of 
economists interested in control theory were faced with the following question in 
the early 1980’s. W hat exactly has control theory offered to  economists towards 
improving the quality of optim al decision making processes? To answer this ques­
tion, we exam ine in sections 2.6 and 2.7 the im pact of rational expectations, the 
Lucas critique and the time-inconsistency on the standard applications of optim al 
control theory to  dynam ic choice in economic models. But let us first examine, 
in section 2.5, the recent developments in macro-econometric modelling in the 
context of dynam ic optim isation. This provides a background to  sections 2.6 and 
2.7.
2.5 T he R elationship  B etw een  Theory and Ob­
servation: A  Critical A nalysis o f th e  R ecen t D e­
velopm ents in M acro-econom etric M odelling and  
th e  R ole o f D ynam ic O ptim isation
The question we posed in Chapter One (section 1.3.3) th a t what has been gained 
by the Cowles Commission’s efforts in the 1930s on unifying economic theory, 
m athem atical m ethods and statistics has received wide atten tion  during the past 
10 years especially w ith regard to macro-econometric modelling and advances in 
dynam ic optim isation of behaviour of a representative economic agent. Pesaran 
and Sm ith, among others, have system atically addressed this issue since 1985 
w ithin the framework of the relationship between theory and observation (see Pe­
saran and Sm ith, 1985a, 1985b, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b). More recently, 
an interesting debate on data  dependence versus theory dependence approaches 
to model building in applied econometrics has appeared in the Economic Journal 
(November 1995) in which Danny Quah, Allan Gregory, Gregor Sm ith, M artin 
Eichenbaum , David Hendry and Michael Wickens have participated. In w hat fol-
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lows, I first exam ine the core of the argum ent in this field. The analysis of the 
origin of the gap between data-instigated and theory-based econom etric models 
are then  discussed and the role of dynamic optimising models together w ith a 
critical exam ination of the  attem pts to  bridge this gap are presented. A critical 
analysis of Pesaran and Sm ith’s contribution, i.e. the im portance of economic 
theory in tightening the link between theory and empirical work, is also included 
in this section.
2.5.1 R esp o n ses to  th e  C ow les C om m ission ’s T raditional 
S tra tegy
From an historical point of view, the literature on the interaction between theory 
and observation in applied econometric models can best be analysed by dividing 
the subject into the traditional Cowles Commission’s approach and the reactions 
to it. The la tte r have m ainly appeared in the two broad categories of the atheoreti- 
cal or data-based vector autoregression (VAR) and the astatistical or theory-based 
calibrated models. Developments in the economic modelling aimed at combining 
statistical and theoretical inform ation is another dimension of research work to 
be considered.
The dynam ic optim isation approach which provides a strong link between neo­
classical optim isation theory and econometric models has recently come to play a 
much more prom inent role in applied econometrics. This approach is extrem ely 
im portant since it requires all the behavioural equations in an econom etric model 
to be obtained directly by the solution of intertem poral optim isation problem 
facing an economic agent. This approach is discussed in the next section where 
we present a critical analysis of the different strands of research work which seek 
to bridge the  gap between theory and observation in applied econometrics.
Keynes’ strong criticisms on the first macro-econometric model, developed by
117
Tinbergen (1939) to  test the business cycle theories, formally in itia ted  the  debate 
on the validity of econometric models in unifying theories and observation in eco­
nomics (see Pesaran and Smith, 1985b), The role of theory, data, endogeneity, 
linearity, dynam ics and structural stability were among the issues which raised. 
The Cowles Commission’s m ajor task to provide a solution to  these problems 
formed a solid basis for the rapid expansion of macro-econometric model build­
ing in the 1950s and 1960s. This traditional approach, based on the Haavelmo’s 
probability foundation, (Haavelmo, 1944), which remained unrivalled until the 
1970s (see M organ, 1990), is characterised by the dichotomy between theoretical 
and em pirical activities in which m athem atical economists and econometricians 
provided the model and param eter estim ates, respectively. The role of the theory 
was, according to Tinbergen (1939), confined to “identifying the  list of relevant 
variables to be included in the analysis, w ith possibly the plausible signs of their 
coefficients” . In this framework, regression analysis was the m ain focus of econo­
m etricians w ith the  prim e objective of obtaining conditional predictions.
By allowing for different explanatory variables, choosing different functional 
forms for the behavioural equations, introducing various time-lags structures to 
account for dynam ic adjustm ents (such as Koyck and Almon), using dum m y vari­
ables for certain unobservable explanatory variables and introducing different as­
sum ptions about the stochastic term s in structural equations, the  regression anal­
ysis provided a sta te  of flexibility which made the theory alm ost unfalsifiable. 
W ith much emphasis on estim ators (in contrast to  testing procedures, see Qin, 
1991) the Cowles Commission’s Program m e in Economics soon produced a vari­
ety of estim ators designed to estim ate a system of simultaneous equations. These 
estim ators included instrum ental variables, lim ited inform ation m axim um  likeli­
hood, full inform ation m axim um  likelihood, two- and three-stage least squares 
and /s-class estim ators.
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K oopm ans’ m ethod of identification provided an interesting solution to the 
Cowles Commission’s problem of unification of theory and observation (see Koop­
mans, 1950). I t is well-known th a t the rank and order conditions for identification 
of a single equation in a system  of simultaneous equations are based on the a priori 
inform ation supplied by economic theory about the linear or non-linear restrictions 
among structura l param eters. In other words, w ithout such a priori theoretical 
inform ation m any different structural forms can become consistent w ith a single 
reduced form (which expresses an endogenous variable in term s of exogenous vari­
ables and thus can be estim ated by the OLS m ethod). It follows, therefore, tha t 
w ithout theoretical restrictions structural equations may become observationally 
equivalent. Similarly, one can argue th a t the identification of a single equation in 
a system  of simultaneous equations is equivalent to the problem  of w hether the 
estim ates of structura l param eters can be obtained from the estim ated param eters 
in the  reduced form. If more than one estim ated structural param eters is possi­
ble the equation is said to be over-identified for which the  m ethod of 2SLS was 
developed yielding unique estim ated values of structural param eters. This clearly 
signifies how economic theory could provide a basis for further developments in 
econometrics.
Despite the  outstanding success of the Cowles Commission’s trad itional econo­
m etric practice in estim ating Keynesian and neo-classical models and its popu­
larity amongst the com munity of business and official policy-makers,40 it received 
a num ber of different shocks during the 1970s. The increasing evidence th a t the 
traditional models did not adequately represent the data  led to a growing the­
oretical emphasis on dynam ic specification and model selection in econometrics. 
This provides an example of how the da ta  inconsistency could enhance further 
developments in econometric analysis. Moreover, theoretical developments in ra­
40See Bokin, Klein and Marwah (1991) for an historical account of this success.
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tional expectations, time-inconsistency and dynamic optim isation persuaded the 
theorists to  believe th a t the traditional econometric models cannot successfully 
represent theory. This led to  the Lucas critique. The response of m athem atical 
economists and econometricians were, respectively, to give much greater priority  to 
representing theory at the  expense of statistical analysis and to  representing da ta  
a t the expense of theory. The theory-based calibrated models and the  data-based 
vector autoregressions discussed below are the two well-known m anifestations of 
this response.
The astatistical approach in the theory-based calibrated models can best be 
seen in the Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGMs). “In calibrated m od­
els, the param eters are chosen on the basis of introspection, surveys of previous 
econometric results or set to m atch certain features of the data; frequently taken 
to be the unconditional m om ents” (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995b, p. 7). As the 
title  implies, the  objective of com putable general equilibrium models is to  develop 
a com putable solution to the W alrasian general equilibrium models which m ainly 
relied on calibration m ethods rather than  using econometric techniques.41
Placing greater emphasis on theory-based economic models is usually accom­
panied by greater reliance on pragmatic empirical work. According to Summers 
(1991) a pragm atic em pirical work is an approach which is based on stylised facts  
and is easy to understand and simple to  use. He refers to the  fact th a t m any m ajor 
contributions to economic modelling, such as Friedm an’s work on the consump­
tion function or the work of Solow and Dennison on growth theory, constitute 
examples of pragm atic research in which empirical regularities can easily be un­
derstood w ithout using any formal econometric techniques. Summers concludes
41Dervis, De Melo and Robinson (1982) and Shoven and Whalley (1992) provide a review 
of the CGMs. It should be noted that CGMs have their roots in the classical contributions 
of Leontief (1941) and of Leif Johansen (1960). The latter developed a multi-sectoral growth 
model for Norway.
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th a t “formal econometric work, where elaborate technique is used to apply theory 
to  da ta  or isolate the  direction of causal relationships when they are not obvious 
a priori, v irtually always fails” (p. 129).
The data-instigated or atheoretical approach of Sims (1980), known as the 
data-based vector autoregressions (VAR), is another response to  the failure of the 
traditional approach of the Cowles Commission. As we discussed earlier, the re­
gression analysis (single or m ultivariate models), which is called by Hylleberg and 
Paldam  (1991) the  traditional strategy of m arrying theory and observations, was 
an effective m ethod in empirical economic modelling until the 1970s because the 
functions of the theory involved were to identify the list of relevant explanatory 
variables (and possibly the plausible signs of their coefficients) and to  provide 
some linear or non-linear param etric restrictions. Although not m any test pro­
cedures were included in the traditional strategy (for example, the possibility of 
pre-testing and specification searches discussed by Learner, 1978), the comparison 
of the conditional predictions provided by the model with the  actual realisations 
could have allowed an informal testing of the plausibility of the  statistical methods 
of estim ation. The rise of the New Classical Macroeconomics, (see Lucas and Sar­
gent, 1981), w ith emphasis on the rational expectations and general equilibrium 
modelling, as well as the partial failure of Keynesian macro-econometric models 
in predicting th e  stagflation of the 1970s, provided heavy criticisms of the trad i­
tional strategy. It was soon realised th a t factors such as unobservable theoretical 
variables, inaccurate functional forms and appropriate adjustm ent processes ren­
der all econometric models significant misspecification errors. This, together with 
the recognition of the  incompleteness of economic theories, paved the  way for a 
data-instigated atheoretical approach to empirical economic research work.
The univariate ARIMA model, which represents a variable in term s of its
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lagged values of a moving average of lagged disturbances, was a successful earlier 
a ttem p t in this new approach. Despite using no information from economic theory 
and thus being atheoretical, economic theory could at some occasion provide cer­
ta in  restrictions on these models (for example, speculative asset prices should be 
a random  walk in efficient m arkets thus, ARIMA(0,1,0) follows). The response of 
econometricians to  the relative success of the ARIMA models in out-perform ing 
traditional regression models in forecasting was twofold: giving more emphasis 
on model specification, diagnostic and misspecification tests; and placing much 
greater priority in the incorporation of the information available in ARIMA m od­
els than  in the traditional econometric models. In this regard, the LSE tradition 
associated with Sargan (1964) and Hendry (1982, 1987) known as the Error Cor­
rection Models (ECMs) and the VAR approach, discussed earlier, are the  two 
m ajor research strategies resulting from the la tte r response. Let us now examine 
how these two approaches have contributed to bridging the gap between theory 
and observation in applied econometric models.
H endry’s ECMs42 is based on a general autoregressive d istributed lag model in 
which an endogenous variable is explained by its own lags and current and lagged 
exogenous variables. After testing the estim ated model for its statistical adequacy, 
the model will then, upon using economic theories, become m ore simplified by re- 
param etrisation and restrictions tha t reduce the num ber of estim ated coefficients. 
This yields a single equation in which the changes in dependent variable are ex­
pressed by changes in the explanatory variables and the lagged dependent and 
independent variables. Evidently, only on two occasions is economic theory per­
m itted  to play its role in this approach: at the beginning when the choice of 
variables is being made and at the final stage with the re-param etrisation and 
im position of restrictions. This completely violates the trad itional strategy in
42See Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) for a critical and detailed examination of this approach.
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econom etric modelling based on the dichotomy between form ulating behavioural 
equations based on economic theories and estim ating its param eters by using ap­
propriate statistical methods of estim ation. Spanos clearly elaborates this point in 
his celebrated textbook (1986, pp. 670-671) as follows: “Econom etric modelling 
is viewed not as the  estim ation of theoretical relationships nor as a procedure for 
establishing the ‘trueness’ of economic theories, bu t as endeavour to understand 
observable economic phenom ena using observed da ta  in conjunction w ith some un­
derlying theory in the context of a statistical framework” . In H endry’s m ethod, 
econometric modelling is, therefore, nothing more than  characterisation of da ta  
properties in param etric relationships based on an observed sample. The role of 
economic theory is, therefore, marginalised to provide an economic in terpretation  
of such relationships based on the specification of their long-run properties.
In contrast to  H endry’s approach, which is a single equation structure, VAR 
is a m ultivariate m ethod. All variables are treated  as endogenous being explained 
by the lagged values of themselves and other endogenous variables. There are 
no restrictions imposed by economic theories on param eters. It is easy to see 
th a t VAR is structurally  a reduced form since endogenous variables are modelled 
as a function of predeterm ined variables. Economic theories, therefore, cannot 
produce any economic in terpretation of coefficients since these coefficients are 
usually a com bination of structural param eters. It is well-known th a t except for 
recursive systems, economic theories can only provide explanations for structural 
param eters.43 The correspondence of VAR to reduced form has led M onfort and 
R abem ananjara (1990) to assume the existence of a structural form for any given 
VAR. The question arises as to w hat are the sequential restrictions necessary 
to specify a corresponding structural form. These restrictions include the pre- 
determ inateness of some variables, exogeneity and non-causality conditions.
43For a critical analysis of such an environment of atheoretical econometrics see, Cooley and 
Le Roy (1985).
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Having briefly discussed the responses to the traditional strategy in model 
building, we now tu rn  to examine the origin of the gap between the  data-instigated 
and theory-based approaches to applied econometric analysis. The role of dy­
nam ic optim ising models in this debate and the various attem pts to  tigh ten  the 
link between theory and evidence in macro-econometric models are also critically 
appraised.
2.5 .2  D a ta -in stig a ted  vs T heory-based  E con om etric  M od ­
els: T h e O rigin o f th e  G ap, th e  R ole o f D y n a m ic  O p ti­
m isin g  M od els and a C ritica l A nalysis o f th e  A tte m p ts  to  
B rid ge it
“Year after year economic theorists continue to produce scores of m athem atical 
models and to  explore in great detail their formal properties; and the econom etri­
cians fit algebraic functions of all possible shapes to essentially the same sets of 
da ta  w ithout being able to advance, in any perceptible way, a system atic under­
standing of the  structure and the operations of a real economic system ” . This is 
the view expressed by Wassily Leontief, the Nobel Laureate in economics, on the 
state  of partnership between m athem atical economics and econometrics (see his 
foreword to  Alfred Eichner, 1983, pp. x -x i). He continues to exam ine the origin 
of and the  rem edy for, such an unfortunate failure by saying th a t “T hat sta te  is 
likely to be m aintained as long as tenured members of leading economics depart­
m ents continue to  exercise tight control over the training, prom otion and research 
activities of their younger faculty members and, by means of peer review, of the 
senior members as well” . W hile I would agree with the structure of Leontief’s 
broad conclusion, there are reasons to believe th a t his analysis does not advance, 
in any perceptible way, the understanding of the nature and origin of the existing 
gap between m athem atical economics and econometrics. Equally im portan t, his 
analysis does not contribute towards tightening the links between them .
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O ur starting  point is the recognition of the fact th a t the unsuccessful partner­
ship between m athem atical economics and econometrics in the  1970s has given 
im petus for advancing the machinery of econometric analysis. This, in tu rn , has 
improved the understanding of the structure and operational properties of the 
real world economic life. In other words, this unsuccessful partnership has not 
been unproductive. Let us recapitulate the main m erits and shortcomings of the 
different strands of developments resulting from the response to the relative fail­
ure of trad itional strategy of econometric modelling before exam ining the place 
of optim ising models in this debate.
We discussed in the previous section tha t the predictive failure of the Cowles 
Commission’s program m e in macroeconomic trends (for example, the stagflation 
of the 1970s) led to  a substantial development in the univariate time-series anal­
ysis. In this regard, the work of Sims (1980) is a clear example. There have also 
been attem pts to integrate data-instigated models and the  traditional economet­
ric analysis. The expanding literature on testing for unit roots, stochastic trends 
and the cointegration approach pioneered by Granger are the most significant 
advances in this field.44
It should be noted, however, th a t the vector autoregressions and the cointe­
gration theory have basically remained data-instigated models. W hile it is true 
th a t the rational expectations and optim isation methods can impose some cross­
equation restrictions on vector autoregression,45 there are not sufficient reasons 
to believe th a t the VAR is not an atheoretical approach. The definition of eco­
nomic theory, of course, plays an im portant role in this judgem ent. W ithout going 
into the methodological issues about the definition of an economic theory, we can 
say, with no loss of generality, th a t on the basis of an economic theory being a
44See, for example, the collection of papers in Engle and Granger (1991), Phillips (1991) and 
Phillips and Hansen (1990).
45See, for example, Hansen and Sargent, 1991.
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description o f causal mechanisms,46 the vector autoregression is basically atheo- 
retical. The same argum ent applies to the cointegration approach. W hile it is 
true th a t the  cointegration approach considers the relationships between economic 
variables, it provides only a long-run relationship without identifying the causal 
direction. Again, w ith regard to the above mentioned definition of economic the­
ory, the cointegration approach will rem ain atheoretical too.
A sim ilar argum ent applies to H endry’s Error Correction Models. Although 
this m ethod is less atheoretical as compared w ith the VAR and cointegration m od­
els, it suffers from the single equation approach (and thus from the sim ultaneity 
character of the traditional approach) as well as from the absence of a theoretical 
role in the  specification of the time-lags and dynamic adjustm ents. The status of 
theory is thus reduced to identifying the long-term relationships between economic 
variables. This role can also be debatable.47 However, w ithin the  framework of 
the im pact of observation on theory, the Summers’ pragmatic empirical work, 
based on the  stylised facts rather than  the elaborate formal econom etric models 
discussed in the previous section, is the most outstanding contribution to  the 
theory-based calibrated economic models.48
The significant step towards the  unification of theory and observation is the 
dynam ic optim isation approach which provides a direct link between neo-classical 
optim isation theory and applied econometric models. This approach, which is 
developed as a response to  the rational expectations hypothesis and the Lucas 
critique, gives more emphasis to the role of economic theory in econom etric m od­
elling. All behavioural equations, in this approach, are obtained directly as solu­
tions to the dynam ic optim isation problem facing an economic agent.
46See, for example, Miller (1987).
47See Alogoskoufis and Ron Smith (1991).
48For a critique of the calibrated approach, see Anderson (1991).
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Some m ajor problems w ith dynamic optim isation approach as a bridging mech­
anism to link theory and measurement in econometric models can be summarised. 
i ) Most of the optimising problems in the literature are based on a representative 
agent w ith very restrictive assumptions about preferences, technologies and the 
inform ation set, such as the information homogeneity to  approxim ate the infor­
m ation heterogeneity of agents discussed in Pesaran (1986 and 1990 chapter 4). 
Arrow (1986) has pointed out the im portance of the assumptions of inform ation 
heterogeneity and decentralised markets where individual differences are prime 
motives for trade, i i ) Partly  because of the above restrictive assumptions, some 
im portant problem , such as the choice of functional forms or the  sector disaggrega­
tion, cannot successfully be accommodated in a dynamic optim isation framework. 
Hi) As Sargent (1987) remarks, dynamic optim isation models based on a repre­
sentative agent suffer from the lack of simultaneous interdependencies of decisions 
m ade by different agents in the context of a general equilibrium  model.
We sketched out a critical exam ination of different efforts towards bridging 
the gap between m athem atical modelling in theoretical economics and applied 
econometrics. None of the work cited above provides system atic analysis of the 
nature and origin of this gap. This introduces a serious theoretical shortcoming 
towards tightening the link between economic theory and statistical estim ation. 
To clarify this point, let us begin with a critical exam ination of the research 
strategy of Sm ith and Pesaran for bridging the gap between theory and evidence.
A Critical Examination of Smith and Pesaran on the Interplay of The­
ory and Observation
Sm ith and Pesaran have system atically refined their argum ent on the interplay of 
theory and observation since 1985 and have only recently (1992 and 1995) formu­
lated the specific structure of how economic theories can improve the performance
127
of applied econometric models. Their earlier work implied only th a t tightening 
the link between economic theories and econometric models necessarily required 
a m ore serious contributions of observations to economic theorisation as well as 
contributions of economic theory to measurements: “As econom etricians, not only 
is it im portan t th a t we adapt our econometric techniques to the  em pirical analysis 
of the economic theory given to us by the theorist, but we need also to  constantly 
search for new ways of making economic theories more suitable for economet­
ric analysis, always bearing in mind the dangers of allowing theory to become a 
s traitjacket” (Pesaran, 1988, pp. 338-339). In other words, the message for the 
role of the  theory in applied econometric models was to select and adapt a theory 
in such a way as to make it more appropriate for applications. As Phillips (1988, 
p. 351) has rem arked “[Pesaran’s] message is, of course, quite an old one. It is 
strongly evident in the writing and work of early researchers like Frisch (1932) 
and Stone (1951) and recently it has been forcefully restated elsewhere by Hendry 
and Wallis (1984) and by Pesaran (1986) himself” .
It is very hard to challenge Sm ith and Pesaran’s research strategy theoretically 
since it is expressed in the most general term s. A question of prim e practical im­
portance is how an econometrician can balance between the too m any restrictions 
derived from theory-based models and a t the same tim e place heavy reliance on 
atheoretical data-oriented methods. As Mankiw (1989, p. 89) com ments “Yet 
like all optimising agents, scientists face trade-offs. One theory m ay be more 
‘beautifu l’ while another may be easier to reconcile with observation” . Pesaran 
himself adm its this problem when he writes (1988, p. 338) th a t “This leaves us in 
an uneasy middle-of-the-road type situation”. He tries to  sort out this problem 
by m aking the role of theory in applied econometric models a function of the 
following factors (ibid, p. 338): 1) the objective of the exercise; 2) the  nature of 
the problem at hand; 3) the degree to which the economic theory and the m ea­
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surem ent model are integrated; and 4) the fashion and trends in the profession. 
Evidently, these facts cannot offer an empiricist engaged in an actual economet­
ric model a practical answer to the aforementioned trade-off between theory and 
observations in econometric models.
The recent work of Sm ith and Pesaran offers a more specific trea tm ent of the 
role of economic theory in applied work. They regard the application of dynamic 
optim isation m ethods in econometric models as an outstanding achievement in 
advancing the theory-based econometric models. They, however, adm it th a t the 
very restrictive assumptions inherent in dynamic optim isation, together w ith the 
fact th a t the behaviour of a representative agent lies at the root of the  optim isation 
approach, can, in principle, make economic theory a straitjacket in econometric 
models. W ithin  this context, they have elaborated their earlier general and non­
specific position on the im portance of economic theory in the interplay of theory 
and observation as follows: “How can we devise a procedure th a t incorporates 
the precision of the m odern dynamic stochastic theory and the flexibility of the 
traditional approach? The aim would be to develop a general econom etric fram e­
work which enjoys the precision of the dynamic optim isation approach but does 
not suffer from its formal stricture when applied literally to  economic problem s” 
(Pesaran and Sm ith, 1992, p. 15). They have tried to  achieve this objective by 
com puting the shadow prices, Let us now examine how well they have succeeded.
It is well-known th a t shadow prices (Lagrange m ultipliers or costate vectors) 
arise in the optim isation problems which are subject to constraints. Shadow prices 
are usually related to prices of goods and services in the m arkets which do not 
exist. This explains why shadow prices are unobservable, which in tu rn  renders 
serious com putational problems for the estim ation of non-linear dynam ic optim i­
sation. The situation will not be pressing if the theory can be cast in (or become
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approxim ated by) LQ form, i.e. linear dynamics with a quadratic objective func­
tion, since analytical solutions exist for its optim al policy sequence. However, 
quadratic objective functions usually imply excessive restrictions on economic 
theories such as asym m etric adjustm ent costs, irreversibilities and non-negativity 
of ou tpu t prices or factor inputs. Such restrictions endanger economic theories of 
becoming a straitjacket. Obtaining conditional predictions for dynam ic optim isa­
tion of non-LQ problems is, therefore, a difficult problem in applied econometric 
models.
Sm ith and Pesaran’s m ain contribution is to  replace the  unobservable shadow 
prices (or expected shadow prices in the stochastic case) by functions (preferably 
linear or other tractable functions) of the  variables th a t determ ine them . The 
resulting dynam ic optim isation problem can be solved for conditional predictions. 
Upon confronting conditional predictions with observation the relative validity of 
the model can be inferred. The crucial role of economic theory in the unification of 
theory and observation, so much advocated by Pesaran and Sm ith, can basically be 
sum marised as the  replacement of the unobservable shadow prices by a functional 
form from observable variables. This allows economic theory to work outside the 
framework of dynam ic optim isation not only to relax the com putational aspects 
of estim ation for prediction but to perm it other relevant economic variables to  
enter the optim isation problem through their influence on the shadow prices.
To illustrate their m ethod, Sm ith and Pesaran have considered the case of 
investm ent in which the optim isation problem gives rise to a Lagrange m ultiplier 
which is the shadow price of capital. They have solved the  problem  by using the 
assum ption th a t a complete second-hand m arket for capital goods does not exist 
(Pesaran and Sm ith (1992), appendix, pp.21-23). Evidently, Bellm an’s dynam ic 
programm ing, which recursively solves the functional equation resulting from re­
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cursive form ulation of the intertem poral objective function, is not appropriate 
for solving such dynam ic optim isation problem because it does not generate the 
shadow prices. However, Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle, which provides an ex­
plicit trea tm en t of shadow prices, linking the values of decision variables over time, 
can effectively handle this problem. More recently, Pesaran and Sm ith (1995) have 
used this m ethod to obtain a substitu te for the unobservable shadow prices by 
their determ inants arising in dynamic optim isation of liquidity constrained con­
sum er behaviour as well as in the optim isation of oil exploration and development.
Undoubtedly, Sm ith and Pesaran have taken a m ajor step in solving non-linear 
dynam ic optim isation problems. The way they have presented em pirical evidence 
in term s of shadow prices rather than as param eters of conditional distribution 
of observable variables is a significant progress towards strengthening the link 
between m athem atical economics and econometrics. Their m ethod makes provi­
sion for some im portant empirical observations (such as liquidity constraints) to 
appear in theoretical term s which can be more apprehended by theorists. W hile 
adm itting  th a t Pesaran and Sm ith have provided a solution to  a long-standing se­
rious problem in estim ation of optim al econometric models they have not justified 
the use of optim ising models in building a bridge between theory and observation. 
Despite the fact th a t dynam ic optim isation models offer a substantial alternative 
within the framework of theory-based models, the assum ption of representative 
agent, among other serious restrictive assumptions discussed earlier, is a strong 
im pedim ent in bridging the gap between theory and observation in applied econo­
m etric models.
2.5 .3  S p ecu la tion s on th e  Future C ourse o f D ev e lo p m en ts
W hile the preceding discussion signifies the existing gap between theorists and 
econometricians, the attem pts to bridge it have been conducive to  advancing the
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sta te  of knowledge in applied econometric models and econometric techniques. 
This, at the same time, has prom oted our understanding of the depth  of the 
problem . In other words, although the  gap exists, we now know more about it 
and we are thus encouraged to learn more. A question of theoretical interest 
is w hether the unification of theory and observation, advocated so much by the 
Cowles Commission Program m e and the Founders of the Econom etric Society, 
can ever be viable?49
At the root of the argum ent lies the fact th a t economic conceptualisations and 
economic observations (or measurements) are not usually m utually  independent. 
For example, the concepts of price and output could not have originated w ith­
out concom itant developments of their associated quantification in the sphere of 
observation and m easurem ent. The gap started  to emerge w ith the process of 
economic theorisation in which simple factual economic concepts were pu t in hy­
pothetical relations in order to explain a given economic observation or to  predict 
a course of development. The m ethod of abstraction discussed in C hapter One has 
always been central in erecting the conceptual edifice of economic theorisation. 
The capacity of economic theory to produce unifying insights into the functioning 
of an economic system depends on how the theory has been abstracted  from the 
complete mass of details called the economic reality. A theory m ay not necessarily 
be a coherent set of assertions about actual economy. However, this m ay not be 
true for theories involved in applied econometric models: the higher the degree 
of applicability of a theory the larger would be the extent of its assertions on 
observations. Theoretical concepts in highly applicable models, such as applied 
micro-econometric models in finance, are more closely linked w ith the correspond­
ing observations and are, therefore, available to more precise m easurem ents. In 
these models, the gap between theory and observation can become minim al in
49The objectives of the Econometric Society and the Cowles Commission are discussed in 
Chapter One, section 1.3.2.
132
the process of model building and testing since the theory will quickly adjust it­
self to  observation. In a similar fashion, one can conclude th a t the adjustm ent 
process for highly aggregated macro-econometric models is very slow m ainly due 
to the weak correspondence between their theoretical concepts and the associ­
ated  observation. In these macro-econometric models the  gap between theory 
and observation is likely to  rem ain substantially wide.
Confrontation of theory’s predictions with evidence can fu rther support the 
above argum ent. It is known th a t in models of partial equilibrium, predictions are 
m ade conditional on auxiliary assumptions which are an integral p art of designing 
an em pirical econometric model. S tatistical inference on conditional predictions 
cannot, therefore, be made by reference to the actual data  which does not concep­
tually  correspond exactly to conditional predictions. This suggests th a t testing 
the predictive property of econometric models is not basically possible and thus 
a careful analysis of the gap between theory and observation cannot successfully 
be carried out.
The im portance of economic theory in applied econometric analysis has a long 
history. Koopmans (1947), representing the emerging econometric approach of 
the Cowles Commission, presents the first substantial analysis on the subject. In 
a critical review on the data-instigated m ethod of Burns and M itchell (expressed 
in their book entitled Measuring Business Cycles, 1946) he writes th a t “Fuller 
utilisation of the concepts and hypotheses of economic theory as a part o f the 
processes o f observation and measurement promises to be a shorter road, per­
haps even the only possible road, to  the understanding of cyclical fluctuations” . 
Almost after 50 years, the work of Pesaran and Smith (1995), relating to the 
im portance of economic theory in applied econometric models, does not extend 
beyond m easuring the shadow prices in term s of observable economic concepts
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in the domain of dynamic optim isation of economic policy design. The m ajor 
problem  of how the applied econometric models based on non-linear dynamic 
optim isation can become integrated with a measurement system  is still open. In 
this regard, applied econometrics awaits a substantial and significant contribution 
towards accommodating economic theories in constructing em pirical models.
A nother im portan t point which has not yet received enough atten tion  is the 
role which has been played by statistical analysis in the debate on the gap between 
theory and observation in applied economics. Since 1932, the Cowles Commission 
has m ainly emphasised the development of different methods to estim ate ■popula­
tion statistics from samples. This has produced a rich literature on econometric 
m ethods now known as the traditional strategy. As Vining (1949) in his renowned 
review of the Koopmans on the Choice o f Variables to be Studied and o f Methods 
o f Measurement says the excessive emphasis of modern statistics, upon certain 
types of problems stressed by Kendall, has been most influential in creating this 
situation. Kendall (1943) remarks th a t “the estim ation of properties of a popu­
lation from a sample is the most im portant practical problem in statistics and is 
long likely to continue so” . However, Yule (1943) has denied this proposition by 
saying th a t “It never was, in my opinion, the most im portant practical problem 
in statistics ... The initial problem of the statistician is simply the description 
of the da ta  presented; to tell us what the data  themselves show. To this initial 
problem the function of sampling theory is in general entirely secondary or an­
cillary ... More recently m ethods, w ith few exception (time-series in economics, 
factor-m ethods in psychology), have been almost neglected, while there has been 
a completely lop-sided development -almost a malignant growth- of sampling the­
ory. I hope there may be a swing back towards the study of m ethod proper and as 
m ethods only develop in connection with practical problems, th a t means a swing 
back to more practical work and less pure theory ...” .
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Undoubtedly, K endall’s emphasis on sampling theory and hypothesis testing in 
applied statistics played a prom inent role in the Cowles Commission’s approach 
to econom etric models. However, it took almost 40 years for economists to take 
the Yule’s recom m endation seriously: economic time-series analysis was revived 
in the  1980’s. Yet the literature on applied econometric modelling awaits a m ajor 
break-through to combine time-series and economic theories.
W hat can be done until then? At one extrem e is the argum ent th a t economic 
modelling, as a precise academic exercise, should not be taken seriously in building 
real world’s economic models. “All empirical methods are simply rough guides 
to understanding -trying to take them  as more seems misguided. Econometric 
m ethods are taught in graduate classrooms without belabouring this obvious, 
im plicit point ... However, when it comes tim e to solve real-world problems, ... 
every tool applies; whatever works, works” (Quah, 1995, p .1596). This conclusion, 
however, appears unconvincing. One cannot be satisfied by the  fact th a t a m ethod 
is simply working ; the question of theoretical interest is how well the  m ethod is 
working. This naturally  leads into the domain of the interplay between theory 
and em pirical evidence in macro-econometric models.
At the other extrem e is the argum ent tha t economic theories should not be 
taken seriously either. “To some extent, the varying weights given to theory reflect 
the range of goals in applied work, from developing theory, to  m easurem ent w ith 
existing theory, to short-term  forecasting. Given this assortm ent of goals, there is 
in tu rn  a range of methods in use, with a continuum between econometricians and 
business cycle theorists” (Gregory and Smith, 1995, p .1607). It appears th a t this 
argum ent does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem, yet it contributes 
to the understanding of the gap which exists between theory and observation by 
classifying the applied work in economics according to their goals.
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Between these two extremes, lies the attem pts to link theories and empirical 
methods in the practice of economic model building. Perhaps H endry’s approach 
is the m ost successful one since it is based on the dichotomy between mapping 
from theory into a model in economic analysis and m apping from a model into 
reality to discover the economic structures in econometric studies. “The best is 
th a t theory delivers a model which happens to capture structure after appropriate 
estim ation. Since structure must be invariant under extension of the inform ation 
set, it cannot be learnt from theory alone w ithout an assum ption of omniscience. 
However, structures potentially can be learnt from em pirical evidence without 
prior knowledge as to  what exists to be discovered. Hence, economic theory is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for determining structures, although it remains 
one of several useful tools for the econometricians” (Hendry, 1995, p p .1633-34). 
H endry’s argum ent does not pay proper attention to the theoretically v ital ques­
tion of what determ ines the dynamics of growth in economic theorisation in the 
interplay between theory and observation in applied econometrics.
In summary, we need to be wary of both theory-based astatistical calibrated 
models as well as data-instigated atheoretical models. The recognition of the gap 
between theory and observation has been conducive to the advancement of our 
knowledge about the problem atic interplay of economic theorisation and applied 
econometric model building. This is likely to continue so. Having realised the 
possibility of a theory becoming a straitjacket, the econometricians, despite the 
teaching of the Cowles Commission’s dichotomy of economic theory and econo­
m etric models, are now in a stronger position in practice to constantly revise and 
modify economic theories in order to make them  more suitable for applied work. 
However, the lack of coherent theoretical justification is a real weakness which 
will persist in econometric practice for the foreseeable future.
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2.6 R ational E xpectations, th e  Lucas C ritique  
and th e  P olicy  Ineffectiveness D ebate
In an engineering approach to economic applications of optim al control theory, it 
is usually assumed th a t the behaviour of an economic agent does not depend upon 
anticipation of future events including the future course of policy actions. This is 
not the  case, however, for recent advances in optim al control applications to eco­
nomic systems where the private sector’s expectations of governm ent’s future deci­
sions play a significant role. Although expectations of future values of endogenous 
variables have long been recognised as an im portant topic in macro-econometrics, 
the trad itional expectations-form ation process has been usually confined to the 
conventional backward-looking dynamic or distributed lag models. The rational 
expectations hypothesis has shifted the expectations-form ation process from an 
essentially backward-looking to a forward-looking perspective.
In order to explain how expectations are formed, M uth (1961, p .315) has 
advanced the hypothesis th a t they are essentially the same as the predictions 
of the relevant economic theory. He maintains tha t “expectations of firms (or, 
more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be 
distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or 
the objective probability distribution of outcomes)” .50 M uth ’s paper, which has 
m otivated a rich literature on the subject, is largely based on his earlier paper 
(1960) in which he established an economic argument to rationalise the  “adaptive 
expectations m echanism ” advanced by Milton Friedman (1956) and Phillip Cagan 
(1956). The rational expectations hypothesis was then developed further and 
extended by the work of Lucas (1965, published in 1981; also 1966, published in
50Keuzenkamp (1991) refers to an early paper by Tinbergen (1932), published in German, 
which anticipates much of Muth’s analysis on rational expectations. In this regard, the work of 
Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) should also be mentioned. They showed that economic agents 
can react to forecasts which might alter the course of events. They demonstrated how these 
reactions can be taken into account in order to produce “correct and self-fulfilling forecasts” .
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1981) and Lucas and Prescott (1971).51
Estim ation m ethods available for macroeconomic models w ith rational expec­
tations are usually based on the assumption tha t expectations variables coincide 
with the fu ture solution values over a sequence of periods. In other words, trea t­
ing expectations variables explicitly rather than substituting them  by appropriate 
d istributed lag functions, necessarily requires tha t expectations coincide with the 
conditional expectations of variables based on the model itself and on all the 
available inform ation (model-consistent expectations).52
Recent advances in econometric models with rational expectations im ply tha t 
this hypothesis m ainly affects short-run properties of models. Wallis (1995) re­
ports th a t “as m ethods of estim ating rational expectations models have been 
incorporated into large-scale macro-econometric modelling practice, it has be­
come clear th a t various im portant long-run model properties do not depend on 
the choice between forward and backward-looking dynamic equations; ra ther, this 
choice principally affects the m odel’s short-run properties” (p. 342-343). Bikker, 
van Els and Hemerijck (1993) confirm this conclusion by estim ating a D utch model 
w ith rational expectations.53
The structu re of the inform ation set and the cost of acquiring more informa­
tion are of prim e theoretical concerns. It is usually assumed th a t individuals know
the structure of the entire model as well as the historical values of all relevant vari­
51For comprehensive and critical reviews of rational expectations hypothesis see Shiller (1978), 
Fischer (1980), Begg (1982), Minford and Peel (1983) and Sheffrin (1983). For early contribu­
tions of the rational expectations hypothesis on macroeconomic policy (and particularly on 
monetary policies) see Sargent (1973, 1977), Sargent and Wallace (1973, 1975, 1976), Barro 
(1976), Fischer (1977) and McCallum (1977).
52For contributions to estimation of econometric models with rational expectations see Muth 
(1960, published in 1981), Lucas and Sargent (1979), Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Hansen and 
Sargent (1980), Chow (1980), Wallis (1980) and Pesaran (1987). Pagan (1986) provides a survey 
of the appropriate estimation methods for macro-econometric models with rational expectations.
53For problems associated with macroeconomic policy formulation using large econometric 
rational expectations models see, Christodoulakis, Gaines and Levine (1991).
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ables. The rational expectations hypothesis implies tha t individuals do not make 
system atic forecast errors since the inform ation set available to them  includes the 
past errors. Since expectations are forecasts conditional upon the set of available 
inform ation, the prediction errors are orthogonal to the inform ation set. In a 
stochastic environm ent this means th a t the unobservable subjective expectations 
are exactly the m athem atical conditional expectations which are derived from the 
model known to the individual.
The im plications of rational expectations for policy analysis are remarkably 
significant. Unlike conventional backward-looking models, models w ith forward 
expectations differentiate between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes. 
In the case of anticipated shocks, some responses prior to the actual shock might 
be expected. The same argum ent applies for tem porary and perm anent shocks. 
In a backward-looking environm ent, the model tends back to its original sta te  
when the tem porary shock is removed. However, a forward-looking expectations 
allows individuals to change their current behaviour on the basis of anticipating 
the future removal of a tem porary shock.
Lucas (1972a,b) has received the credit for applying the rational expectations 
hypothesis to  macroeconomic models. However, the full im pact of the rational 
expectations hypothesis on economic policy analysis and optim isation did not take 
place until the work of Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975), Barro (1976), 
Lucas (1976) and K ydland and Prescott (1977). Their work in itia ted  the debate 
known as policy ineffectiveness in models embodying rational expectations. For 
example, Sargent and Wallace (1975, p. 242) dem onstrated th a t in models with 
rational expectations “the probability distribution of ou tput is independent of 
the determ inistic money supply rule in effect” . In other words, the anticipated 
system atic m onetary policy could have no effect on the m ean and variance of
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output. This is a very strong result. It generalises the claim of Friedm an (1968) 
th a t in the long-run output was independent of m onetary policy: Sargent and 
Wallace concluded th a t output was independent of m onetary policy even in the 
short run.
A num ber of research work, based on the absence of sufficient fu ture or con­
tingent m arkets, were delivered to dem onstrate th a t the anticipated system atic 
m onetary policy does have some effects on output (see, for example, B uiter 1981). 
Also Stanley Fischer (1977) provides a model with rational expectations (based 
on sticky wages) in which system atic m onetary policy can be used to  stabilise 
the economy. However, Holly and Hughes H allett (1989) have shown th a t the 
neutrality  proposition of Sargent and Wallace is essentially associated with the 
concept of controllability in optim al control theory. In this context, th e  question 
of existence of optim al policy can be reduced to the controllability conditions in 
models w ith rational expectations.54 The work of Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
was significantly influential not only for its profound contribution to the policy 
ineffectiveness debate but for illustrating the case where the solutions to macro­
econometric models w ith rational expectations could be substantially different 
from the solutions obtained otherwise.
The assum ption of optimising behaviour in expectations form ation which is 
inherent in the rational expectations hypothesis ensures th a t the  system atic fore­
cast errors associated with alternative hypotheses (such as adaptive, regressive 
or extrapolative expectations which relate expectations on future values to past 
observations) are avoided. Although one might prefer a Bayesian predictor based 
on explicit optimising behaviour, the com parative convenience of em pirical imple­
54Given a model of an economy and given the policy sequence at the disposal of the policy­
maker, the controllability is defined as whether it is possible to reach any desired policy objec­
tives. Controllability is the necessary condition for the existence of optimal policies. See, for 
example, Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972).
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m entation can be considered as the strength of the rational expectations hypoth­
esis. However, the rational expectations hypothesis does not theoretically address 
im portan t issues such as the followings: How does an economic agent construct 
the true  structure of the economy used in forming the rational expectations? (par­
ticularly when there is not a general agreement amongst economists on how the 
economy functions in the real world). W hat are the learning and revision mech­
anisms by which economic agents optimise the process of expectations formation 
to avoid system atic forecast errors?
The work of Lucas (1976) fundam entally changed the process of policy evalu­
ation. He dem onstrated th a t the effects of different policy regimes on the  reduced 
form coefficients of an econometric model, arising from private sector’s expecta­
tions, were ignored in the conventional (backward-looking) approach. The eco­
nomic agents’ expectations play an im portant role in the Lucas critique. The 
structure of an econometric model depends on the optim al decisions of economic 
agents. Expected future behaviour of control variables effectively influence such 
optim al decision rules. Since expected values of policy variables vary w ith changes 
in policy regimes the structure of an econometric model will become dependent 
upon the policy rules. It should be noted tha t, as Buiter (1980, pp. 35-36) has 
observed, the Lucas critique does not necessarily rely on rational expectations; 
it is essentially based on the assumption th a t agents form expectations on their 
perceptions about the policy regimes.55
55 (tp rivate sector behaviour is influenced in many ways by expectations of future variables. If 
changes in government behaviour change these expectations, models that ignore such links from 
government behaviour via private expectations to private behaviour are likely to forecast poorly 
and to lead to misleading conclusions being drawn from policy simulations. This conclusion does 
not require Muth-rational expectations per se, only some direct effect of government behaviour 
on private expectations. The assumption of Muth-rational expectations provides the additional 
hypothesis that the link between private sector expectations and government behaviour comes 
through the private sector’s knowledge of the true structure of the model, including the param­
eters that describe government behaviour” (Buiter 1980, pp. 35-36).
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More specifically, the Lucas critique effectively refers to a significant weakness 
of econometric simulations to obtain predicted values of sta te  variables and hence 
to  provide a guidance for policy decisions. The essence of the argum ent is th a t 
the true  param eters in an econometric model may vary with alternative policy 
sequences. For example, Lucas (1967) shows how a change in the variance of the 
money supply (a policy param eter) will change the slope of the Phillips curve 
(a structu ra l param eter), implying th a t param eters of m acro-econometric models 
th a t appear structural m ay not be invariant to changes in policy. Hence, Lucas 
(1976, p. 20) concludes th a t “simulations using these models, can, in principle, 
provide no useful inform ation as to  the actual consequences of alternative eco­
nomic policies ... [This is] based not on deviations between estim ated and true 
structure prior to a policy change but on the deviations between the prior true 
s tructure and the true structure prevailing afterwards” .
Herein, lies the basic Lucas’ problem for what he calls the “theory of economic 
policy” . The classical methods of estim ating “structurally stable relationships” 
suitable for simulation with alternative policy sequences presupposes the  invariant 
character of estim ated structural relations to  policy rules: “To assume stability 
of [an econometric model] under alternative policy rules is thus to assume th a t 
agents’ views about the behaviour of shocks to the system are invariant under 
changes in the true behaviour of these shocks. W ithout this extrem e assumption, 
the kinds of policy simulations called for by the theory of economic policy are 
meaningless” (Lucas, 1976, p. 25). He adds tha t “Everything we know about 
dynamic economic theory indicates th a t this presum ption is unjustified” (p. 25).
In evaluating the Lucas critique, Gordon (1976) discusses th a t Lucas’ con­
dem nation of economic policy evaluation is not only pessimistic bu t is rather 
considerably overstated. He concludes, (p. 47), tha t “the effects of some pol­
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icy changes can be determ ined if param eter shifts are allowed and are either (a) 
estim ated from the response of param eters to policy changes within the sample 
period, or (b) are deduced from a 'priori theoretical consideration” . It is now 
agreed the Lucas critique has made it quite clear tha t policy evaluations cannot 
satisfactorily be performed within the classical theory of economic policies. In 
other words, existing econometric models cannot be used for exam ination of pol­
icy changes since the structural param eters, such as the propensity to  consume 
out of wealth or the interest elasticity of money demand, would likely change as 
policy changes.56
Nonetheless, the Lucas critique has inspired new em pirical research work in 
macroeconomics to identify the deep structural parameters. It is agreed (see, for 
example, Sargent 1982) th a t once the truly structural param eters in an econo­
m etric model (i.e. tastes and technology in utility  and production functions) 
are identified, the  response of consumers and producers to policy actions can be 
deduced. Instead of estim ating the structural relations, the param eters of, for 
example, u tility  function are estim ated in this new approach. In tertem poral op­
tim isation lies at the heart of this approach and the param eters (of, say, utility  
function) are estim ated from the first order conditions which are in fact the Euler 
equation.57
56For more recent critical comments on the Lucas critique, see Sims (1982, 1987) which 
specifies the very restrictive conditions under which the identification of differences between 
system behaviour under different policy rules with changes in system behaviour when the policy 
rule is changed at some point in future is valid. Tony Lawson (1995) offers one of the most 
recent contributions to the Lucas critique. He generalises the Lucas critique beyond the simple 
implications for policy simulations using already derived econometric models. He attempts 
to extend the critique to the “endeavours of constructing and estimating such models in the 
first place, if using observations recorded in periods in which policy rules have been frequently 
changing” (p. 258).
57In this regard, Hall and Mishkin (1982) have estimated the rational expectations life-cycle 
consumption model using panel data in order to arrive at the parameters’ estimation of a utility 
function. This method can also be used to test restrictions. For example, by testing restrictions 
imposed by the underlying model of intertemporal optimisation, Hall and Mishkin (1982) have 
found that about 20 per cent of consumers in their sample do not satisfy the first order Euler 
conditions, implying that they may be regarded as being liquidity constrained. For a further
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Despite the fact th a t the rational expectations hypothesis and particularly  the 
contributions by Lucas, have had profound effect on both policy modelling and 
econometric practice, in general and the mechanism of building policy-oriented 
macro-econometric models, in particular, it is by no means acceptable th a t all 
areas of macro-econometric behaviour should be modelled according to  forward- 
looking or rational expectations hypothesis. As Currie and Levine (1993, pp. 1-2) 
have pointed out “Even if we were convinced th a t all economic agents behaved 
in this way, backward-looking relationships can be regarded as empirically ac­
ceptable approxim ations if the influence of the past on current decisions greatly 
outweighs the influence of future (rational) expectations. The stability  of many 
macroeconomic relationships in the face of many changes in regime indicates tha t, 
for w hatever reason, the Lucas critique may not be all pervasive” .
2.7 T im e Inconsistency  and th e O ptim al Control 
o f M acro-econom etric M odels w ith  R ational E x­
p ectation s
The problem  of ensuring consistency in dynamic choice was first addressed in a 
seminal paper by Strotz (1956). The problem for Strotz was not to explore the 
implications of rational expectations for optimal policy-making. He was mainly 
concerned with examining the problem of optim al choice among a num ber of 
alternative tim e-paths for consumption when consumer’s taste  changes. For Strotz 
the crucial question was this: “if [a consumer] is free to reconsider his plan at 
later date, will he abide by it or disobey it- even though his original expectations 
o f future desires and means o f consumption are verified?” (p. 165, emphasis in 
the original). His answer is th a t the optim al plan of future behaviour chosen 
as of a given tim e “may be inconsistent with the optimising future behaviour of
discussion of this point and a strong critical analysis of the Euler equation approach (mainly 
with reference to its identification problems), see Garber and King (1983).
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the individual ( the intertemporal tussle). In this case, (1) the conflict may not be 
recognised and the individual will then be spend-thrifty (or miserly), his behaviour 
being inconsistent with his plans, or (2) the conflict may be recognised and solved 
either by (a) a strategy of pre-commitment, or (b) a strategy o f consistent planning” 
(p. 180, emphasis in the original). It is interesting to note th a t the concept of pre­
commitment, which is now widely used in optimal control of macro-econometric 
models with rational expectations, was originated and carefully applied by Strotz 
in 1956.
Note th a t for the  case of consumer behaviour considered by Strotz, a contrac­
tual savings scheme could enable an individual to enter into pre-com m itm ent to 
carry out the plan. It should also be noted th a t by the strategy of consistent 
planning, Strotz implies th a t the optim al current decisions are based on the as­
sum ption th a t plans will be revised in the future. The dynamic programm ing 
approach can essentially be used to formulate a consistent planning by imposing 
the principle of optim ality at each stage of planning.
The problem of inconsistency in dynamic choice was extended by Poliak (1968), 
Blackorby et al (1973), Pelag and Yaari (1973), and Hammond (1976), among oth­
ers. However, it was the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) which first 
recognised the possibility of optim al policies in models with rational (forward- 
looking) expectations to become sub-optim al through the passage of tim e (see, 
also Prescott, 1977). This property, which is known as time inconsistency or dy­
namic inconsistency in forward-looking models, has significant im plications for 
optim al control applications to economic policy-making practice.
More precisely, K ydland and Prescott (1977) have shown th a t when govern­
m ent economic policies affect the way in which the private sector’s expectations 
are formed, an optim al future policy obtained in one period will not be opti­
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mal from the vantage point of tha t future period, implying th a t ex ante optim al 
policies become sub-optim al ex post. In other words, when the current state  is 
a function of the announced future economic policies, tim e-consistent values for 
current and future policy-instrum ents are not optimal because a lower value for 
the objective (cost) function can be achieved by implementing a different value 
for the future policy-instrum ents. It is, therefore, to the advantage of the policy­
m aker to change the policies in subsequent periods which are in optim al from the 
vantage point of a previous period. This conclusion is based on the assum ption 
th a t economic agents take into consideration any relevant inform ation (including 
the inform ation on the intentions of policy-makers) in the process of optimising 
their dynam ic choice.
For causal or backward-looking models in which the current s ta te  is a function 
of both  the past state  variables and the current values of control variables, the 
application of the standard  optim al control techniques, such as Bellm an’s dynamic 
programm ing, does not face any problem. However, since the standard  dynamic 
programm ing does not accommodate the im pact of future policies on current 
values of state variables, the principle of optim ality breaks down for optim al 
control of non-causal or forward-looking models in which current sta te  variables 
depend on the anticipated future states.
To explain the failure of the principle of optim ality recall th a t, in engineering 
optim al control the current sta te  of a system, in a non-stochastic environm ent, 
is a function of the initial state and the sequence of policies applied, while the 
future state of the system depends upon the current policy and the current state. 
The private sector will respond to its own expectations of the fu ture state of 
the economy resulting from the policy actions announced by the government. 
The principle of optim ality m aintains th a t “an optimal policy has the  property
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th a t whatever the initial state  and initial decision are, the remaining decisions 
m ust constitu te an optim al policy with regard to the state  resulting from the 
first decision” (see Bellman, 1957). The assumption of forward-looking rational 
expectations hypothesis clearly violates the additive separability assumption of 
objective function inherent in the principle of optimality. W hen policy optim i­
sation unfolds, previous optim al policy recommendations may not appear to  be 
optim al due to the observed variations in state variables resulting from the realisa­
tion of forward-looking expectations. The dynamic programm ing solution, using 
backward recursive functional, does not provide the same answer as the global 
optim um  values unless the model is causal In other words, the time-consistent 
solution is not necessarity the same as the optimal solution unless the future 
decisions do not affect the current states, which could make the  system  causal.58
The above argum ent underlies the strong reservation of Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) on the application of optim al control theory to economic stabilisation poli­
cies. They argue th a t “even if there is an agreed-upon, fixed social objective 
function and policy-makers know the tim ing and m agnitude of the effects of their 
actions, discretionary policies, namely, the selection of tha t decision which is best, 
given the current situation and a correct evaluation of the end-of-period position, 
does not result in the social objective function being maximised. The reason for 
this apparent paradox is th a t economic planning is not a game against nature, 
but, rather, a game against rational economic agents. We conclude th a t there is 
no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expec­
tations are rational” (p. 473).
If K ydland and P resco tt’s recom mendation is not to attem pt to select policies
58For further discussions on this point, see Holly and Zarrop (1983), Levine and Holly (1987) 
and Holly and Hallett (1989). For an examination of the conflict between optimality and time- 
inconsistency, see Calvo (1978) who carefully examines the difference between the constraints 
facing the policy-maker in subsequent periods and what they were in the previous period.
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optimally, how should policies be selected? They join Lucas (1976) in saying tha t 
“economic theory [should] be used to evaluate alternative policy rules and tha t 
one with good operating characteristics be selected. It is probably preferable th a t 
selected rules be simple and easily understood, so it is obvious when a policy­
m aker deviates from the policy. There could be institutional arrangem ents which 
make it a difficult and time-consuming process to change the policy rules in all 
bu t emergency situations” (p. 487). In what follows we examine the  pattern  
of research work which has developed in response to the new outlook towards 
optim al policy design originated by the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott.
The underlying point is th a t the optim al policy choice is form ulated as a dy­
nam ic game between intelligent players, i.e. policy-makers and the private sector. 
Under such circumstances, the behaviour of the private sector is conditioned by its 
perception of the nature of the control to be applied. W hen the policy-maker an­
nounces the policies, and when the private sector’s expectations are formed, there 
is always an incentive for the policy-maker to renege on the previously announced 
policies (tim e-inconsistent optim al policies); and since this can be anticipated 
by the private sector, the announced policies lack credibility in the absence of 
a pre-com m itm ent mechanism. A simple solution follows th a t the governm ent’s 
discretionary power should be taken away by binding it to a fixed policy rule.
I t is im portant to  note th a t the failure of the standard optim al control theory in 
obtaining optim al policy sequence for dynamic economic systems w ith forward- 
looking expectations is not the result of the structural shortcoming of control 
theory in handling systems which actively react to control signals. One can argue 
th a t the prim e interest of many econometricians and m athem atical economists in 
the la te  1960’s and early 1970’s were basically in the autom atization of optim al 
economic planning, the  com putations of optim al policies in econom etric models,
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and the exam ination of m athem atical properties of optim al policy and sta te  tra ­
jectories. This overshadowed the very basic argument of the s tructu ra l differences 
between physical and economic systems and hence largely ignored those properties 
specific to  economic systems which usually constrained the applications of engi­
neering control theory. Otherwise, m athem atical economists and econometricians 
did not have to  wait until the 1980’s and early 1990’s to approach the dynam ic 
optim isation of economic systems from a game theoretic point of view. M athe­
m atical control theory had so much to offer in gam e-theoretic control theory as 
early as the late 1950’s.59
In the context of a two-person (government and the private sector), non-co­
operative closed-loop game in which policy rules at any tim e are functions of the 
state  a t th a t tim e and thus of the new information set which becomes available, 
each player’s policies affect the sta te  and, therefore, influence the fu ture poli­
cies via the closed loop or feedback mechanism. Each player minimises his cost 
function by choosing his optim al policies subject to equations of m otion and the 
rules of the  game (for example, Stackelberg or Nash assumptions for single-stage 
or one-shot games).
W ith  regard to  the hierarchical structure of the Stackelberg games in which a 
leader (the government) can impose his actions on a follower (the private sector), 
the dom inant player anticipates the reactions of the follower to announced policies 
and then optimises accordingly. The government optimises subject to the  private 
sector’s first-order conditions for optimality. However, Miller and Salmon (1983, 
1984) have shown tha t, in contrast to the single-controller, the optim al rule cannot 
be expressed as a linear tim e-invariant feedback even if an open loop Stackelberg 
game is assumed. They have dem onstrated tha t, in this case, optim al policies are
59See Berkowitz and Fleming (1957), Ho, Bryson and Baron (1965) and Behn and Ho (1968) 
for an approach based on differential games and optimal pursuit-evasion strategies.
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either a linear time-varying contingent rule or a type of integral control.
In this regard, Levine and Currie (1984) argue th a t such rules are attractive 
because they avoid feedback on other possible unknown variables. The open loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium  exists if the leader is com m itted to  pursue his announced 
optim al policies. As discussed earlier, under the assum ption of unrestricted dis­
cretion, the dom inant player can benefit by reneging on the  announced initial plan 
since the leader knows th a t his announced future plans can significantly influence 
the follower. However, after the expectations are formed, bygones are bygones and 
the departure from the ex ante optim al policies becomes more profitable . Note 
th a t the  plan which involves the combination of announcement and reneging is 
dynam ically consistent since there is no incentive to depart from it (the perfect 
cheating solution in Currie and Levine, 1985).
The formal procedure of incorporating rational expectations into the optim al 
control problem  is to partition  the state  vector into predeterm ined state  variables 
and a vector of non-predeterm ined forward-looking (free or jum p) variables.60 
Levine and Currie (1983, 1984) and Currie and Levine (1983, 1984a,b,c) have 
obtained the complete solution to control rules in rational expectations models. 
They have found th a t a feedback rule on the predeterm ined sta te  variables must 
be in the form of either a linear time-varying rule on the current value of the 
predeterm ined sta te  variables or a time-invariant rule on the current and past 
values of such variables.
W hen the two players (government and the private sector) in teract according 
to Nash assumption, each player takes the o ther’s actions as given and thus each 
has equal status in the game. In other words, under the Nash assum ption, each 
player has no influence on the behaviour of others and hence an equilibrium  posi­
60For the exact definition of these terms, see Currie and Levine (1982) and Buiter (1984).
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tion is one th a t provides no incentive for players to move. W hilst the Stackelberg 
assum ption appears to  be more satisfactory in explaining governm ent-private sec­
to r’s behaviour in macro-econometric models, the policy-maker, under the Nash 
assum ptions, should ensure th a t the expectations are consistent w ith the opti­
mised policies, since with rational expectations hypothesis economic agents under­
stand and correctly anticipate the policy-makers’ policies. In an open loop Nash 
game, each player minimises his cost function subject to the system  dynamics 
while treating  as param etric his rivals’ policy vector.
Currie and Levine (1985) provide a solution to the open loop Nash game in the 
context of optim al control theory. The Nash assumption ensures the identity  of ex 
ante and ex post optim al policies since there will not be an incentive to  renege on 
the announced polices. The Nash game precludes time-inconsistency by making 
players ignore the effects of their decisions on the rivals’ policy rules.61
2.7.1 T im e In con sisten cy , R ep u ta tion  and th e  S toch astic  
E nvironm ent
Repeated games involve memory and thus current strategies depend upon the 
past history of the game. The resulting notions of reputation and credibility may 
prevent the government to depart from the announced optim al plan. The problem 
of reputation building and its implications for time-inconsistency are reported in 
Barro and Gordon (1983). Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) and Barro (1986) provide 
a num ber of im portant extensions and Currie and Levine (1993) present the most 
recent advances on this issue.
The essential point is th a t designing a superior policy to  the Nash strategy is 
possible only when the policy-maker is concerned with reputation. The contribu­
tions on reputational considerations can be regarded as an im portant development
61For a survey of Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium strategies in dynamic games, see Cruz 
(1975).
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in the time-inconsistency literature. The mechanism of reputation building is an 
interesting complex problem. For example, Backus and Driffill (1985a,b) refer to 
the im plausible length of tim e th a t the government and the private sector have 
been playing the game in the UK experience of anti-inflationary policies. The 
UK governm ent’s com m itm ent to such policies has been m et w ith private sector 
scepticism to expect higher inflation. The behaviour of the private sector has not 
reflected the com m itm ent of government to anti-inflationary policies.
Much of w hat has been said earlier for the determ inistic case can be applied to 
the more realistic stochastic environments. Levine and Currie (1984) have shown 
th a t the certainty equivalence property of linear systems with quadratic cost func­
tion applies equally to the optim al control problems with rational expectations. 
In other words, the optim al control rule is the same for the stochastic and deter­
ministic cases when the system is linear and the cost function is quadratic. In a 
further contribution to optim al control of stochastic rational expectations m od­
els, Currie and Levine (1985) have pointed out the significance of th e  discount 
param eter on the tim e inconsistency property of the optim al policy in a stochas­
tic environm ent. W hen the policy-maker gives higher weight to the future the 
incentive to renege on the announced policies declines. The policy-maker should 
weigh the advantages of reneging against the costs of pursuing the inferior tim e 
-consistent rule w ith respect to  future shocks. As Currie and Levine (1985) con­
clude, if the rate  of discount is not too high, the future cost will outweigh the gains 
from reneging. This implies th a t the policy-maker has an incentive to adhere to 
the ideal rule and thus avoid the tem ptation to cheat. Since the private sector is 
aware of this, the ideal rule is credible and sustainable.
It is well-known th a t stochastic shocks transform a determ inistic policy game 
into a repeated game. The policy-maker is, therefore, more inclined to invest
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in its reputa tion  to secure long-term policy gains rather than  short-term  gains 
from reneging. However, as Currie and Levine (1985) have pointed out “the  key 
assum ptions are th a t governments last for ever and th a t the private sector never 
forgets past inconsistencies so reputations cannot be re-established” .
There are argum ents suggesting th a t in a stochastic environm ent an observed 
policy change should be decomposed into two components: one arising from the 
optim al response to  random  shocks (stabilisation component) and the other, aris­
ing from the time-inconsistency of the optim al policies (strategic component). 
Although such an uncertainty about the cause of an observed policy change is 
beneficial to the policy-maker by exploiting the private sector’s uncertainties, the 
private sector might become more inclined to  distrust any government announce­
m ents due to the  resulting higher levels of confusion. Canzoneri (1985) provides 
an exam ple of this type of problems by examining m onetary policy games and the 
role of private information.
A stochastic environm ent sheds more light on the question of simple rules 
versus full optim al feedback rules. Recall our earlier discussion on Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) who strongly advocated simple rules on the basis th a t they have 
good operational characteristics and can easily be understood, allowing private 
sector to m onitor policy-makers’ deviations from the announced policies. The 
second property is of crucial im portance particularly when the private sector’s 
behaviour depends strongly on their understanding of governm ent’s announced 
policies.
As Levine and Currie (1984) have shown, simple rules which are specified at 
the initial period to be linear tim e-invariant feedback rules on the sta te  variables 
do not satisfy the property of certainty equivalence. One m ight, therefore, argue 
th a t the performance of these rules becomes a function of the natu re of the future
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stochastic unknown disturbances. This can significantly reduce the desirability 
of simple rules in practical im plem entations. In a series of papers, Currie and 
Levine (1983, 1984a,b,c) and Levine and Currie (1983, 1984) have reported the 
possibility of identifying simple rules th a t perform well in the presence of different 
random  disturbances. Since simple rules are basically designed to protect against 
random  exogenous shocks, they are sensitive to the nature of such disturbances.
The inform ation concerning a group of shocks specific to an economy is, therefore, 
of v ital im portance in designing simple rules.
2.7.2 R ational E xpectations and E conom etric M od­
elling in P ractice
Lessons from the repeated-gam e literature together with the advances in reputa­
tional equilibrium, strategic behaviour involving memory, stochastic environm ents 
in game theory and information structure of games have substantially  enriched 
the literatu re  on economic policy optim isation with forward-looking expectations.
An im portan t question is how these ideas are relevant to as well as being useful 
in the practice of economic policy-making in the real world
In contrast to m ajor theoretical advances in macro-economics during the past 
twenty years, It appears th a t macroeconomists in business and government have 
largely continued to base their forecasting and policy analysis on conventional 
m edium  to large-scale macro-econometric models. To explain the disparity be­
tween the theoretical macro-economics and applied macro-econometrics one may 
argue th a t the nature and complexities of these theoretical developments have 
been of the sort th a t cannot be quickly adopted by applied macro-econometricians.
Manldw (1988, p. 437-438) provides an analogy from the history of science 
to support the above argument: “The Copernican system held out the  greatest
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promise for understanding the movements of the planets in the simplest and in­
tellectually m ost satisfying way. Yet if you had been an applied astronom er, you 
would have continued to  use the Ptolem aic system. It would have been fool­
hardy to navigate your ship by the more promising yet less accurate Copernican 
system. Given the state  of knowledge im mediately after Copernicus, a complete 
separation between academic and applied astronomers was reasonable and indeed 
optim al” . It appears th a t M ankiw’s argum ent is not very convincing since it is 
based on the assum ption th a t the real value of the recent theoretical advances in 
macro-economics will u ltim ately be judged by whether they prove to be useful to 
applied econometricians. The validity of this argument can be seen only through 
the passage of tim e. In other words, w hat Mankiw is really suggesting is th a t we 
should wait to  see its “success” .
Com putational difficulties associated with optim al control solutions for m od­
els w ith forward expectations have been one of the real obstacles in applied work. 
Recall th a t an optim isation algorithm usually requires a Jacobian m atrix  of first 
derivatives of targets w ith respect to control variables in all periods. In con­
trast to conventional backward-looking models, where target variables respond 
only to  current and lagged values of control variables, in models w ith forward 
expectations, such derivatives require the evaluation of m odel-consistent forward 
expectations.62
O ptim isation of large scale non-linear models with rational expectations can 
become excessively expensive from com putational point of view. O btaining linear 
representations of the original non-linear models is a reasonable a ttem p t to deal 
w ith non-linear models. For example, Christodoulakis, Gaines and Levine (1991) 
have linearized the London Business School model before developing a m ethodol­
ogy to  design optim al fiscal and m onetary policies for large econom etric models
62For a further discussion of this point, see Wallis (1995).
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with rational expectations.63
It is now generally agreed th a t despite its im m ediate low practical returns, the 
optim al control of macro-economic models with forward-looking expectations has 
considerable potential in advancing the econometric practice of model building. 
By emphasising micro-foundations as well as macro-economic policy coordinations 
(at national and international levels), macro-econometric modelling with rational 
expectations provides a better understanding of the real economy at work. It may 
also provide a profound im pact on changing the outlook and the way economic 
policies are being designed. The two concepts of time-inconsistency and credibility 
are the most im portant outcomes when optim al control of an economic system 
is viewed as a dynam ic game between intelligent players. These concepts will 
continue to play a significant role in an econometric approach towards optim al 
economic planning for the foreseeable future.
2.8 Sum m ary and Concluding R em arks
In this chapter we have been concerned with some of the m ain underlying rea­
sons for using m athem atical and engineering control theory in economic policy 
optim isation and the lim itations of their applications. More specifically, we have 
identified the conditions under which economic applications of optim al control 
theory have produced results of value. The prospects for fu ture cooperation be­
63For earlier work on implementations of rational expectations in the London Business 
School model, see Budd et al (1984). See also Levine (1988), Levine and Currie (1987) and 
Christodoulakis and Levine (1988) for further elaboration on this point. Hall (1986) presents a 
Nash-type computation in a model with a single forward expectations variable. For a Stackelberg 
approach in deriving an inflation-unemployment trade-off by optimal control in a model with 
three forward expectations variables, see Wallis et al (1987, chapter 3) and for an appraisal of 
such different computational methods, see Fisher (1992, chapter 7). Both the Bank of England 
[Easton and Matthews (1984)] and the Treasury [Spencer (1984)] have reported experimenting 
with models incorporating rational expectations. Similarly, Darby (1984) reports on the Na­
tional Institute’s work on macro-economic models with rational expectations. And finally, for 
an optimal control software for rational expectations models, see Gaines, al-Nowaihi and Levine 
(1989).
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tween control theorists and economists are also considered. We have presented in 
this chapter an analytical and historical framework to  exam ine the past 45 years 
of research work in this field as well as the partnership between control engineers 
and economists in applying control theory to economic policy optim ization. The 
m ain concluding remarks are stated  below.
1. The early applications of classical m athem atical optim ization techniques in 
economic analysis, appeared in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, did not profoundly 
encourage the application of control theory to economic analysis.
2 . Following the great depression of the 1930’s the study of economic regula­
tions and stabilisation policies became fashionable. The Keynesian contribution 
m ade the government the m ain economic regulator and stabiliser on the  ground 
th a t an inherent tendency to  generate stability and full employment does not exist 
in a capitalist economy. On the other hand, the servo-mechanism (self-regulating 
systems or autom atic stabilisations) was being extensively discussed in the clas­
sical control theory of the 1930’s, 1940’s and the early 1950’s. This encouraged 
the interest of economists in engineering stability theory. However, the  direct 
economic applications of stability and self-regulation in the servo-mechanism did 
not take place until the 1950’s with the contributions of the engineers Goodwin 
(1951), Simon (1953), Tustin (1953) and the economist Phillips (1954).
3. Stability-type applications of control theory to economics soon came to 
an end because classical control theory itself entered the new realm  of m odern 
control theory in the la te 1950’s and early 1960’s through developments of Pon- 
tryagin’s m axim um  principle and Bellm an’s dynamic programming. In this new 
perspective, any controller, in a dynam ic system design context, should posses 
some optim ality character. However, the ideas of feedback and closed-loop con­
trol systems from classical control theory remained an im portan t analytical tool
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in economic policy optim ization.
4. The encouraged interest in m athem atical economic growth theories which 
were stim ulated  by the rapid economic growth in advanced industrial countries 
in the 1960’s produced a vast literature on optim al growth theories based on 
Ram sey-type models of the  1920’s enhanced by contributions of von Neumann 
and Kantorovich together with theoretical advances in u tility  and social welfare 
functions. In this framework, the first order conditions in Pontryagin’s maxim um  
principle proved to be the most effective m ethod in analyzing the optim ality 
conditions in growth paths. Modern optim al control theory has perform ed its 
most significant contribution in the theory of policy optim ization in the 1960’s.
5. The 1970’s is the decade of econometrics and control theory. Many control 
theorists became interested in econometrics and many econom etricians applied 
optim al control techniques in their m edium  and large-scale linear and non-linear 
models. These applications had become so fashionable th a t overshadowed the 
very interesting and original techniques, developed quite separately from control 
theorists, by economists such as Theil (1964), to study the properties of optim al 
economic policies.
W hilst the applications of determ inistic optim al control to linear models w ith 
quadratic objective functions produced com putationally trac tab le  optim um  state  
trajectory  and policy sequence, applications of stochastic and adaptive control 
to non-linear econometrics models proved to be only an academic exercise in the 
literature of the la te  1970’s and early 1980’s. Due to the accum ulated forecasting 
errors and model misspecification which cannot be effectively trea ted  by stochastic 
optim al control techniques, policy-makers were not in a position to  prefer econo­
m etric control models to their classical simulation models on the  ground th a t the 
la tte r could easily accom m odate policy-makers’ value judgem ents.
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6. The applications of more advanced control techniques, such as dual control 
and estim ation or probing and caution in stochastic control, only proved to  be of 
theoretical interest and cannot constitute a significant improvement in the quality 
of optim al policies or system performances in economic analysis.
7. By the early 1980’s, the basic techniques of optim al control theory, i.e. 
determ inistic, stochastic and adaptive controls together with their com putational 
and estim ation applicabilities to econometric models of optim um  policy design 
were carefully analysed by economists and their potentials and shortcomings had 
been fully identified. Research work since then has been directed either towards 
detailed exam inations of economic policy issues within the well-known standard  
control techniques, or have been m otivated by securing economic applications of 
optim al control theory in the presence of rational expectations hypothesis.64
8. Control theory, together with fundam ental concepts in systems theory such 
as controllability and observability, rem ain valuable tools in analyzing dynam ic 
properties of econometric models as well as in measuring the sensitivity of model 
specifications with respect to different patterns of priorities and estim ation tech­
niques.
9. The idea of autom ation has always been the underlying theoretical basis 
of engineering optim al control. This is in sharp contrast to the im possibility of 
autom ation in economic planning practices. When, following Keynes, the gov­
ernm ent was seen as the main controller, optim al control techniques were most 
warmly welcomed by the community of m athem atical economists who viewed eco­
64In this regard, in addition to a number of journal papers referred earlier, the following books 
should be mentioned: Holly, Rustem and Zarrop (1979), Bensoussan, Kleindorfer and Tapiero 
(1980), Liu (1980), Kendrick (1981), Murata (1982), Feichtinger (1982), Feichtinger (1985), Aoki 
(1987), Carraro and Sartore (1987), Martos (1987), Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989), Beavis 
and Dobbs (1990), Gabszewicz, Richard and Wolsey (1990), Petit'(1990), Kamien and Schwartz 
(1991), Leonard and Vanlong (1992) and Currie and Levine (1993).
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nomic planning for stabilisation and growth simply as a m athem atical theory of 
optim ization.
T he definite success of engineering control theory in achieving the high ac­
curacy in guidance systems, in control of industrial processes, and in electronic 
systems did not provide any opportunity for the early Keynesian economists to 
th ink  seriously about the underlying differences between physical and economic 
systems. Economic policy optim ization are dynamic systems in which the feed­
backs between government decisions, as the main controller and private sector’s 
reactions to such controls are decisive. Economic systems are adaptive in nature 
in which actions and reactions constitute the mechanism of economic behaviour. 
By revealing such structural differences, the rational expectations hypothesis has 
directed control theory treatm ents of economic policy optim ization to  the new 
realm  of gam e-theoretic approach. Control theory as a powerful optimization 
technique has enriched the theoretical analysis of optim al properties of economic 
policies since the  1960’s and will continue to do so.
10. The increasing evidence th a t the traditional models did not adequately 
represent the da ta  led to a growing theoretical emphasis on dynam ic specifica­
tions and model selection in econometrics. This provides an exam ple of how the 
data  inconsistency could enhance further developments in econometric analysis. 
Moreover, theoretical developments in rational expectations, time-inconsistency 
and dynam ic optim isation persuaded the theorists to believe th a t the traditional 
econometric models cannot successfully represent the theory. This led to  the Lu­
cas critique. The response of m athem atical economists and econometricians were, 
respectively, to give much greater priority to represent theory at the expense of 
statistical analysis and to represent data  at the expense of theory. The theory- 
based calibrated models and the data-based vector autoregressions are the two
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well-known m anifestations of this response.
11. The significant step towards the unification of theory and observation in 
applied work is the dynamic optim isation approach which provides a direct link 
between the neoclassical optim isation theory and applied econometric models. 
This approach, which is developed as a response to the rational expectations 
hypothesis and the Lucas critique, gives more emphasis to  the role of economic 
theory in econom etric modelling. All the behavioural equations, in this approach, 
are obtained directly as solutions to the dynamic optim isation problem facing an 
economic agent.
The crucial role of economic theory in the unification of theory and obser­
vation, advocated strongly by Smith and Pesaran, can basically be sum m arised 
as the replacem ent of the unobservable shadow prices by a functional form from 
observable variables. This allows economic theory to work outside the fram e­
work of dynamic optim isation not only to relax the com putational aspects of 
estim ation for prediction but to perm it other relevant economic variables to enter 
optim isation problem through their influence on the shadow prices. While ad­
m itting th a t Sm ith and Pesaran’s contribution is a significant advance towards 
strengthening the  link between m athem atical economics and econometrics, they 
have not justified the use of optimising models in building a bridge between theory 
and observation. Despite the fact th a t the dynamic optim isation models offer a 
substantial alternative w ithin the framework of theory-based models, the assump­
tion of representative agent, among the other serious restrictive assumptions, is a 
strong im pedim ent in bridging the gap between theory and observation in applied 
econometrics.
13. The recognition of the gap between theory and observation has been con­
ducive to  the advancement of our knowledge about the problem atic interplay of
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economic theorisation and applied econometric model building. Having realised 
the possibility of a theory becoming a straitjacket, the econometricians, despite 
the teaching of the  Cowles Commission’s dichotomy of economic theory and econo­
m etric models, are now in a strong position in practice to  constantly revise and 
modify economic theories in order to make them  more suitable for applied work. 
However, the lack of coherent theoretical justification is a real weakness which 
will persist in econometric practice for the foreseeable future.
14. A ttem pts to  accommodate rational expectations in control theory appli­
cations to economic policy optim isation necessarily involve game theoretic ideas. 
The am ount of inform ation th a t each player (government as the  controller and 
the private sector) has on the constraints of the other player is an im portan t fac­
tor in deriving th e  optim al solution. The fact th a t the public has considerable 
inform ation on governm ent’s objectives and constraints in a dem ocratic environ­
m ent significantly lim its the success of any set of optim isation policies. Moreover, 
despite being Pareto-optim al, the assumption of a cooperative game is not al­
ways realistic. On the other hand, there is no possibility of stopping a player 
from reneging on the cooperative solution or from cheating in a non-cooperative 
setting. Although the loss of reputation when the government reneges on the 
announced policies might ease the severity of this problem, the non-optim ality of 
the policies adopted will rem ain a crucial issue.
15. W hen the government plays the dominant role in a single-stage non- 
cooperative game, the optim al policies will become tim e-inconsistent and thus 
violate the principle of optimality. The incentive to renege on the announced 
policies transform s the conventional optim al control of economic systems to the 
problem of finding policies which are optim al w ithin the subset of credible and 
tim e-consistent policies. Lessons from the repeated game literature together with
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the advances in reputational equilibrium, strategic behaviour involving memory, 
stochastic environm ents in game theory, and information structure of games have 
substantially enriched this literature.
16. Despite its im m ediate low practical returns, the optim al control of macro­
econometric models w ith forward-looking expectations have considerable poten­
tials in advancing the econometric practice of model building. By emphasising 
micro-foundations as well as macro-economic policy coordinations (at national 
and international levels), macro-econometric model-building with rational expec­
tations provides a better understanding of the real economy at work. It may also 
provide a profound im pact on changing the outlook and the way economic poli­
cies are being designed. The two concepts of time-inconsistency and credibility 
are the most im portant outcomes when optimal control of an economic system 
is viewed as a dynam ic game between intelligent players. These concepts will 
continue to play a  significant role in an econometric approach towards optim al 
economic planning.
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Chapter Three
Optimal Consumption Behaviour 
Under Liquidity Constraints: an 
Application of Optimal Control 
Theory
3.1 Introduction
Recent em pirical work using both micro and macro da ta  have shown th a t con­
sum ption is excessively sensitive to current income than what is w arranted by 
perm anent income-life cycle hypothesis.65 The excess sensitivity of consumption 
to income can be attribu ted , among other things, to the lack of a perfect capital 
m arket. The fundam ental assumption of LC-PIH is th a t households maximise 
their lifetime u tility  functions subject to their lifetime budget constraints when 
free borrowing and lending to smooth consumption are possible. Im perfect cap­
ital m arkets are largely characterized by borrowing or liquidity constraints. A 
“liquidity constrained” household cannot borrow freely to  sm ooth its consump­
tion trajectory  over time; thus current income becomes a m ajor determ inant of 
current consumption.
The im portance and consequences of liquidity constraints in models of con­
sum ption behaviour are discussed in section 3.2. O ptim al control of m ulti-stage
65See, for example, Hall (1978), Hall and Mishkin (1982), Flavin (1985), Zeldes (1989), Cush­
ing (1992) and Jappelli and Pagano (1994).
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dynam ic model of consumption behaviour under liquidity constraints is the main 
focus of the remaining six sections in this chapter. A rational forward-looking 
consumer is assumed to behave according to  a familiar Ramsey model w ith addi- 
tively separable u tility  function. Having a span of life T , the consumer is assumed 
to have an initial financial wealth A q and receives a real disposable income Yt in 
period t. He consumes Ct in period t and it is further assumed th a t his ra te  of 
tim e preference is S. The real rate of interest r  is assumed to be a determ inis­
tic function of tim e. Although the assumption of a known real ra te  of return  is 
ra ther binding, except for the case where the government issues indexed bounds, 
it is used here for its m athem atical tractability. The assum ption of an additively 
separable utility  function is also a restriction on consumer’s preferences, bu t it 
is commonly used in the literature because of its analytical convenience. It is 
further assumed th a t there is no rationing in the goods m arket, so consumers are 
not constrained by the purchase of goods and services.
The problem  facing the consumer is to find the optim al consumption path
which maximises his expected lifetime utility  function subject to  a lifetime budget
constraint and an additional constraint on borrowing. This leads to the following
maxim ization problem  in standard  calculus of variation,
T
J  = M a x  E  J  e~5tU[C(t)]dt, (3.1)
to
subject to
At+i =  (14 * v)At +  Yt — Ct, (3*2)
A t >  0. (3.3)
It is assumed th a t U[C(t)] is increasing and strictly concave. Inequality (3.3)
implies the existence of liquidity constraint. This means the consum er’s end-
of-period financial asset, after receiving income and allowing for consumption 
expenditure, cannot be negative. In other words, this inequality reflects the fact
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th a t consumers cannot consume today the income which they receive tomorrow. 
This condition can, of course, be generalised to
>  - a ,  (3.4)
where a is the lim it on net indebtedness. Further generalization will also be 
considered in this chapter.
To exam ine the role of liquidity constraints, it is useful to  consider first the 
optim al consumption behaviour in the absence of liquidity constraints, i.e. where 
consumers can borrow and lend freely at the riskless rate. This will allow us 
to  exam ine the effects of liquidity constraints on the optim al properties of the 
consumption path . In this case, the optim ization problem reduces to  the  maxi­
m ization of equation (3.1) subject to constraint (3.2). In section 3.4, optim al con­
sum ption trajecto ry  and its properties are obtained by the m ethod of Pontryagin’s 
maximum principle. It is also shown, in this section, th a t such applications lead 
to the H all’s random  walk hypothesis of consumption behaviour. Applications 
of Bellman}s dynamic programming to  optim al consumption path  for the same 
problem  is also exam ined in this section. We have shown th a t the application 
of the dynam ic programm ing confirms Hall’s hypothesis. Using the direct search 
technique based on Bellm an’s principle of optimality, we have obtained the basic 
recurrence functional equation for optim al consumption behaviour.
Generalization of the results obtained in sections 3.3 and 3.4 to the case where 
liquidity constraints are binding will then follow. Functional recurrence equation 
and envelope theorems are used in section 3.5 to derive the m athem atical prop­
erties of the optim al consumption path  when liquidity constraints bind. Section 
3.6 deals w ith the application of the generalised Hamiltonian and the rejection of 
Hall’s random  walk hypothesis for liquidity constrained consum ption functions. 
It is shown, among other results, th a t the application of control theory provides
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an explicit m athem atical relation to examine the effects of liquidity constraints 
on consum ption behaviour. Problems associated with interest ra te  variations and 
in tertem poral elasticity of substitution in optim al consumption path  under liquid­
ity constraints are the subject of section 3.7. Section 3.8 considers the properties 
of optim al consumption in a stochastic environment, which is then followed by a 
sum m ary and concluding remarks in section 3.9.
3.2 T he Im portance and Im plications o f Liquid­
ity  C onstraints in C onsum ption M odels
Liquidity constraints, as an explanatory variable in consumption models, neces­
sarily introduce a num ber of interesting theoretical problems such as follows.
1. Liquidity constraints which represent the lack of financial deepening, can be 
regarded as an im portant determ inant in consumption-saving behaviour in devel­
oping countries which are usually characterised by financial underdevelopment.
Defining financial deepening as increases in the ratio of financial assets to 
G D P  and defining excess sensitivity parameter as the fraction of consumers who 
are more sensitive to  current income than  what PIH implies, one expects an in­
verse relationship between excess sensitivity param eter and financial deepening. 
This leads to the hypothesis th a t M cKinnon’s type of financial liberalisation 66 in 
developing countries, which would ease borrowing constraints, will reduce the ex­
cess sensitivity param eter. In this regard, one can argue tha t, in general, liquidity 
constraints make fiscal policies such as tax  cuts or debt-financed fiscal spending 
more effective. A fall in current income affects consumption behaviour in devel­
oping countries more severely as compared to developed countries because a large 
portion of consumers in developing countries are liquidity constrained.67
66See McKinnon (1973).
67See, for example, Hubbard and Judd(1986) and Heller and Starr(1979).
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2. The relationship between liquidity constraints and the aggregate saving rate  
is interestingly complex. The inability of households to borrow the desired am ount 
in an im perfect credit m arket might lead to higher saving rates as com pared with 
saving ratios in developed financial m arkets. This problem has received a consid­
erable atten tion  in recent literature on consumption-saving behaviour. Hayashi, 
Ito and Slemrod (1988) have examined this property for the United States and 
Japan; Jappelli and Pagano (1994) have a ttribu ted  the high saving rates in Italy  to 
its relatively underdeveloped consumer credit and mortgage m arkets; and Muell- 
bauer and M urphy (1990) and Beyoumi (1991) argue th a t the  sharp decline of 
the UK saving rates in the  1980s might be due to financial deregulations. By 
increasing saving rates, liquidity constraints might induce capital accum ulation 
and hence can stim ulate higher rates of growth.
The above conclusion m ight appear to be inconsistent w ith the McKinnon type 
argum ent th a t financial developments enhance the process of economic growth. 
M cKinnon (1973) argues th a t by removing credit rationing, the resulting com peti­
tive financial interm ediation promotes more efficient allocation of credit to invest­
m ent and thus higher rates of return  on capital can be achieved.68 To reconcile 
the role of liquidity constraints in promoting growth rates w ith the McKinnon- 
Shaw model of financial liberalisation, one has to differentiate between credits to 
firms and credits to  households [Jappelli and Pagano (1994)]. Such differentiation 
can be rationalised in view of the average loan size, inform ational asym m etries 
and the cost of contract enforcement. However, the argum ent th a t “if banks ra­
tion credits to households while making it available to firms efficiently, capital 
accum ulation and growth will be enhanced”69 might be valid only w ithin a static 
framework. The maximising behaviour of firms will become adversely affected
68See McKinnon(1973). See, also Fry (1984), Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) among others.
69Jappalli and Pagano (1994), p. 84.
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by the  behaviour of liquidity constrained households in a dynam ic optim ization 
context through the resulting changes in households’ demand.
3. Demographic structure of the population is likely to be a key factor in 
explaining the relationship between liquidity constraints and saving rates. Faster 
growth rates might stim ulate the consumption of the young and thus reduce saving 
rates.
Liquidity constraints usually apply more severely to the young portion of pop­
ulation. The young usually find liquidity constraints more binding in smoothing 
the consumption pattern  over time. This is a point of particular im portance in 
modelling the nature and effects of liquidity constraints in developing countries 
due to their higher proportions of young population.
The existence of young population and the pervasive liquidity constraints in 
developing countries make the Keynesian type consumption function more data  
admissible. This does not, however, reduce the im portance of life-cycle pattern  
in consumption-saving behaviour in these countries because savings during the 
m iddle years would still be optim al if consumers wish to enjoy the period of 
retirem ent. This explains the fact th a t fiscal policies in developing countries 
which affect the current income is more effective to influence the consumption- 
saving trajectory. Moreover, as H ubbard and Judd (1986) argue, it is the young 
segment of the population which strongly feel the implications of such current 
income fluctuations.
4. Liquidity constraints may become closely linked with the concept of in­
form ational asymmetries and the related notions of adverse selection and moral 
hazards. The reason for the banks’ unwillingness to lend freely to households 
for consumption purposes might be the uncertainties about households’ future
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income as well as the risk of default. T hat explains why borrowing against the 
purchase of durable goods is not so binding because durable goods can be used 
as collateral.
Modelling the uncertainties associated with household’s fu ture income is cur­
rently one of the most active research work in theoretical developments in con­
sum ption theory. By adding the assumption of rational expectations to the stan­
dard life-cycle-permanent income hypothesis, Hall (1978) m ade the first significant 
a ttem p t in form ulating the stochastic implications of income in a consumption 
function. The household’s decision on how much to borrow and save is not usu­
ally independent of the uncertainties about future events. This makes the ques­
tion of insurance a m atter of crucial im portance in explaining saving-consumption 
behaviour in developing countries. The absence of an efficient system  of insur­
ance might further prom ote the precautionary saving motives. It follows th a t, as 
Besley (1993) m aintains, savings, credits and insurance in developing countries 
are closely related with one another and can best be analysed w ithin a unified 
theoretical framework.
Development of small scale indigenous financial institutions operating in rural 
and urban areas can partially relax household’s liquidity constraints arising from 
their future income uncertainties. Such financial institutions m ay successfully 
adm inister the optim um  allocation of loanable funds. The accuracy of inform ation 
about potential borrowers will minimise the risk of adverse selection and moral 
hazards associated with credit allocation.
5. Household’s uncertainties about their future income, a typical characteristic 
of developing countries, stim ulate precautionary motives to save. These motives 
interact w ith liquidity constraints because in an underdeveloped credit m arket 
where households are usually unable to  borrow when times are bad there exists
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an incentive for higher savings in good times.
6. A lthough any relaxations of liquidity constraints through improvements 
in consumer loan m arkets perm it an individual to  increase his consum ption, this 
increm ental consumption should be paid back with interest during the consum er’s 
life-cycle. Provided th a t the individual’s real income does not grow enough, this 
interest paym ent will constrain individual’s future consumption. Despite the fact 
th a t such a decline in future consumption might be consistent w ith individual’s 
u tility  maximisations a tendency may exist for aggregate consumption to fall when 
the economy is not growing fast enough to compensate for the aggregate interest 
paym ents.
7. Assuming th a t liquidity constrained consumers generally are more sensitive 
to current income variations as compared to liquidity unconstrained individuals; 
and assuming further th a t liquidity constrained and unconstrained individuals are 
usually the m onetary debtors and creditors, respectively, it follows th a t a signifi­
cant increase in the real ra te  of interest might have income redistributional effect 
between borrowers and lenders. This will affect the level of aggregate consump­
tion through the existing differences between marginal propensities to  consume. 
Note, however, th a t in the absence of liquidity constraints, the effect of changes 
in the interest ra te  on consumption is usually expected to be m inim al because the 
resulting intertem poral substitution and wealth effects work in opposite directions.
8. To the extent th a t the role of inflation on consumption behaviour is reduced 
to the effects of inflation-induced changes in interest rates on consumption, an 
increase in the rate  of inflation may affect the liquidity constrained consumption 
through interest rate variations.
9. Provided th a t the nominal rate of interest and the nominal credit ceilings are
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fully adjusted to accommodate the inflation rate, then consumption will rem ain 
unaffected because consum er’s real wealth has not changed. If the credit lim it for 
liquidity constrained consumers are not revised, they are forced in a position to 
reduce their consumption in proportion to any higher loan repaym ents resulting 
from the increased interest rates. To the extent th a t liquidity constrained individ­
uals reduce their consumption, the aggregate consumption m ay decline following 
an inflation.
10. Under the circumstances th a t an inflation rate does not change the  nominal 
ra te  of interest, the  resulting fall in the real interest rate implies a redistribution 
of income from liquidity unconstrained lenders to liquidity constrained borrowers. 
The net effect on consumption appears to be indeterm inate not because substi­
tu tion  and income effects work in opposite directions, but because there exists 
uncertainties on the future ra te  of inflation which hinders liquidity constrained 
consumers to increase their consumption in the first instance. However, as infla­
tion proceeds, liquidity constrained consumers can increase their consumption.
11. The composition of consum er’s asset portfolio is also im portan t because 
the higher the degree of asset’s liquidity in consumer’s portfolio the lower would 
be the liquidity constraints. The purchase of illiquid physical assets (houses and 
lands) may affect the liquidity constrained consumption behaviour in the  following 
ways: i) it reduces the portion of liquid assets in consumer’s portfolio and hence 
increases the liquidity constraints, ii) it constitutes a collateral for borrowing and 
hence decreases the future liquidity constraints. W ithin this context, th e  problem  
of credit rationing appears to be of prim e importance.
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3.3 O ptim al C onsum ption P roperties using th e  
M axim um  P rincip le
The problem  is to  maximise the objective function (3.1) subject to  the constraint 
(3.2). We employ the m ethod of maxim um  principle due to Pontryagin (1962). A t 
and Ct are sta te  and control variables, respectively. In section 3.3.1, we first show 
the application of the m axim um  principle to consumer’s intertem poral optim iza­
tion problem  produces an optim al consumption path  which has the  property th a t 
for an increasing consumption the ra te  of interest should exceed the  consum er’s 
rate of tim e preference. A Bernoulli-type utility  function is used in section 3.3.2 
to test the validity of the general result obtained in section 3.3.1. This example 
confirms the property r > S along the optim al trajectory of consum ption be­
haviour where r and 5 are the real ra te  of interest and the ra te  of tim e preference, 
respectively. In section 3.3.3, we dem onstrate how the H all’s im portan t result 
obtained in 1978, i.e. the random  walk hypothesis of consum ption behaviour, 
can directly be obtained by applying the m ethod of m axim um  principle to the 
classical m axim ization problem of consumer’s utility function.
For applying the m ethod of m axim um  principle in its continuous version, we 
first w rite equation (3.2), which in control terminology is usually called the equa­
tion of motion  or system dynamics, as follows,
— At = rAt -+* Yt — Ct.
The lim it of the above equation when we take discrete periods of length A t  and 
then let A t  tend to zero, provides a continuous version of the equation of motion. 
Note th a t since our flow variables, rA t , Yt and Ct, are now rates per unit of 
tim e, the right hand side of the above equation should be m ultiplied by A t.  We, 
therefore, have
A (t  +  A t)  -  A(*) =  [rA(*) +  y(*) -  C(*)]A t.
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Dividing by A t and letting A t go to  zero, will give the tim e derivative of A (t), i.e.
A(t) =  rA (t) +  y (f)  -  C{t).  (3 .5 )
Conventionally, we write t as a subscript in discrete models and as an argum ent 
in continuous cases. It is further assumed tha t the initial level of consum er’s 
financial asset is given, i.e.
A (t0) -  A(0) =  a.
3.3.1 C on su m er’s R a te  o f T im e P reference, In terest R a tes  
and th e  O p tim al P a th  o f C onsum ption
Defining the m ultiplier A(t), which in control terminology is also called co-state 
variable, auxiliary variable, adjoint variable, or dual variable, we can construct 
the H amil ton ian  as follows,
H  =  E  U[C(t)]e-s* +  A(t)[rA(t) +  Y{t)  -  C{t)}. (3.6)
Our control variable C ( i ) can maximise H  if
d H
dC(t)
=  0 ,
or
EU'[C( t) ]e-St^  \{ t) .  (3.7)
We observe th a t the m axim ization of the Hamiltonian gives the optim al consump­
tion variable C (t ) not as a function of tim e but a function of the co-state variable 
A(t). The tim e path  of the co-state variable is thus required. This entails solving 
a two boundary value problem in the canonical equations. From the canonical 
equations we have
d H  ■
=  m ,9A(t)
and by using equation (3.6) we have
A (t) = —r\( t ) .  (3.8)
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If we now solve equation (3.7) for C(t)  we obtain C(t)  as a function of A(£), which 
by substitu ting  back into the equation of motion, i.e. equation (3.5), we derive 
an equation in term s of sta te  variable A(t)  and the m ultiplier A(t). This together 
with equation (3.8) constitute a pair of differential equations for the s ta te  variable 
A(t)  and m ultiplier A(t). Note th a t due to  the simplicity of our problem , A(t) can 
directly be obtained from equation (3.8), which by substitution into equation (3.7) 
and into the equation of motion (which can be w ritten in term s of the  sta te  and 
the m ultiplier), provide the optim al trajectory  for consumption and the resulting 
financial asset.
We are, of course, interested more on the properties of optim al control and 
state  trajectories. To examine the optim al consumption trajectory, we differen­
tia te  equation (3.7) with respect to time. Since m arginal u tility  of consumption 
U'(C ) is a function of consumption, and C  is assumed to be a function of time, 
we have
B n m  = »*(*)
d C ( t ) dt dt
or
{ E  U"[C(t)]E C(t) -  5E U'[C{t)]}e“*  =  A(t).
Using equation (3.8) yields
{ E U ”[C(t) \EC{t)  -  6 E U ’[C(t)]}e-St =  - r A ( t ) .
We can now substitu te  equation (3.7) in the  right hand side of the  above equation 
to obtain
{ E  U"[C(t)]EC(t)  -  SE  C n C (i)]}e-ft =  - E  U'[C{t)]e-5tr ,
or
E  U"\C(t )]EC(t )  -  SE  y '[C (f)j =  —E  U'[C(t)]r.
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Dividing both  sides by EU'[C(t) \  yields
Defining rj(C) as the elasticity with which the marginal u tility  of consumption 
declines as consumption increases, i.e.
( C(t)U"[C(t)]  ^ Qr U"[C(t) _  77(C)
we will have
U'[C(t) ’ U‘[C{t)] C { t ) 5
EC(t )Er ,[C(t)}
or
E C ( t )  r — 8
=  8 —  v
C{t)
or E  C(t) A  r ~ S
Er,[C{t)  ]J C (i). (3.10)C(t) E V[C(t)Y
The assum ption of C A R A  can be used to simplify equation (3.10). Define pa — 
 or
EU"[C{t))
Pa E U '[C {t) \  Pa’
we can write equation (3.10) as follows,
p*aE  C{t) = r — 8. (3.10a)
Equation (3.10) together w ith the equation of motion, equation (3.5), provide a 
pair of differential equations in the sta te  variable A(t)  and the control variable 
C(t).  Given initial values for consumption and financial assets, these two differ­
ential equations determ ine the subsequent changes along the solution trajectory  
which passes through this initial point. Since U is an increasing function and is 
strictly concave, therefore, 77(C) >  0 . Equation (3.10) implies th a t the optim al 
level of consumption increases, i.e. C(t)  >  0, if r > 8, which means th a t the 
ra te  of interest exceeds the consumer’s rate of tim e preferences. Note th a t the 
alternative case, i.e. 8 > r , implies th a t the consumer can improve his position 
by borrowing a t the rate  r. The optim um  value of C will then decline at la ter 
stages in the life-cycle.
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According to 7’ >  d, consumers will accumulate assets indefinitely, and in 
the lim it, the income stream  becomes irrelevant as consumption comes to be 
financed increasingly out of capital income. Liquidity constraints are unlikely 
to be of relevance for such consumers. In fact, saving  and not borrowing is 
their concern. This does not, however, provide a serious problem  since we can 
assume th a t in the presence of no inheritance or bequest, the  discounted present 
values of consumption and income over the consumer life span m ust be equal. The 
optim ality  condition obtained above implies tha t the consumer should save during 
his early stages of life span and then spend income together w ith the accum ulated 
assets during his later years. Again, the finding of Carroll and Summers (1989) 
should be taken into account: although one expects tha t in occupations with an 
uncertain but relatively flat income profile consumers should accum ulate when 
they are young, but, as in most occupations, consumption tracks income closely.
3.3 ,2  T h e B ern ou lli C ase
Let us now consider the Bernoulli case, t/[<7(£)] =  lnC(t) .  This exam ple demon­
strates the validity of the result obtained in the previous section, i.e. along the 
optim al increasing consumption path  the property r > S holds. Despite the  strong 
criticisms pu t forward by Arrow (1965, 1970) on the application of this type of 
u tility  functions on the ground th a t they are not bounded, the support of Samuel- 
son (1969) among others, have made the use of Bernoulli type u tility  functions in 
economic analysis quite popular.
Consider a consumer with income y ( t)  who consumes C(t)  and whose financial 
assets is defined as in equation (3.5), which is repeated here.
A(t)  = rA( t)  +  F ( t)  — C{t).
A(t)  and C(t)  are state and control variables, respectively. All other notations 
are defined earlier. The consumer wishes to maximise the present value of his
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additively separable u tility  function defined as follows,
J  =  M a x  f e ~ st ln[C(t)]d(t).
J t  o
As before, we first define the Hamiltonian,
H  = ln{C(t)\e~st +  A(i)[rA(f) +  Y( t)  -  C (i)].
D ifferentiating H  w ith respect to the  control variable C(t) ,  yields
1 ,-st
C ( t ) ‘ m =  o,
or
1
C(f) = ■St
m  '
Equation (3.14) gives the optim al consumption trajectory  as a function 
m ultiplier A(tf).
From the canonical equations we have
d H
dX(*) =  a w ,
or
which upon the substitu tion of equation (3.14) becomes
rA (t) +  Y( t)  -  =  i f f ) .
We also have
=  m ,d A ( t ) 
or
—rX(t) = X (t).
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
of the
(3.15)
(3.16)
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Equations (3.15) and (3.16) are a pair of differential equations which can be solved 
for financial asset A(£) and the m ultiplier X(t). F irst, we write the general solution 
of equation (3.16) as follows,
A (f) =  A(0)e” r<. (3.17)
To find A(0), we substitu te equation (3.17) into equation (3.15) to obtain
A(t) =  rA( t)  +  Y{t)  -  X~1{ 0 ) e ^ \
or
A(t)  -  rA(t)  =  y ( t )  -  A - ^ O je ^ * .
M ultiplying both  sides by e~ri yields
[A(i) -  rA (^)]e-rt =  y ( t)e ~ rt -  X~l (0)e~St. (3.18)
Consider the term  A(t )e~rt. Taking differential with respect to t provides
■^[A(t)e~rt] =  A(2 )e~r:t — re~rtA(t)  = [A(t) — rA(t)]e~rt.
Substituting equation (3.18) into the above equation yields
which by integration we have
A (t)e -H -  A { 0 ) =  Y(t)[ 1 -  e~rt]/r -  A-X(0)[1 -
Since A{T)  is known, we can easily obtain A(0) from the above equation. This
will complete our solution for optim al values of financial assets and consumption
[from equations (3.15) and (3.16)].
Substitution of equation (3.17) into equation (3.14) yields the optim al trajec­
tory for consumption, i.e.
C(t) — [A~1 (0 )er<]e~l5t,
179
or
C(t)  =  A-l (0)e(' - ' s)‘. (3.19)
Equation (3,19) implies th a t the optim al level of consumption grows if r > 5. This 
is exactly the same result which we obtained in the previous section [see equation 
(3.10)]. The discussion on r < 5 is similar to what we have said before and will 
not be repeated here.
3.3 .3  P on tryag in ’s M axim um  P rin cip le  and H a ll’s R andom  
W alk H y p o th esis
In this section, we show th a t the application of Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle 
to consum er’s optim al consumption behaviour will lead to H all’s random  walk 
hypothesis of consumption behaviour. Similar results will be obtained in section 
3.4 using Bellm an’s dynamic programming. Recall tha t equation (3.9) played 
an im portant role in deriving equation (3.10). Defining pa as the A rrow -Pratt 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion C A R A  [Arrow(1970), Pratt(1964)], we have
U"[C(t)l 
Pa U'[C{t)\ ■
Substitu te pa in equation (3.9) to  obtain
E PaE  [<?(*)] =  r  -  <f.
To find a discrete analogue to this equation, we can apply the m ean value theorem. 
According to  this theorem  we have
r c(t  + h)~ G(t)
h
Equivalently,
E[C(t  + h) -  C(f)] =  h ^ ~ S\
E  pa
Assuming h = 1 and E  pa = p* provide
^ + i  ~  ~ ( r  — ^) +  ^  -f £t+i,
Pa
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=  C(t).
where it is assumed th a t f?(6 +i) =  0 . Following Hall(1978), we assume th a t the 
interest ra te  equals the subjective u tility  discount rate, i.e. r  =  5, Hence
C*+i — Ct +  6 + 1  j 
which is the random  walk hypothesis of consumption behaviour.
The above argum ent proves our claim th a t the result obtained by the Hall- 
Euler equation approach in modelling optim al consumption behaviour, which has 
established an active field of research in consumption theory since Hall (1978), 
can be derived directly by applying Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle to  classical 
problems of maximising consum er’s expected utility.
3.4 O ptim al C onsum ption  P roperties using th e  
D ynam ic Program m ing
The analysis of discrete tim e dynamic m ulti-stage optimal consum ption behaviour 
can best be analysed by using Bellm an’s dynamic programm ing. Consider a con­
sum er w ith the following objective function
M a x  J  = E
T
£ ( 1  +  i )~ ‘U(Ct) |fi, (3.20)
u=o
where is the expectation conditional on information set H at tim e t. S
is the individual’s rate  of tim e preference. The optim ization process, therefore, 
starts by maximising the present discounted value of expected utility  conditional 
on the inform ation set available at tim e to.
The consum er’s budget constraint is given by
At+i — (1 +  0^4-i T  Yt ~  Ct . (3.21)
At  is the consum er’s financial assets measured at the beginning of the period.
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The optim al consumption problem as proposed above, falls w ithin the domain 
of dynam ic optim ization. The individual consumer can act at tim e t Q to  select 
Co. He knows his initial assets at tim e f0 to select C0. A lthough the consumer 
knows his initial income Lo, we assume there exists uncertainties about his income 
next period. He can only guess what th a t income will be and upon this he takes 
his decision on consumption. Hence, the optim al policy at this stage will not 
be independent of what the consumption will tu rn  out to  be in next period; the 
la tte r in tu rn  will be a function of the optim al policy rule in the following stage. 
Such series of inter-related optim al policy formulations will continue as the process 
unfolds towards the end of planning horizon.
The dynam ic programm ing formulation of optim al consumption behaviour is 
based on Bellm an’s principle of optim ality which states th a t an optimal policy has 
the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining 
decision must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from  
the first decision.70 The application of the principle of optim ality reduces a m ulti­
stage dynam ic optim ization into a series of two-period optim al decision rules. 
This does not, however, guarantee an explicit solution for the general optim al 
consumption behaviour. Such a failure would not imply th a t the solution does 
not exist. Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1988) have proved the existence of the 
solution under quite general conditions.
There exists explicit solution for a special class of consumption problems whose 
utility  functions belong to the H A R A  class, i.e. hyperbolic absolute risk aversion. 
Recall th a t this class of u tility  functions include the isoelastic or constant relative 
risk aversion, C R R A  and the quadratic utility functions. M erton (1971) has 
proved th a t for the class of H A R A  u tility  functions, the value function belongs 
to the same family of underlying utility  functions. The explicit solution can be
70See R. Bellman (1957).
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obtained once the param eters of the value function are derived.
T he numerical solution for a non-linear dynamic programm ing formulation of 
an economic system  is basically obtainable by using the retu rn  function and a 
backward induction. Consider a consumer at period T  — 2  where there are only 
two stages to go to the end of planning horizon. Given the value of financial 
asset A t - 2 , the individual faces a two-period optim ization problem in which the 
optim al decision on consumption should be derived. By solving this problem, the 
consumer obtains the optim al consumption as a function of wealth. From this, 
we can derive the expectation of utility  from period T  — 2  onward. The value 
function for period T  — 2 can thus be obtained. Using this value function, the 
consumer starts solving the two-period optim ization problem form ulated in period 
T  — 3 which similarly provides the value function in period T  — 3. This process 
can be repeated backward until the initial period, where it is assumed th a t the 
initial level of consumer’s financial asset A q i s  fully specified. By deriving the 
value function for period zero, we can obtain the associated policy value which is 
the optim al consumption policy at tim e zero. This can be used to  determ ine the 
optim al level of financial asset in the next period. Such forward solutions continue 
until the optim al consumption trajectory for all periods are determ ined.
The organization of the remaining topics on optim al consumption properties 
using the m ethod of dynam ic programm ing is as follows. The application of direct 
search technique in deriving optim al consumption path  is presented in section 
3.4.1. This m ethod is based on the repeated application of Bellm an’s principle of 
optim ality . Despite the significance and im portance of this technique in control 
theory, no a ttem p t has been reported on the utilisation of this technique in optim al 
policy form ulation of consumer’s intertem poral choice problems.
The familiar Euler equation for optim al consumption is usually obtained by
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direct applications of the Lagrange m ethod. In section 3.4.2 I have shown tha t 
the Euler equation can be obtained by using the functional recurrence equation 
together w ith the envelope relation. This approach provides more generalization 
by allowing the possibilities of dealing with problems such as stochastic income 
generating processes or stochastic interest rates.
The assum ption of a Bernoulli-type utility  function is m ade in section 3.4.3. 
By the application of the guess technique in solving the functional recurrence 
equation we have obtained the result th a t optim al consumption is a non-linear 
function of consum er’s tim e preference and a linear function of wealth. Moreover, 
we have dem onstrated how the guess technique can establish explicit relations 
for the  value function. These results may generalise the result of B lanchard and 
Fischer (1990).
3.4.1 O p tim al C onsum ption  P ath  by D irect Search
We now exam ine the derivation of optim al consumption trajecto ry  by direct appli­
cation of Bellm an’s principle of optimality. For the sake of generality, a non-linear 
model for optim al consumption behaviour is assumed in which not only the con­
sum er’s u tility  function is non-linear, the equation of motion is also assumed to 
have a general non-linear structure, i.e. =  f ( A t , C t, t) .
Let us m ention at the outset th a t the existence of a num erical solution does 
not necessarily imply the possibility of obtaining such solutions. The central role 
of the  application of the principle of optim ality in optim ization technique is th a t 
instead of searching among the set of all admissible policies we consider only those 
which satisfy the principle of optimality. This considerably reduces the num ber 
calculations. The num ber of calculations required by the direct enum eration in­
creases exponentially with the num ber of periods in the optim ization process, 
whereas the com putational requirem ents associated with the principle of optim al­
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ity  increases linearly. Unfortunately, the memory requirements in such numerical 
solutions increases so fast th a t, except for problems of very low dimensions, in­
creasingly higher com puter capacities are required. This is usually referred to as 
the curse of  dimensionality, a term  invented by Bellman (1957).
Let us refer to  two points before we examine the underlying m athem atics of 
backward and forward solutions to value functions. The first point is th a t the 
value functions, which are alternatively called return  functions, cost functions, 
or cost-to-go functions, are optimal value functions as their definitions imply.
The second point is th a t since the recurrence property, as defined below, does not
depend on stochastic properties of an optim ization problem, we can, for notational 
simplicities, consider the determ inistic case only.
For a greater generality, assume th a t the asset at the end of planning period, 
A t , which is the sta te  variable, is given. Define Vo as the cost of reaching the 
final value for sta te  variable A t , thus
U0 (At ) = ^ ( A t ). (3.22)
The problem is to find an optim al closed-loop policy sequence for consumption in 
the following general form
C ° » \A t), i  =  0 ,1 ,2 , • ■ ■, T  — 1 ,
which minimises the following value function
T—1
Vjv(C*, A)) =  ^  4>(At+1 , Cjy t) +  -0(A t ), (3,23)
t=o
where C opt(' • •) stands for optim al consumption and V/v indicates th a t the con­
sum er operates the optim ization process over the N  periods still to go. The form 
of the value function f  indicates th a t the consumption decisions to be m ade and 
included in V  are Co, C\, C2 , ■ • ■, C t - i  and the resulting assets are A\,  A 2 , • ■ *, A t-
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Our approach to obtain the optim al consumption sequence is to solve a recurrence 
functional equation which is based on Bellm an’s principle of optimality.
Assume th a t the consumer is in period T  — 1 where there is only one period 
to go. The consumer should decide on his final period consumption policy based 
on the existing assets, A t_ i. The value function is
V l(A t-i, Ct - i) =  i, C t- i )  +  V’(C t)) (3.24)
which by using equation (3.22) becomes
V l(A t_i, C t- i )  =  4>(At - i, C t- i )  +  Vo(At), (3.25)
where V\ indicates th a t there is only one period to go. Using the equation of 
motion, we know th a t A t  is a function of A t - i and C t - i ,  thus
Vi (A t - i, C t - i )  =  <£(At-i, C t- i )  +  V o[/(A t_i, C t- i) ] .  (3.26)
The optim al consumption C°p<(At - i ,T  — 1) is th a t policy which generates the 
optim al value function, thus the optim al value function can be defined as
Vi P\ A T- i ) =  m a x {</>(■ • ■) +  U0(* • •)} ■
C-T-l
The te rm  C°p* (A t-i, T — 1 ) means th a t the optim al consumption has been applied 
at stage T  — 1 w ith A t - i  as the consum er’s asset.
The cost of operation or the return  function over a two-period process with 
initial asset A t - i  is the following,
V2 ( A t - 2 , C t - i ,  C t-s )  =  4>(At ~ 2 , C t—2 ) +  </>(At-i, C t - i )  +  ^»(At), 
which upon using equation (3.24) yields
y2( . ..)  =  <J)(At - 2 , C t—2 ) +  V i(A t-i, C t - i ) .  (3.27)
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The optim al consumptions C^li and C^f2 are those policies which generate the 
optim al return  over the interval [T — (T  — 2 )] defined as follows,
V T V r - s )  =  m ax {<j>{AT- 2 , CT- 2) +  Vx.(AT- U CT- i)} . (3.28)
^T-l i^T-2
According to the principle of optim ality we know th a t regardless of the initial 
consumption decision, C t - 2 : the remaining decision, C t - i, m ust constitute an 
optim al consumption policy with respect to the financial assets, A t - i , resulting 
from the first decision on consumption, C t - 2 - Thus equation (3.28) can be w ritten 
as
V ^ \ A t . 2) =  max{<KAT- 2, Ct- 2) +  V T ^ r - i ) }  • (3.29)
In general, for an (N  — A'r)-stage process at tim e i.e. for K  period to go, where 
K  =  (N  — T -M ), we have
VN-K{At)  =  max |  (j>(Au Ct) +  ip{AT) \ ,
and as before, the application of the principle of optim ality yields
= m ax {<j>(Au Ct) + Ct)]} ■ (3.30)
Equation (3.30) is known as the basic recurrence functional equation. This 
equation generates the optim al return  or optimal “cost-to-go” for an ( N  — K)-  
stage process if we know the optim al return  for an ( N —K —l)-stage process. To see 
this, let us assume tha t the set of all admissible financial assets and all admissible 
consumption policies are known. Using the recurrence functional equation (3.30) 
and applying all admissible consumption values to each admissible financial asset 
gives
V 7 ‘(Ar ) =  tK A T).
Equation (3.30) also implies that
V T ‘(At _i) =  m a x {<t>(AT^ ,  CT- i )  +  V0^ ( A T)} .
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From the available set of financial assets at tim e T — 1 , we select the  first one 
and apply all the admissible consumption policies at tim e T  — 1 to  com pute the 
following: i) the next period financial asset A t using the equation of m otion and 
ii) 4>(At - i , C t - i ).
The A t  values obtained in (i ) above enable us to choose the corresponding set 
of V ^ ( A t ) .  The following term
4>(At - i, Ct - i ) H- VqP\ A t )
determ ines a set of quantities of which the largest one is V j ^ A t - i ) .  The second, 
th ird , ... and n th  values of the available set of financial assets will then be chosen. 
Each of these values together with the available set of Ct - i will determ ine the set 
of A t , K)0p< and c/)(At - i , Ct - i ).  The largest quantity of
4>(At ~ i, Ct - i) +  Vo°p*(At)
is V{pt( A T - 1). The associated values of A t - i  and Ct - i would be retained in the 
memory.
Equation (3.30) implies tha t
V ^ A t- i ) =  max{<KAT- 2l CV_2) +  V ^ Y r - i ) }  .
Analogously, if we select the first value of the available set of financial assets in 
period T  — 2  and try  all the admissible consumption policies stored in the memory 
so far, we will obtain the followings: «) A t - i  by using our equation of m otion and 
n ) 4>{At-2 , C t ~ 2 )- We now store the value of A t - i  and examine the associated 
V f pt(AT~i) which has already been stored. The largest quantity  of
<5&(At-2, Ct - 2 ) +  Vi01* (A t- i)
is V f pt( A t ~ 2) • The associated C t - 2 and A t - 2  should be retained in the memory. If 
we select the second, third, ... and n th  values of the available set of financial assets
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we can similarly produce a set of V f pt{AT~2) which together w ith the associated 
A t - 2 and C t - 2  will be stored.
In period i +  1, the inform ation about as well as the associated
Af+i and Ct+i are available. W hen we move back to period i, the available set 
of At  and Ct will determ ine A*+i. Com pute </>(At,Ct) and choose V f f tK- i(A<+i) 
which is associated with the com puted values of Ct+1 - For each pair of financial 
asset and consum ption policy at tim e t, we obtain
<f>(At, Ct) +  1/JpV i W + i ) i  
the largest value of which is V ^ k _-l(A*+i).
In period zero, the basic recurrence equation is
V ^ ( A o )  =  m ax {<6 [A0, C0] +  V 'Z 'iW A ), C o)]}.
It is assumed th a t the initial level of consumer’s financial asset Ao is fully specified. 
Applications of all admissible consumption policies at tim e zero to the value of 
financial asset A0 gives the followings: i) A x by using the equation of motion and 
ii) 0(Ao, Co). As before, we com pute the entire values of
<fi(A0, Co) +  V JJ^ A i) ,
and choose the largest one as V ^^A o). The associated policy value is the optim al 
consumption policy at tim e zero CoPt, which can be used to determ ine the optim al 
level of financial asset next period, i.e. Ajp*, using the equation of motion. The 
stored inform ation will give optim al value of the associated retu rn  and the  asso­
ciated consum ption policies. Cxpt will be used in equation of m otion to  produce 
A 2Pt, which provides, through inspection in the memory storage, the optim al con­
sum ption C2pt and optim al return  at period 2 , i.e. V f pt. We continue this process 
until all C^pt, C%pt,‘ • *, C ^ l x and the resulting financial assets, i.e. A ^ ,  A ^ ,
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•••, AZp and their associated optim al return  values are obtained. The optim al 
consumption trajectory  is thus obtained.
3.4 .2  P ro p ertie s  o f  th e  O ptim al C onsum ption  P a th
In this section we derive the familiar Euler equation for optim al consumption by 
using the functional recurrence equation of dynamic programm ing together with 
the envelope relation. We will also show, following Blanchard and Fischer (1990), 
th a t H all’s random  walk hypothesis can be directly derived by using the Euler 
equation thus obtained.
We sta rt by defining the time-varying optimal value function Vt(At) as
r t
J 2 ( i  + s ) - ^ u ( c T) \n t
mT ~ t
(3.31)Vi(-di) =  m a x E
subject to the equation of motion, i.e.
-4*4-1 =  (14- r)At  4- Yt — Ct.
All the term s are defined earlier. Equation (3.38) implies th a t the optim al value 
function is the present discounted value of expected utility  evaluated along the 
optim al trajectory. For example,
Vt (At)  =  m a x  {E[U(Ct) +  ( 1  +  5)~l U(Ct+1) +  • ■ • +  ( 1  +  5 )-(T- <>i7(Cr)]|n1} , 
or
yt+i(A i+1) =
m a x  { £ [ ( 1  +  S)~l U(C,+1) +  ( 1  +  S )-2 y (C (+i) +  • • • +  ( 1  +  .
Note th a t At  is the only sta te  variable in the model which is being directly affected 
by the only control variable in the model, i.e. the consumption Thus, the 
optim al value function is a function of the asset variable only. One can argue 
th a t the optim al value function is a function of conditional jo in t distribution
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of future labour income and rates of return. However, because our equation of 
m otion for At+i does not allow for the im pact of consumption on conditional joint 
d istribution of fu ture income (or the rate of return), these variables cannot be 
included as argum ents in the optim al value function. The fact th a t the  optim al 
value function is tim e variant captures the possibility of having different forms of 
this function over time.
Using equation (3.31), we write the functional recurrence equation as follows, 
Vt(At) =  m ax{lf(C t) +  (1 +  <5)-1B[V(+1(ylt+1)]|a t} . (3.32)
Equation (3.32) is based on Bellm an’s principle of optim ality sta ted  earlier th a t
“an optim al policy has the property th a t whatever the initial sta te  and initial
decision are, the  remaining decision m ust constitute an optim al policy w ith regard
to the sta te  resulting from the first decision”. To maximise the right hand side of
equation (3.32) subject to our equation of motion, we take the derivative of the
right hand side w ith respect to  Ct. This gives
d u (°<) +  (1 +  n - i  f f d V t+ it^+ i)  9 A 1+1 
dCt +  1 9At+1 ' dCt
Using the equation of motion to evaluate , we find
U'(Ci) - ( l  + 5 ) -1EVtf+1(At+1) = Qy
or
U \ C t) =  ( 1  +  S y 1 EVt+1(At+i). (3.33)
The functional form of the value function in equation (3.33), which is the first- 
order condition for optimality, is not known. We, therefore, cannot make any 
significant progress by using equation (3.33). However, we can use the envelope 
relation between U'(Ct) and V'{At)  along the optim al trajectory. Consider a small 
variation in At  in equation (3.32). We have
l/'(A«) =  ( l  +  5 ) - 1 B A !v(+l(Ai+1)],
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or
m H ( 1  +  r . M g i ,
which by using the equation of motion becomes
K'(/t<) = (l + 5)-li?Vi'+1(Ai+1)(l + r).
Upon using equation (3.33) we have
V { A t )  =  ( 1  +  r)U'(Ct)- (3.34)
According to the envelope relation (3.34), the marginal value of financial assets 
along the optim al trajectory, is equal to the marginal utility  of consumption mul­
tiplied by (1 +  r). In other words, the  marginal value of financial assets is equal 
to the increase in m arginal utility  of consumption at tim e t  +  1 viewed as of tim e 
t.
The appearance of ( 1  +  r) in envelope relation (3.34) refers to  the fact th a t the 
term  Ct has entered the equation of m otion at the end of period t while financial 
asset At  is assumed to be known at the  beginning of the period. Hence, A i + 1  in 
the equation of motion, is a function of ( 1  + r )A t, whereas Y% — Ct is not m ultiplied 
by (1 -f r). If we model the equation of motion as
=  (1 +  +  Yt — Ct), (3.35)
the envelope relation would then appear as
V'(At)  = U'(Ct). (3.36)
Substituting the envelope relation (3.34) into the first-order conditions, equa­
tion (3.33), yields
Cf/(C'*) =  ( l +  ^ r 1 ^ /(C,m ) ( l + 0 ,
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or
u '(c t) =  ^ s a 'C C W O . (3.37)
Equation (3.37) is the Euler Equation for the optim al consumption-saving prob­
lem. Note th a t changing the equation of m otion to equation (3.35) and using the 
envelope relation (3.36), will not alter the Euler equation.
The Euler equation (3.37) is nothing but the generalization of Keynes-Ramsey 
condition under uncertainty; th a t is, the  marginal rate of substitu tion between 
consumption in two periods is equal to the marginal ra te  of transform ation. Ac­
cording to  the Euler equation, if a consumer at tim e t reduces the consumption 
by AC* and invests the resulting saving at the rate of interest r  and consumes the 
proceeds at tim e i-J-1 , then the decrease in utility  at tim e t, which is U'(Ct), m ust 
be equal to  the increase in the expected utility  at time t +  1 , i.e. ( 1  +  r ) E  Uf(Ci+1), 
viewed as of tim e A i.e. (1 +  ( )^” 1[(1 +  r ) E  U^Ct+i)].
It is interesting to note th a t Hall’s random walk hypothesis, which is based 
on life-cycle perm anent income hypothesis, can be directly derived from the Euler 
equation which is based on the dynamic programming, [Blanchard and Fisher 
(1990)]. To see this, it suffices to write equation (3.37) as follows.
 ^ -U'(Ct+i) = U'(Ct) -f i^+i,
where it is assumed th a t E(ist+1 ) =  0. Alternatively,
U'{Ct+1) = 'yU,{Ct) + {i+ll (3-38)
where 7  =  y^;. Moreover, under certain conditions, we can deduce from equation 
(3.38) th a t consumption follows a martingale. For example, assuming a quadratic 
utility  function together w ith the assumption tha t the ra te  of interest r  is equal 
to the rate of tim e preference 8 , will result the followings: i ) U'(Ct) and U'(Ct+i)
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become linear functions in consumption and ii) becomes 1 in equation (3.38). 
Thus, we can write
Ct+i = Ct +  f*+1, (3.39)
where £*+ 1  =  &f<+i and A: is a constant.
3.4 .3  T h e B ern ou lli C ase and O ptim al C on su m p tion  Func­
tio n s
In section 3.3.1 we used the m ethod of maximum principle to obtain the optim al 
consumption-saving behaviour for an individual whose utility  function is of the 
Bernoulli type. Here we solve the same problem using Bellm an’s dynam ic pro­
gramming. Since the utility  function belongs to the class of those with hyperbolic 
absolute risk aversion, the application of the “guess technique” in solving the 
functional recurrence equation is possible. We have shown th a t such applications 
provide a relationship which specifies the optim al consumption as a non-linear 
function of consum er’s tim e preferences and a linear function of wealth. This 
generalises the Blanchard and Fischer result (1990). Moreover, we have demon­
strated  how an explicit relationship for the value function, at the optim um  level 
of consumption, can be achieved.
Consider the following dynam ic optim ization problem,
M a x  E
subject to
■ T
£ ( 1  +  SyH nCt
.t= 0
^4-t+i — (1  +  r)At +  Yt — Ct,
where all the term s are defined earlier. Using equation (3.32) we w rite the func­
tional recurrence equation as follows,
Vt{At) =  m ax{/nC t +  (1 +  ^ “ ^ [ ^ ( A f + i ) ] ! ^ }  .
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Assuming th a t the value function is tim e invariant, we obtain
V { A t ) =  m ax { l n C t +  (1 +  ^ - ^ [ V ^ + O P , }  . (3.40)
To obtain the property of optim al consumption trajectory, we differentiate the 
right hand side w ith respect to Ct to find
dlnCt t d V { A w ) 9 A t+1
^ a +{1 + 5) E ~ d A ^ r - ^ a = 0 '
or
Since the  utility  function belongs to the class of hyperbolic absolute risk aver­
sion, we can assume th a t the functional forms of the value function and the u tility  
function are identical. This enables us to guess the following form for the value 
function whose validity will be checked at later stages. Our guess is therefore
V { A t) = a  + (3ln(At). (3.42)
Substitu te equation (3.42) into equation (3.41) to find
1 d[a + f3ln{A,+1)]
C T (1 + <S) E 8A^------- = ° ’
or
Ct
We now substitu te  the equation of motion into the above equation. After rear­
rangem ent, we have
1 (3 1
Ct ~  (i + <y)‘(i + r)A, + y , - c v
or
W "k (1 T ^)]Ct =  (1 -f A)[ ( 1  -f- r ) A t 4- Tt],
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or
^  ~  j5 4. ( 1  + s) ^  +  (3.43)
From the  equation of motion we know th a t our individual consumer starts at pe­
riod (£ + 1 ) with the assets obtained from the previous period plus the accum ulated 
interest, i.e. (1 +  r )^ t-  W hen the individual receives Yt , the sum of ( 1  +  r)At  +  Yt 
constitutes his wealth out of which the individual can consume. If we denote the 
above sum as A * we have
C% =  $A*U (3.44)
where
1 +  8
*  = (3-45)
Equation (3.44) shows th a t the optim al consumption is a linear function of wealth. 
The optim al consumption clearly depends on /?, the param eter of our initial guess 
for the value function V ( A t). We can obtain the value of this param eter by sub­
stitu ting  Ct from equation (3.44) into the functional recurrence equation (3.40), 
which also checks whether the initial guess has been correct. Note th a t if we obtain 
the value of /?, an explicit relation for optim al consumption will then follow.
F irst substitu te  the initial guess into both sides of the functional recurrence 
equation. We have
a  +  (3lnAt — max{/n(7< +  (1 +  S)~xE[a  +  j3ln(At+i)]j  ,
or
a  +  p in  At = m a x ^ ln C t  +  ck(1 +  5)~l +  (3(1 + 8)-1E  /n(A f+1) | .
Substitu te the optim al consumption behaviour, equating (3.44), into the above 
equation to obtain
a  +  p l n A t =  ln{$A*t ) +  a ( l  +  S ) ' 1 +  (3(\ +  +  r ) A t +  Yt -  C J. (3.46)
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The te rm  ln(...) in the th ird  term  on the right hand side of the above equation 
can be w ritten as
ln[( 1 +  r )A t +  Yt -  Ct] = ln(A*t -  $A*) =  ln ( l  -  $)A J,
or
/n [(l +  r )A* +  Yt — Ct\ — /n ( l — 3?) +  In A *.
By substitu ting back into equation (3.46) we have
a  -f (3lnAt =  l n $  +  a ( l  +  S)~x +  j3( 1 — £)- 1 /n( 1 — $) +  [! +  (3( 1 +  £)- 1]/nA*.
Since the functional form of the right hand side is exactly the same as th a t of the 
left hand side, we conclude th a t the initial guess was structurally  correct. The 
corresponding param eters should, therefore, become equal to  each other. This 
gives the following relations,
/n4? +  a ( l  +  £) +  (3(1 — 5) ln( 1 — 4>) =  a ,
l + P i l  + S ) ' 1 ^ ^
From equation (3.48) we have
P 1 + 5 _ _
(3.47)
(3.48)
(3.49)
We now use the value of /3 from equation (3.49) to obtain $  from equation (3.45). 
This gives
$  =  (1 + 5)/
1 + 5
+ (! +  «)
or
$  =
1 +  8 ' (3.50)
The above value of $  can be used to provide an explicit function for optim al 
consumption as follows,
We observe th a t the optim al consumption is a non-linear function of tim e prefer­
ence and a linear function of wealth, The change in interest rates or in the future 
income affect optim al consumption in so far as they affect wealth.
The above procedure is quite general and the value of a  can also be obtained 
alongside with the  value of j3 from the system of equations (3.47) and (3.48). By 
substitu ting these values into the initial guess, i.e. V(A*) =  a  +  j3ln{At), we can 
obtain an explicit relation for the value function.
3.5 P roperties o f th e  O ptim al C onsum ption  P ath  
w ith  L iquidity C onstraints
We generalise the optim ality condition [or the Euler equation (3.37)] to the case 
where consum ption behaviour is constrained by liquidities. Using the m ethod 
of dynam ic programm ing, we show how the Lagrange m ultiplier measures the 
am ount by which consumer’s utility  will change resulting from the relaxation 
of borrowing constraints. This section generalises section 3.3 to the case where 
liquidity constraints bind. Consider a consumer who wishes to  maximise the 
following objective function
Li=0
J  = M a x  E  
subject to
A t+i =  (1 +  r)At  +  Yt — Ct, 
and the liquidity constraint
A t >  0.
Following the argum ent we had in section 3.4.2, the functional recurrence equation
is
V(Af) — nmx |c /(C i) +  (1 +  <5^) l E  V^A*^) +  7r ( A ^ i ) | , (3.52)
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where 7r is the Lagrange m ultiplier for liquidity constraints. Recall th a t the nota­
tion A has been reserved as the m ultiplier for the equation of motion. Differentiate 
the right hand side with respect to Ct to  obtain
8U{Ct)  I ( 1  I S)~ 'E  l dV{At+l)  aA ,+11 I 9w{At+l) 9At+i  0  
dCt K 1 I d A t+1 ' dCt J d A t + 1 ' dCt '
or
For the envelope relation, consider a small variation in A t in equation (3.59), 
V ’(At) =  ( 1  +  Q - ' E  ^ ; V ( A t+1) +
or
V \ A t) =  (1 +  ^ ( l  -1- r )E  V '(A t+1) +  ( 1  +  r ) 7r. (3.54)
If we now transfer the  second and the th ird  term s in equation (3.53) to the right 
hand side and then  m ultiply both  sides by (1 +  r) we obtain exactly the right 
hand side of equation (3.54). We can then write
V'(At)  =  (1 +  r)U'(C),
or
V ^A t+i) =  (1 4- r)U'(Ct+i). (3.55)
Substituting equation (3.55) into equation (3.53) gives
U’(Ct) =  (1 +  ^ [ ( l  +  r )E  U'{Ct+l)] +  7T,
or
W (C t) =  U'(CM ) + r .  (3.56)
Equation (3.56) is the optim ality condition for consumption behaviour of a con­
sumer with liquidity constraints, n which is the Lagrangian m ultiplier associated 
with the liquidity constraint measures the amount by which consum er’s u tility  will
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change if current constraints on borrowing become relaxed by one unit. In other 
words, 7r represents the amount by which the marginal u tility  of borrowing will 
increase at period t by reducing the consumption next period. If 7T becomes zero, 
the liquidity constraint will be totally relaxed and the optim ality condition (3.56) 
will be the same as in equation (3.37) where the marginal ra te  of substitution 
equals marginal ra te  of transformation.
3.6 T he G eneralised H am iltonian, L iquidity Con­
straints and the R ejection  of H all’s R andom  W alk  
H yp oth esis
In section 3.5, we used Bellm an’s dynamic programming to derive the optim al­
ity conditions in consumption path  when liquidity constraints were binding. In 
this section, we obtain the same result, i.e. equation (3.56), by applying the 
generalised H am iltonian function in the maximum principle. This argum ent is 
the generalization of section 3.3 where the maximum principle was applied to the 
optim ization of consumption behaviour w ithout liquidity constraints.
Specifically, we answer the following two questions in this section: z) how 
can the existence of liquidity constraints directly influence the  ra te  of change 
in the optim al consumption trajectory; and n ) how does H all’s random  walk 
hypothesis of consumption collapse when an individual consumer is facing w ith the 
liquidity constraint. These two questions and particularly the la tter, are of prim e 
theoretical value since the rejection of orthogonality tests of H all’s random  walk 
hypothesis is usually carried out on the alleged existence of liquidity constraints. 
Our results here constitute, for the first time, a strong theoretical framework 
for such em pirical tests because it explicitly formulates the effects of liquidity 
constraints on optim al consumption path. We assume th a t consumers, in an 
imperfect capital m arket, face an upper limit to their net indebtedness which is
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a function of their income. The problem is to maximise the objective function, 
[equation (3.1)],
J  =  M a x  E  [ T e~StU[C(t)] dt,
Jto
subject to the asset transition equation (3 .2 ),
A(*) =  rA(*) +  y ( * ) - C ( * ) ,  
and the assum ption of liquidity constraints,
A(f) >  - a - b Y { t ) ,  (3.57)
where a is the lim it of net indebtedness.
Define the H am iltonian as before, i.e. equation (3.6),
H  =  E U[C(t)\e~St + A(i)[ivl(*) +  Y ( t )  -  C(f)],
where A(t) is the  adjoint variable. The control variable, C ( t ), should maximise H  
subject to the inequality constraint (3.57). W riting equation (3.57) as A { t ) +  a +  
bY(t)  > 0, we can construct the generalised Hamiltonian as follows,
H * =  EU[C(t)]e~St +  A(i)[rA(i) +  Y ( t )  -  C(t)} +  +  a +  bY(t)\.
The control variable C(t)  can maximise H* if
dH*
dC(t)
=  0 ,
or
—StEU'[C(t)]e~dt = \{t ) .  (3.58)
Equation (3.58) gives the optim al consumption C(t)  as a function of the adjoint 
variable A(t). To obtain the tim e path  of the adjoint variable, we use the canonical 
equation, i.e.
d H * •
=  aco,dA(t )
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or
A(t) =  — rA(t) — 7r(i). (3.59)
To obtain the properties of optim al consumption policy, we differentiate equation 
(3.58) w ith respect to tim e. Since {/'[C^i)] is a function of C (t), we have
E U " [ C { t ) ] E ^ ^ - e - St -  Se~s,EU'[C(t) \  =  A(f),
and by using the equation for A(t) we obtain
{ E  U"[C(t)]E C(t)  -  SE U‘[C{t)]}e-st =  -rA (<) -  n (t).
Substitu te equation (3.58) into the right hand side of the above equation and 
divide both  sides by we have
E U "[C ( t ) ]EC { t )  -  8EU'[C{t)}  =  - r E U ’[C(t)] -  n( i)es\
or
EU,m E c it )- S  + r = -  ^ eSt
EU'[C(t)}  w  EU'[C(t)} '
Assuming tha t
<“ ">
and noting th a t E  pa =  — is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, we
have E  paC(t)  = r — 5 + ^ ( t ) .  Assuming p* =  E pa, then
p l E C ( t ) = r - S  + il>(t). (3.61)
Equation (3.61), is an im portant result in consumption optim ization when liquid­
ity constraints bind. This equation implies th a t with a concave utility  function, 
where £/"[(7(£)] is negative and thus the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is pos­
itive, if liquidity constraints are binding at tim e i, i.e. ip(t) >  0, then the optim al 
consumption increases, C(t) > 0, provided tha t the interest rate is m ore than  or 
equal to the subjective ra te  of tim e preferences, i.e. r > S. If liquidity constraints
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are not binding, ip{t) =  0, then consumption will increase if r > 6. However, equa­
tion (3.61) implies th a t with a concave utility  function, the existence of liquidity 
constraints makes the optim al consumption to grow, not only when the interest 
ra te  is more than  or equal to  the subjective rate of tim e preference (r >  S), but 
even when r < S, provided th a t ip(t) >  r  — 5. Under such conditions one can 
conclude th a t the liquidity constraint may shift the optim al consumption profile 
forward even when the ra te  of tim e preference exceeds the  interest rate.
We now prove th a t the existence of liquidity constraints invalidates H all’s ran­
dom walk hypothesis of optim al consumption. Recall th a t H all’s hypothesis has 
been frequently tested for the explanatory power of variables (other than  con­
sumption) in predicting consumption for the next period. H all’s hypothesis has 
been rejected since variables such as lagged stock prices or lagged income proved 
to be significant in explaining current consumption [see, for example, Hall and 
Mishkin(1982) and Zeldes(1989)]. It is well-known th a t the failure of random 
walk hypothesis of consumption is usually attribu ted  to the presence of liquidity 
constraints, thus the existence of liquidity constraints and its im pact on con­
sum ption have been tested indirectly. I have been unable to  find, in the published 
literature on this subject, a complete theoretical treatm ent which shows i) how 
the existence of liquidity constraints can directly affect the optim al path  of con­
sum ption and ii) how the random  walk hypothesis of consumption breaks down 
when liquidity constraints are binding. I have answered the former question by 
deriving equation (3.61) and will answer the la tte r as follows.
Using the m ean value theorem, we can write equation (3.61) as
E [ c ( t  +  h ) -  c(«)] =
Pa
By assuming h =  1 we have
C(t  +  1) — — (r — 5) +  C(t)  H— +  6+i- (3.62)
Pa Pa
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Using H all’s condition for the random  walk hypothesis, i.e. r — 8, we have
C(t  +  1) =  C(t)  d— -^ ( i )  +  <5+1, (3.63)
p *
where
i m  -  77 (*)e^
^  £f/'[C(i)]’
is defined in equation (3.60) and Tr(t) is the adjoint variable associated w ith liq­
uidity constraint in the generalised Ham iltonian function. Equation (3.62) implies 
tha t w ith a concave utility  function, the expected value of optim al consumption 
increases when i) r  >  8 and ii) ip(t) >  r — 8 even if r < 8. Moreover, equation 
(3.63) indicates th a t Hall’s random  walk hypothesis can be rejected if liquidity 
constraints bind, i.e. ^  0. This result holds even under the  condition r  =  8.
3.7 T im e-varying Interest R ates and th e  P rop­
erties o f O ptim al C onsum ption P ath  under Liq­
u id ity  C onstraints
As discussed before, the Euler equation approach in modelling consumer be­
haviour, which has been initiated by Lucas (1976) in his critique of standard  
estim ation of consumption function, is based on the first order conditions in an 
individual’s intertem poral optim ization problem [equation(3.37)J. We have also 
noted th a t the rejection of the Euler equation,71 has been related to the exis­
tence of liquidity constraints.72 Note th a t the tests for the existence of liquidity 
constraints are usually carried out either indirectly, or are simply based on a par­
ticular assumed consumption-income relationship. Such problems in modelling 
the existence of liquidity constraints, w ithin a rational expectations life-cycle per­
m anent income hypothesis, are mainly rooted in the difficulties associated with 
finding satisfactory proxies for liquidity constraints. King (1986), Hayashi (1987)
71See, for example, Flavin(1981), Muellbauer (1983), Mankiw, Rotemberg, Summers (1985) 
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991).
72See, for example, Hall and Mishkin (1982), Hayashi (1985) and Zeldes (1989).
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and M uellbauer and Latim ore (1995) have reported the achievements in modelling 
the liquidity constraints in this direction.
It is possible to  relax this theoretical shortcoming substantially by, first, in­
troducing a function representing the structure of liquidity constraints (or the 
nature of capital m arket imperfections) and then accommodating this function 
within an individual’s intertem poral optim ization problem. This approach, which 
was adopted in the previous section, will be further developed here. We show how 
the generalised H am iltonian function can be useful in modelling this problem.
In section 3.7.1 we will obtain an equation similar to equation (3.61) in which 
the change in consumption is related to the liquidity constraint, interest rates and 
consum er’s tim e preferences. However, time-varying interest rates do not change 
our general conclusion which states th a t the existence of liquidity constraints 
necessarily results in an increasing consumption over tim e if the interest ra te  
becomes equal to the subjective rate of tim e preferences. However, when r(t)  <  S , 
the consumption might not increase even if liquidity constraints bind. This, of 
course, depends entirely on the severity of the liquidity constraints: the condition 
> r ( t ) — S m ight ensure a forward shift of optimal consum ption profile when 
consum er’s tim e preferences exceed the rate of interest. Using the Kuhn-Tucker 
condition, we will analyse, in section 3.7.2, the interactions between time-varying 
interest rates, the utility  discount ra te  and the severity of liquidity constraints. 
This section generalises the results of Heller and S tarr (1979) to  the  case where the 
interest ra te  is time-varying and the liquidity constraint specifies the consum er’s 
net indebtedness as a function of income.
Using an inverse relationship between the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
and the intertem poral elasticity of substitution, we obtain, in section 3.7.3, a 
relationship in which the intertem poral elasticity of substitu tion appears as the
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coefficient of liquidity constraint. This produces the im portant result th a t the re­
sponse of optim al consumption to variations in the severity of liquidity constraints 
will be conditioned by the consumer’s intertem poral elasticity of substitution.
3.7.1 T im e-vary ing  In terest R ates and L iqu id ity  C onstra in ts
This section generalises the results we obtained in section 3.6 by using a time- 
varying interest rate. In equation (3.61), we dem onstrated the  effects of liquidity 
constraints on the optim al tim e path  of consumption; and equation (3.62) clearly 
showed how the existence of liquidity constraints could invalidate H all’s random  
walk hypothesis of consumption. We will examine these results under the condi­
tion of time-varying interest rates. The generalised H am iltonian function will be 
used throughout.
The problem  is to maximise the following objective function,
J  = M a x  E  [ T e~$tU[C{t)\ dt,
Jio
subject to the asset transition equation,
A{t)  =  r(t)A{t)  +  Y ( t )  -  C{t ), (3.64)
and the following constraints on borrowing,
A(t) > —a — bY(t).
Note th a t the specification of the objective function and liquidity constraints are 
as before whereas the asset transition equation embodies a tim e-varying interest 
rate.
Defining the generalised Ham iltonian as 
H"  =  EU[C(t)]e~St +  A(t)[r(t)A(i) +  Y{t)  -  C(t)\  +*r(i)[A(t) +  a +  6K(t)], (3.65)
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the optim al value of consumption will maximise H* if
d H *
dC{t) =  o ,
or
-stEU'[C{t)]e-5i = A (*). (3.66)
To obtain the tim e path  of adjoint variable A(t), we use the canonical equation
dH* { f .
m ,
dA(t )  
or
A(i) — — 7T (t). (3.67)
Differentiating equation (3.66) with respect to tim e and substitu ting for A(t) from 
equation (3.67) yields
E U " [ C { t ) ] E C { t ) -S E U '[ C { t ) ]  =  - r { t ) E U * [ C ( t ) ] - n ( t ) e St.
Dividing both sides by E  U'[C(t)] and defining tp(t) as
ip(t) =
TT(t)e5t
EU'[C(t)Y
yields
E p aE  C(t)  =  r(t) -  S +
or
p*E C(t)  =  r(t)  — 5 +  0 (t) , (3.68)
where pa is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and p* — E  pa.
Equation (3.68) is the generalization of equation (3.61) where the interest rate 
is not constant. According to equation (3.68), for any concave u tility  function, 
where pa > 0, the existence of liquidity constraints, t ) >  0, does not necessarily 
result in an increasing consumption over time. This is due to  the variability of 
the interest rate. Despite structural similarities between equations (3.68) and
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(3.61), one can argue th a t for periods in which r(t) < 5, consumption might not 
increase due to the  existence of liquidity constraints if ^ ( t )  <  S — r(t).  Moreover, 
the condition > r ( t ) — S ensures th a t optim al consumption profile will shift 
forward even if r(t) < S.
3.7 .2  L iqu id ity  C onstra in ts and th e  In teraction s b etw een
r(t) and S
In the previous section we proved th a t the effect of liquidity constraints on the 
pattern  of optim al consumption over tim e depends on the relative m agnitude 
of tim e varying rates of interest, the utility  discount ra te  and the severity of 
liquidity constraints. In this section, we show th a t the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
for optim ization of consumer’s utility  over tim e can provide a useful relationship 
between these factors. Heller and Starr (1979) have used the Lagrangian approach 
to the same problem  with tim e-invariant interest rates and a liquidity constraint in 
the form of non-negative assets, i.e. A(t)  > 0. This section extends their analytical 
framework and generalises their results by introducing z) time-varying interest 
rates and ii) a liquidity constraint which specifies consum er’s net indebtedness as 
a function of his income, i.e. A(t )  — —a — bY(t).
Consider an individual consumer maximising the following discrete utility  
function,
T
J  =  M a x  £ ( 1  +  S y 'U lC t ) ,  (3.69)
{=0
subject to the following asset transition equation
-^t+i =  (1 +  f't)At -f- Yi — Ct, 
and the liquidity constraints,
A t > - a - b Y t . (3.70)
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It is assumed th a t the consumer’s initial asset is non-negative and is given, i.e.
A S > 0 .
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
L = ^  {(1 +  6) *U(Ct) +  A*[(l +  rt)At + Yt — Ct — A ^ i]  +  tt^ A* -j- a +  bYt]j .
<=o
(3.71)
The second term  in equation (3.71) includes At  and A t+i. To avoid problems which 
might arise in differentiating L with respect to A*, we can divide the planning 
horizon in the Lagrangian as follows,
L  = U(Co) + A0[(l + r0)AJ + 1q — Co] -f- 7To[Aq + a + hho]+ 
5^{(1 +  $) tU{Ct) +  At (Yt — Ct) +  [(1 +  rt)Xt — Ai_i]Af+
t=i
flf[Af +  a 4- 617]}.
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for an optim um  are
——-—1'> *’ *-■’—- —— < 0 ,  Cf >  0 with complementary s lackness , (3.72) 
o C tn
dL
= 0, (3.73)dA,
d L
>  0> Xt > 0 with complementary s lackness , (3.74)
o X t 
$ L
—— > 0 ,  7Tt >  0 with complementary s lackness . (3.75)
O  7Tt
By assuming U'(0) =  +oo, the condition Ct > 0 in equation (3.72) ensures th a t 
the left hand inequality binds, i.e.
(1 +  S ^ U ^ C t )  — A* ~  0. (3.76)
From equation (3.73) we have
(1 + V t ) X t  “* X t - i  + TTt — 0,
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or
Af_! -  (1 +  r t)At =  7Tf. (3.77)
In equation (3.74), gives the asset transition equation which is an equality by 
definition. Therefore, is binding and thus A(t) should be slack, i.e.
A* >  0. (3.78)
By the same argum ent, equation (3.75) gives
A t +  a +  bYt > 0 ,  7Tt >  0 with complementary slackness.
If our liquidity constraints bind, then we have
7T* > 0, (3.79)
or
Kt{At +  a +  bYt) = 0. (3.80)
Equation (3.80) implies th a t the Kuhn-Tucker m ultiplier for liquidity constraint 
is non-zero if equation (3.70) holds, i.e. liquidity constraints bind. By equation 
(3.77) we have
At-i >  (1 +  r t )Ai, (3.81)
if 7rt is nonnegative. According to equation (3.80), if liquidity constraints bind
then (3.81) holds w ith stric t inequality. From equation (3.76) we have
(1 +  =  A(_,,
or alternatively,
C/'(C(_1) =  (l +  i ) t- 1A,-1, (3.82)
which by substitu ting equation (3.81) for Xt~i yields
U'(Ct- 1) >  (1 +  ^ " ' ( l  +  r f)At . (3.83)
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From equation (3.76) we know tha t
U'(Ct) = { l + 5 y \ t . (3.84)
Substitu te  equation (3.84) into equation (3.83) to obtain
U'(Ct-i)  > +  £)-1 ( l +  r*),
or
u ’ ( G t - i )  >  (3-85)
Equation (3.85), which is based on the assumption of binding liquidity constraint, 
is an im portan t result. It clearly invalidates Hall’s random walk hypothesis.
Recall th a t H all’s random  walk hypothesis of consumption is based on the
assum ption of equality between interest ra te  and subjective tim e ra te  of discount.
Equation (3.85) implies th a t even if r t =  5, we have
> U'(Ct). (3.86)
W ith regard to the assumed concavity of utility  function, i.e. U"(Ct) <  0, equation 
(3.86) implies th a t consumption is increasing over tim e whenever the liquidity 
constraint is binding.
3.7 .3  In terest R a tes, In tertem p oral E la stic ity  o f  S u b stitu ­
tio n , and L iqu id ity  C onstraints
It is well known th a t the effect of interest ra te  variations on consum ption can best 
be analysed by intertem poral elasticity of substitution. The analytical framework 
to study the  intertem poral elasticity of substitution in an optim al consumption 
program m e with liquidity constraints are not yet satisfactorily developed. After 
a brief introduction to this problem, I will dem onstrate how the optim al control 
theory can contribute towards form ulating this problem by utilising the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion.
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An individual’s plan to change his consumption from one period to  the next 
depends, in principle, upon his expectations of real interest ra te  variations. An 
increase in the expected real interest rate tends to lower current consumption. 
The associated intertem poral substitution effect and particularly the  response of 
consum ption to  a change in real interest expectation, which is captured by the 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution, plays an im portant role in determining 
the ra te  of change in consumer’s future consumption.73
From a theoretical R E —L C —P I H  point of view, any change in the household’s 
consumption plan depends on the expectations of real interest rates. Unfortu­
nately, empirical work on intertem poral elasticity of substitution in consumption 
resulting from interest ra te  variations do not usually provide a consistent analyt­
ical framework to  study the relationship between interest ra te  and consumption. 
The following are some examples.
Hall (1985) reports th a t despite fluctuations in the expected real interest rates 
(expected return  from common stocks, treasury bills, and savings accounts), there 
has been only small shifts in the rate of growth of consumption. Using the US data, 
he concludes th a t the estim ated values of intertem poral elasticity of substitution 
are small which supports the strong proposition th a t the elasticity is unlikely to  be 
much above 0.1 and may well be zero. Hall’s model of estim ating the intertem poral 
elasticity of substitution has been extended by Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) 
to take into account the possibility th a t some households behave as rule of thumb 
consumers in the sense th a t they do not obey the LC  — P I H ,  Their estim ates for 
the US data  shows th a t about one-half of income accrues to  such individuals due 
to the existence of liquidity constraints. Jappelli (1990) has estim ated th a t such 
liquidity constrained consumers account for 18-19 per cent of all US consumers
73See Hall(1981), Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers (1985), Patterson and Pesaran (1992), 
among others.
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who receive about 11-12 per cent of income.
More recently, Patterson and Pesaran (1992) have reported th a t, by using 
an instrum ental variable moving average technique [ I V M A ) ,  a  re-estim ation of 
H all’s model (1988) on quarterly da ta  for the US economy provided an estim ate 
of the in tertem poral elasticity of substitution which is significantly different from 
zero. They concluded th a t there are strong indications of misspecification in the 
model used by Hall since he did not consider the non-L C  — P I H  consumers; 
and when such consumers were taken into account the ra te  of change of income 
would become a significant explanatory variable. Moreover, they reported th a t 
Cam pbell and M ankiw’s “one-half” result has proved not to be robust to changes 
in the  sample period. Thus, upon some modifications, the proportion of income 
going to liquidity constrained consumers were found to be around 11 per cent.
Let us now present our formulation of interactions between interest rates, 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution and liquidity constrained consumption. 
Intuitively, the intertem poral elasticity of substitution can be negatively related 
to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Defining
U"[C{t)] dlnU'[C(t)\  
pa ~  U>[C(t)} ~  dC
as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (C A R A ) ,  we know th a t U"[C(t)\ is a 
m easure of concavity of the utility  function. It is known th a t a consumer with a 
sharply concave utility  function will, according to LC — P I H , avoid intertem poral 
substitu tion and will, therefore, prefer to smooth the consumption pa th  over his 
planning horizon. Since U''[C(i)] <  0, such consumers will have high pa which 
accompanies a low intertem poral elasticity of substitution. The same argum ent 
applies for constant relative risk aversion pr defined as [see Seldon (1978)],
U"[C(t)} _  d ln U ’
dlnC(t )
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It should be noted th a t only for some class of utility  functions is the intertem poral 
elasticity of substitu tion ju s t equal to the reciprocal of the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion [see Hall (1985)]. However as Hall (1988) reports, it seems th a t 
the best way to  estim ate the intertem poral elasticity of substitu tion is simply 
by regressing the log-change in consumption on the expected real interest rate 
because, intuitively, the ra te  of change in consumption over tim e can reveal the 
m agnitude of the intertem poral elasticity of substitution in consumption.
In what follows, I derive an approxim ate relation between the intertem poral 
elasticity of substitu tion and the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Using this 
relationship, I will then show how the time-varying interest rate  and liquidity con­
strain t can affect the changes in optim al consumption through the intertem poral 
elasticity of substitution. More specifically, we dem onstrate th a t the consum er’s 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution will condition the response of optim al con­
sum ption variations to liquidity constraints.
Defining the intertem poral elasticity of substitution as
g =  9 ln { U w \ c ( t ) \ i } ! d ln n ’ (3' 87)
and expanding U'[C(t +  1)] by a Taylor series, we have
U'[C(t +  1)] =  £/'[<?(*)] -f A C(t  +  l)*7"[C(i)] +  • • ■.
Dividing both sides by U'[C(t)] yields
= 1 . AC(t  + i v ^ M  , , m
U'[C(t)]  ^ +  ^U'[C7(i)]' ( ^
Note th a t in the second term  on the right hand of equation (3.88) is exactly
pa w ith an opposite sign. Thus pa will be negatively related to  on the
left hand side of this equation. This completes our proposition th a t the  coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion and intertem poral elasticity of substitu tion are inversely
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related, i.e.
A> =  / _» -  (3-89)
We can now return  to our familiar consumption optim ization problem  with a 
liquidity constraint of the form H(t) >  —a —bY(t)  and an asset transition  equation 
with tim e-varying interest rate. Recall equation (3.68), which was obtained by 
the application of Pontryagin’s maximum principle, namely,
E p aE C ( t )  — r(t) — 5 +  ^ ( t ) ,
where ip(t) was defined as
ir(t)e5i 
^  =  E U ’[0(t)Y
and 7r(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the liquidity constraint. Substi­
tu ting  equation (3.89) into equation (3.68) gives
EC(t )  =  f{cr)r(t) -  f ( a )6  +  (3.90)
Equation (3.90) has im portant implications. It clearly specifies how the rate  of 
interest affects the change in consumer’s optim al consumption trajectory  through 
the in tertem poral elasticity of substitution as its coefficient. Moreover, it states 
tha t the intertem poral elasticity of substitution appears as the coefficient of the 
liquidity constraint. Equation (3.90) implies th a t the response of optim al con­
sum ption to liquidity constraints will be conditioned by the consum er’s in tertem ­
poral elasticity of substitution. It is interesting to examine the te rm  /(cr)'0(t). 
This term  captures simultaneously the effects of i ) pure preference param eters
such as the u tility  function and the subjective ra te  of preference; ii) interest ra te
variations; and in )  structural param eters in the credit m arket which are m ani­
fested in the formulation of liquidity constraints. The first two factors are reflected 
by the intertem poral elasticity of substitution and the th ird  factor is captured by 
Moreover, according to equation (3.90), the time-varying interest ra te  affects 
the relationship between liquidity constraints and optim al consum ption policies 
through its effects on the intertem poral elasticity of substitution.
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3.8 O ptim al C onsum ption in a S tochastic  E nvi­
ronm ent
The discussion we had so far on determ inistic dynamic choice-theoretic consump­
tion models was based on the following assumptions: 1) The objective of choice 
was real consumption expenditures; 2) The utility function, representing prefer­
ences for the objective of choice, is monotonically increasing and strictly  concave;
3) Constraints facing the agent can be summarised in a budget constraint; and
4) The agent’s optim al choice maximises utility  over the planning horizon subject 
to the assumed constraints. We have also used the following auxiliary assump­
tions: 1) The agent is assumed to be rational; 2) The agent’s planning horizon 
is the lifetime of himself (and his spouse if applicable and not of his parents or 
m ature children); 3) The agent has direct access to perfect capital and insurance 
markets; 4) The agent m ust be solvent at the end of the planning period; and 5) 
The intertem poral utility  function is additive and depends on real consumption 
expenditures in each period. Moreover, these models assume th a t the following 
variables are certain: the length of the agent’s lifetime or the planning horizon, the 
rate  of return  on investment, and the non-interest income which is also assumed 
to be exogenous. Different variants of the standard choice-theoretic consumption 
models are possible. An example is the existence of borrowing constraints which 
yields the liquidity constrained consumption models discussed in sections 3.6 and 
3.7.
W ithin the above context, uncertain lifetime and uncertain fu ture income are 
the two m ajor sources which give rise to stochastic optimal consumption behaviour. 
Despite the im portance of uncertain labour income in deciding on optim al con­
sum ption plans and despite a great deal of research work on life cycle and perm a­
nent income hypotheses, “yet, closed form decision rules for optim al consumption 
in the presence of uncertain labour income have not, in general, been derived. It
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seems strange th a t so much theoretical and empirical work has been done studying 
consumption and yet we do not even know what the optim al level of consumption 
or sensitivity of consumption to income should be in most very simple settings” 
(Zeldes, 1989, p. 275).
In this section, we consider the case where optim al stochastic consumption is 
constrained only by liquidity. U ncertainty about the longevity of life as well as 
uncertainty on the future income play the m ajor roles in the stochastic behaviour 
of liquidity constrained consumers. It should be noted, however, th a t uncertain 
lifetimes can partially  be responsible for uncertainty in future non-interest income 
simply because the la tte r is contingent on the survival of the agent and, therefore, 
becomes uncertain. In the following, we first examine the im pact of uncertain life­
times on optim al consumption behaviour. In section 3.8.2 we study this problem 
for uncertain income as well as uncertainty in the rate of interest. The im plication 
of income uncertainty on optim al control applications to dynam ic consumption 
choice is the subject of section 3.8.3.
3.8.1 U n certa in  L ifetim es and th e  O ptim al C on su m p tion  
B ehaviour
Consider an individual consumer maximising the following discrete u tility  func­
tion,
J  — m ax E 7 E (1 + S)~iU(Ci)
. i—t
(3.91)
where t  is the  current age and r  is the age th a t the consumer is expected to 
live. Clearly, r  is a stochastic integer in the range of (t +  1) and T , where T  is 
the assumed (and certain) end of the planning period. O ther term s are defined 
earlier. The individual consumer maximises (3.91) subject to  the following asset 
transition equation,
^i-fl =  (1 +  +  Yt ~  Cf>
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defined in equation (3.21) and the liquidity constraints
A t > —a — bYt>
defined in equation (3.70). It is also assumed th a t the consum er’s initial asset is 
both  non-negative and given.
Given survival to age £, let the probability of living to age (£+1) be P r 1 \t). 
The probability of living to age (f+2) is P r L (tf+ l|i) P r L( t+ 2\t+ l) .  In general, the 
probability of living to age i, given survival to  age t, is rim=<+i L ( m \ m  — 1). It 
follows, therefore, th a t the optim al consumption plan, C opi(t)^ which is contingent 
only on survival in each period, maximises the following objective function,
j - i  n PrL(m|m — 1)(1 +  5 ) ~ ' U ( C i ) .  (3.92)
i=t m=i+l
The structu re of equation (3.92) and the associated constraints, i.e. equations 
(3.28) and (3.82), is similar to the determ inistic problem defined in sections 3.6.2 
and 3.7.2, hence the results given there apply equally to the case of uncertain 
lifetimes.
The uncertain lifetime poses no problem in deriving tractab le solutions to op­
tim al consum ption plans. To justify this conclusion, recall th a t the underlying 
variable in the uncertain lifetime is “survival” , which can be regarded as a di- 
chotomous dum m y variable. The utility  function, on the other hand, is non-zero 
if the survival variable is non-zero. This com patibility of the u tility  function and 
the survival variable ensures the sim ilarity of objective function (3.92) and those 
discussed in sections 3.6.2 and 3.7.2 for determ inistic case. The above sim ilarity 
between stochastic and determ inistic structures breaks down if the underlying 
variable in uncertain lifetime were continuous. For example, the assum ption of 
dependency of utility  derived from consumption on health invalidates the simple 
structure of the objective function (3.92). Similarly, for a m ultiple-person family,
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the uncertain lifetime renders the maximisation of equation (3.92) subject to the 
asset transition  equation (3.21) and the liquidity constraints (3.82), inexpressible 
in a determ inistic form presented in sections 3.6.2 and 3.7.2.
M ultiple-person families pose serious problems for optim al consumption plans 
when lifetimes are uncertain. O ptim al consumption in each period is contingent 
on family consumption in th a t period as well as on the probability distribution 
of fu ture family consumption. The complicated m athem atical expectations of 
family compositions a t different periods makes it difficult to apply the  m ethod of 
dynam ic program m ing to derive closed form solutions for optim al consumption 
decisions. An alternative approach is to assume th a t the family behaves as if 
expected family consumption in each future period will be realised with certainty. 
Mariger (1986) has used this approach to model the econometric specification 
of optim al consumption behaviour with uncertain lifetimes. The difficulty is to 
revise, at each period, the expectations of family composition in fu ture periods 
in order to reflect the new information which has become available to  the fam­
ily. It follows th a t the optim al fam ily’s consumption plan cannot be projected 
w ithout the knowledge of the tim e-paths of family composition since the optim al 
consumption plan is contingent on this composition.
3.8 .2  In com e U n certa in ty  and th e  O ptim al C on su m p tion  
B ehaviour
Modelling stochastic future income in an individual’s optim al consum ption be­
haviour has always been a challenging issue. It was usually agreed th a t “it is not 
possible to obtain a closed-form solution for the optim al consum ption plan when 
future labour income is uncertain” (Mariger, 1986, p. 59). The usual remedy 
was to elim inate all relevant income uncertainties by assuming a full insurance 
for net labour income in each period provided tha t at least one family m em ber is 
alive. Note th a t there is no incentive for a single-person family to purchase such
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insurance.
The alternative practice was to  assume th a t the individual consumer behaves 
as i f  expected fu ture income is certain (see, for example, Hall and Mishkin, 1982). 
However, the seminal work of Dreze and Modigliani (1972) can be regarded as 
the m ost influential early contribution on optimal consumption decisions under 
uncertainty. It should be noted tha t Dreze and M odigliani’s work benefited from 
the earlier work of Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) on optim al saving decisions 
under uncertainty. The classical work of Dreze and Modigliani considers an agent’s 
optim al consum ption decision in the context of two-period models. M ariger (1986) 
has extended their work to  a m ulti-period model with additive intertem poral 
u tility  function. Following Dreze and Modigliani, consider an agent w ith a two-
period horizon who receives a certain labour income YL± and an uncertain labour 
income Y L 2 in periods one and two, respectively. The problem  is to choose 
consumption in the first period, Ci, to maximise the following expected u tility  
function which is assumed to be monotonically increasing and stric tly  concave,
J  = Et=i{U[Cu {l +  r ) ( Y L i  -  Cx) +  Y L 2]}. (3.93)
It is further assumed th a t E t= i (Y L 2) equals the mean value of uncertain labour 
income in the second period, i.e. Y L 2. Let C°pt maximises equation (3.93) subject 
to asset transition  equation and liquidity constraints and let J opt{C{pt) be the 
associated cost. Now define Cj^a;) as the optim al first period consum ption when 
Y L 2 is certain to  be equal to a  and let J i ( a )  be the associated cost. Dreze and 
Modigliani show th a t
ARA{C°XP\  C2) > $  or < 0  f o r  all C2 -> C?* <  or > C ? ( Y L i ) ,  (3.94)
where A R A ( C ° pt, C2) represents the change in the absolute risk aversion as C°pt 
increases and C2 decreases along the budget line, Y L 2 is th e  certain  level of
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income in period-two which makes the consumer as well off as w ith the uncertain 
income Y L 2i th a t is
J+[C+{YL+)\ =
From equation (3.94) it follows th a t for decreasing absolute risk aversion, as C2 
increases and C\ decreases along the budget line (with the expected utility  held 
constant), the condition A R A ( C i Pt, C2) >  0 provides a sufficient condition for 
saving, in the  case of uncertainty, to become greater than  in the  certainty case. 
Moreover, since Y L 2 < Y L 2 for a risk-averse consumer, then from equation (3.94) 
we have
ARA{Clpt,C 2) > 0  for all C2 -> C f '  < C+(YT^),
which means th a t decreasing absolute risk aversion ensures income uncertainty 
to increase saving above the level th a t would occur if Y L 2 were certain to  equal 
its mean, namely, Y L 2 =  Y L .  In fact, higher variations of Y L 2 around its mean, 
Y L , implies th a t the consumer will respond by saving more in the first period. 
In other words, current consumption is lower when labour income in each future 
period is stochastic than  when it is certain to equal its mean. This implies th a t 
the assum ption of certainty equivalence will tend to an overestim ate of consump­
tion particularly  for working families who are heavily dependent on their labour 
income.
C apital income uncertainty, or more specifically, rate of re tu rn  uncertainty, 
poses even more problems for dynamic optim al consumption decisions. The stan­
dard procedure is to take expectations over the portfolio ra te  of re tu rn  w ith risky 
assets. The difficulty arises because the individual consumer m ust evaluate, in 
each period, the likelihood of becoming liquidity constrained in fu ture periods 
when deciding on optim al current consumption. Simplifying assum ptions can, of 
course, help towards obtaining a tractab le solution. For exam ple, it is usually as­
sumed th a t the joint distribution of asset returns in each fu ture period is known
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in the initial stage.74
Hakansson (1970) considers an agent facing risky assets whose rate  of return  
are independently and identically distributed over time. He assumes th a t the 
intertem poral u tility  function is additive and is of the isoelastic form. M erton 
(1971) essentially considers the same problem for the continuous case where he 
assumes a Weiner process for asset returns. The assumption th a t the joint dis­
tributions of asset returns in each period are known in the initial period ensures 
th a t all the relevant past information is reflected in the current level of net worth. 
Hence, future wealth is the only uncertain variable in the model which is rele­
vant to future consumption. O ptim al consumption plan can thus be reduced to 
a consumption-investment plan contingent on wealth in each period. Note tha t 
the assum ption of independently distributed capital returns plays a key role in 
this dynamic optim isation, since, otherwise, optim al consumption in each period 
would be contingent not only on wealth but on the sequence of past related rates 
of retu rn  on risky assets.
An im portant finding of Hakansson and Merton is th a t the dem and for risky 
assets in each period is proportional to wealth, the proportion depending only 
on the joint distribution of asset returns. Moreover, the increased capital risk 
decreases (increases) the propensity to  consume wealth in each period if r\ is less 
(greater) than  zero, rj is the exponent on consumption in an isoelastic utility  
function (used in Hakansson and M erton work) which measures the degree of 
concavity of the intertem poral utility  function. A large value of rj implies a larger 
consumption growth rate if the rate  of interest exceeds the coefficient of tim e 
preference. It should be noted th a t “capital risk” , in the above context, is defined 
according to  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), namely, a capital asset is riskier if its
74See Hakansson (1970) and Merton (1971) for the early seminal work on optimal investment 
and consumption strategies under risk.
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uncertain ra te  of return , r, is augm ented to r +  e, where c is d istributed as white 
noise.
An im portan t point is th a t, Hakansson and M erton did not, unfortunately, pay 
much atten tion  to the im portant role of liquidity constraints in their analysis of 
the im pact of stochastic rate of return  on optim al consumption plans. Recall th a t 
their m ajor finding implies th a t the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets 
depends only on the joint distribution of asset return, th a t is, it is independent 
of the size and the composition of agent’s wealth. It follows, therefore, th a t the 
individual consumer should borrow heavily in the early phases of th e  life cycle 
when his full wealth is mainly in the form of future earnings. Hence, an optim al 
portfolio choice can only be modelled correctly when liquidity constraints are fully 
taken into account. The converse is also true: an optim al consum ption plan which 
takes liquidity constraints into account but does not acknowledge the  effects of 
portfolio choice on risky assets will be equally inaccurate.
The findings of Hakansson and M erton, initially developed for a two-period 
model, were then generalised by Sibley (1975) and Miller (1976) for a m ulti­
period optim al consumption plan with uncertain income. They showed th a t the 
results obtained by Hakansson and M erton are true for m ulti-period models. They 
also showed th a t beginning at any initial level of uncertainty on income, the 
precautionary saving increases with a Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) m ean-preserving 
spread on income. These results were further generalised by Zeldes (1984) to 
account for the sensitivity of consumption to wealth or to transitory income, i.e. 
the slope of the consumption function rather than  its level. Using a second-order 
Taylor expansion of marginal utility, Zeldes showed tha t with constant relative risk 
aversion adding uncertainty raises the slope of the consumption function. This 
implies th a t income uncertainty makes consumption more sensitive to transitory
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income than  under certainty equivalence. An interesting related result is th a t w ith 
constant absolute risk aversion the consumption function would shift downward 
in a parallel way when uncertainty is added, leaving the slope unchanged. In 
a sim ilar development, Roel (1986) and Kimball (1988) have shown th a t excess 
sensitivity will occur for a class of u tility  functions tha t include constant relative 
risk aversion and excludes constant absolute risk aversion.75
Closed-form solutions for dynam ic optim al consumption plans w ith stochastic 
income and constant absolute risk aversion have been reported by Schechtman 
and Escudero (1977), Caballero (1987) and Kimball and Mankiw (1987), among 
others. Zeldes (1989) is the first author who has successfully form ulated an exact 
closed-loop solution for optim al consumption with uncertain income and a u til­
ity function which is constant relative risk aversion. Following Hall and Mishkin 
(1982), Zeldes assumes th a t income can be decomposed into two separate com­
ponents. The first is the “lifetime” or perm anent component which is assumed 
to follow a geometric random  walk and is disturbed at each period by a random  
shock which captures the effects of pay rises, job changes, health  changes and 
other similar persistent factors. The other component is the transitory  compo­
nent which is assumed to follow an M A ( 2) and is hit each period by a random  
shock representing the effects of one-time bonuses, unem ployment spells and other 
similar transitory  factors. It is assumed th a t these two components are separately 
observable.
Zeldes (1989) has used the stochastic dynamic programm ing to calculate the 
optim al consumption plan with uncertain income. He form ulated the problem 
simply as a stochastic control problem with only one state  variable (wealth), one 
control variable (consumption) and one disturbance variable (income). Using a 
technique of Bertsekas (1976) in stochastic dynamic programm ing, Zeldes dis­
75See also Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992, 1994) and Flavin (1993).
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cretized the sta te  space into an S  element grid. Beginning from the term inal 
period, a backward induction is used to  solve for the value function and the cor­
responding optim al consumption. At each stage, the sum of current u tility  and 
the discounted expected value of next period’s value function was m aximised to 
yield the optim al level of consumption. I t is well-known th a t the accuracy of 
the results depends upon the width of the grid used for the discretization in the 
stochastic dynam ic program m ing framework. The approxim ate errors can thus 
be m ade arbitrarily  small by narrowing the width of the grid at the expense of 
more com puting tim e and excessive com puter memory known as the curse of  
dimensionality in Bellm an’s dynamic programming.
However, Zeldes (1989) reports th a t the resulting consum ption function is 
quite different from the certainty equivalence benchmark. The rational individ­
uals w ith constant relative risk aversion develop an optim al consum ption plan 
which “exhibits excess sensitivity to transitory income, hence they save too much 
and have expected growth of consumption th a t is too high relative to the sim­
ple perm anent income hypothesis benchm ark even in the absence of borrowing 
constraints” (pp. 295-296).
3.8 .3  Im p lica tion s o f In com e U n certa in ty  on th e  A p p lica ­
tion s o f  O p tim al C ontrol T heory  to  D yn am ic C onsum p ­
tio n  D ec ision s
D epartures from the certainty equivalence when an individual consumer is fac­
ing an uncertain future income pose serious problems in the application of op­
tim al control theory to consumption optimisation. Recall th a t in the case of 
certainty equivalence, the optim al consumption is proportional to  the sum of fi­
nancial wealth and the present value of expected future income. As discussed 
in C hapter 2, the assum ption of certainty equivalence significantly facilitates the 
applications of optim al control techniques to identify and com pute optim al sta te
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and control trajectories.
As discussed in the previous section, the numerical complexities in calculat­
ing optim al consumption pa th  when future income is uncertain -as is usually the 
case in practice- are beyond the capacity of hum an brain or the  available business 
com puters. This may render the standard  optimisation of rational expectations 
perm anent incom e/life cycle hypotheses unacceptable models of individual’s con­
sum ption behaviour. This conclusion is based on Zeldes’ results obtained by 
applying the direct search m ethod in stochastic dynamic program m ing, which re­
quires excessive com puter memory beyond the capacity of the  existing business 
computers. However, the application of alternative optim al control techniques,
i.e. Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle, is not promising either since obtaining a 
closed-form solution, when income is stochastic, requires com plicated and heavily 
involved iteration techniques which similarly demands excessive com puter storage 
capacities far beyond the hum an brain or the standard computers.
We are, therefore, faced with a very serious methodological problem  in the for­
m ulation of dynam ic intertem poral consumption decisions with stochastic income. 
The backward inductive procedure inherent in the stochastic dynam ic program ­
ming plays the key role in this problem. The basis of the argum ent, which also 
constitutes a criterion for assessing the usefulness of an optim isation procedure, is 
best explained by Pem berton (1993, p. 3): “For the optim al solution to a model 
to be a useful guide to actual behaviour requires tha t the relevant agents in the 
real world can themselves identify and atta in  the solution (though not necessarily 
by using the same m ethods)” . On the basis of this criterion, the standard  stochas­
tic dynam ic programm ing fails to be accepted as a useful optim isation m ethod 
in dynam ic optim al consumption decisions because it is impossible to  carry out 
the inherent backward inductive procedure. In fact, “either the problem  gets so
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hideously complex th a t it is beyond the com putational power of the  decision­
maker; or the sequence of implications stretches so far into th e  fu ture th a t the 
consequences get shrouded in the mists of tim e” (Hay, 1983, p. 137).
Friedm anite defence of optim isation which heavily depends on “natu ra l selec­
tion” , “in tu ition” and “practice and /or learning” cannot save the backward induc­
tion procedure in com puting dynam ic optim isation of consumption from Pem ber­
to n ’s attack. Recall th a t in an optim al control of rational expectations perm anent 
incom e/life cycle hypotheses, the optim al current consumption is contingent on 
future optim al decisions on consumption. As Pem berton (1993) argues, neither 
practice nor learning from past mistakes can make it easier to com pute the opti­
mal consum ption sequence. Although the Euler equation, which is the necessary 
condition of optim isation, gives an intuitive meaning on balancing the m arginal 
utilities of consumption in two periods, it does not provide any corresponding 
intuition for the actual consumption decisions. Moreover, “every individual con­
sum er has to solve his or her own, unique lifetime backward induction problems 
and no as i f  simplifications are available” (Pem berton, 1993, p. 5). Thus, Fried­
m an’s natural selection argum ent and the associated concept of innate abilities, 
do not apply to  th e  dynam ic optim isation of consumer behaviour.
Despite Pem berton’s effort to overcome this shortcoming by replacing the con­
sum er’s detailed plan for the future by their concern for the future  and thus reduc­
ing the insoluble m ulti-period backward induction problem by a straightforw ard 
two-period forward-looking problem, much has to be done before a workable opti­
mising model can be designed to explain and compute the individual’s consump­
tion behaviour in a stochastic environm ent. It appears th a t the following may 
facilitate the realisation of this objective.
i) A revival of research interest in “consumption function” approach (or solved-
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out consum ption functions) to consumer behaviour may, in principle, avoid many 
com putational problems associated with optim al control applications to dynam ic 
optim isation of constrained consumption. For example, the  curse of dimensional­
ity in com puting optim al consumption paths, reported by Zeldes (1989), can be 
avoided by adopting a solved-out consumption function approach since this does 
not depend on a backward induction procedure. The past 15 years have witnessed 
a flourishing literature on the Euler equation approach in perm anent income-life 
cycle hypotheses. As M uellbauer and Lattim er (1995) point out “the  enthusi­
asm of the Euler approach and the large scale abandonm ent of the solved out 
approach, particularly in N orth America, for modelling aggregate consumption, 
has gone too far” (p. 294).
ii) A new approach is required which brings together the theory-based Euler 
approach and the data-instigated “solved-out” consumption function approach to 
model the constrained optim al consumption decisions over tim e. This takes us 
back to the controversial issue of theoretical rigour against pure empiricism, i.e. 
theory against observation, discussed at length in Chapter two (section 2.5). The 
theoretical and em pirical advances in optim al consumption behaviour and optim al 
consumption plans under income uncertainty (both labour and capital incomes 
uncertainties) during the past 20 years have revealed th a t the theoretical rigour 
of the Euler equation approach, which demands extrem e and unrealistic assump­
tions about consumption behaviour, should somehow be relaxed at the expense 
of introducing more theoretical elaboration into the simple “solved ou t” rational 
expectations perm anent incom e/life cycle hypotheses of consum ption behaviour 
in a stochastic environment.
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3.9 Sum m ary and C oncluding R esu lts
After a brief introduction to  the theoretical problems associated w ith liquidity 
constraints in households5 consumption behaviour in section 3.2, our analysis of 
control theory applications to consumption behaviour starts w ith an exam ination 
of the properties of the optim al consumption path  in the absence of liquidity con­
straints. This provides a basis for analyzing the effects of liquidity constraints 
on the optim al consumption path. It is well-known tha t the Euler equation ap­
proach in the consumer u tility  maximization reduces the m ulti-stage consumer 
dynamic optim ization problem  into a sequence of two-period decision process in 
which consum ers decision on next period5s consumption depends on the current 
consumption given consum ers current income and financial assets. One can easily 
obtain the Euler equation using the Lagrange multiplier. I have shown in section 
3.3 th a t Pontryagin5s m axim um  principle and Bellm an5s dynam ic programm ing 
can both  directly be applied to consum ers multi-stage decision processes in or­
der to obtain the optim ality conditions for consumption growth pa th  as well as 
deriving the Euler equation. Although the Euler equation and the optim ality  
conditions thus obtained are exactly the same as those produced by the Lagrange 
m ethod for a two period case, the methodology employed in solving the m ulti­
stage decision process using the optim al control theory provides an opportunity  
for introducing different assumptions on consumer’s utility  specifications or on 
the constraints in the sta te  and control space. My other related results are as 
follows.
i ) Using a Bernoulli-type utility  function and obtaining a differential equation 
for optim al consumption behaviour by applying the m axim um  principle, the fol­
lowing optim ality condition for an increasing consumption path  is obtained: the 
interest ra te  should exceed the consumer’s rate of tim e preference (section 3.3.2).
ii) The application of Bellm an’s dynamic programming to a problem  similar
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to  (i) above produces exactly the same result (section 3.4.3).
Hi) Again, by using a Bernoulli-type utility  function and by solving the func­
tional recurrence equation in the dynam ic programming, together w ith using the 
guess technique, we have dem onstrated in section 3.4.3 th a t the  optim al consump­
tion is a non-linear function of the tim e preference and a linear function of wealth. 
The change in the  interest ra te  or in the future income affect optim al consump­
tion in so far as they affect wealth. This generalises the result of B lanchard and 
Fischer (1990).
Recall th a t specific solutions exist for a special class of consum ption problems 
whose u tility  functions are hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (including the iso­
elastic or constant relative risk aversion and the quadratic u tility  functions). The 
solution to other classes of consumption problems are basically possible only by the 
direct search m ethod using the recurrence equation in the dynam ic programm ing 
which is itself based on Bellm an’s principle of optimality. To dem onstrate the 
methodology of solving the recurrence equation backward in tim e to obtain an 
optim al closed-loop policy sequence for consumption, I have used in section 3.4.1 a 
general non-linear budget constraint and a non-linear value function. This appears 
to be the first a ttem p t at dem onstrating the potentiality of this control technique 
in dealing with non-linear economic dynamics and general objective functions.
The other im portant result obtained in this chapter on the optim ization of 
consumption behaviour w ithout liquidity constraints is the  direct application of 
the dynam ic program m ing together with the envelope theorem  in order to derive 
the Euler equation for optim al consumption (section 3.4.2). Moreover, it is shown 
how this result will lead to  Hall’s random  walk hypothesis for consumption.
In section 3.3.3, Pontryagin’s maximum principle has been directly applied, 
for the first tim e, to the consum er’s optim al consumption program m e in order to
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derive H all’s random  walk hypothesis of consumption behaviour. The utilisation 
of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion significantly facilitated this derivation. 
The result thus obtained is exactly the same as those derived by applying Bell­
m an’s dynam ic programm ing. This completes the application of standard  optim al 
control techniques in producing Hall’s hypothesis which currently plays a vital role 
in the  Euler approach to consumption theory.
By exam ination of the properties of the optim al consumption p a th  when liq­
uidity constraints are binding, I have produced a num ber of results, w ith and 
w ithout time-varying interest rates. These results, which are presented in sec­
tions 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, include the following:
t) By using the m ethod of dynamic programming together w ith th e  envelope 
theorem, I obtained the optim ality condition in term s of the  Lagrange m ultiplier 
associated w ith the liquidity constraints. This m ultiplier represents the am ount 
by which the consumer’s u tility  will change if current constraints on borrowing 
become relaxed by one unit.
ii) By using the generalised Ham iltonian function in the m axim um  principle, 
I have shown how liquidity constraints can directly affect consum ption behaviour 
along the  optim al path.
in )  Again, by using the generalised Hamiltonian, I have shown how the ex­
istence of liquidity constraints rejects H all’s random  walk hypothesis. We know 
th a t the effects of liquidity constraints on consumption are usually tested  indi­
rectly. Our result here is of prim e theoretical value because, for the first tim e, it 
gives an explicit relationship between liquidity constraints and the random  walk 
hypothesis.
iv) The above result has been obtained under the conventional assum ption tha t 
an individual’s net indebtedness is a constant function of his income. By using 
the generalised H am iltonian, I have shown how different form ulations of liquidity
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constraints can, in principle, be handled in dynamic optim ization problems of 
consumer choice.
v ) I have shown, using the Hamiltonian approach, how tim e-varying interest 
rates can affect consumption variations along the optim al consum ption trajectory.
v i ) Using the m ethod of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, I have obtained an explicit 
relation which dem onstrates how the existence of liquidity constraints can reject 
H all’s random  walk hypothesis. The same result has been obtained earlier in 
this chapter by using the generalised Hamiltonian function. The application of 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, however, provides a better insight into the possi­
ble interactions between time-varying interest rates and the u tility  discount rate. 
However, the generalised Hamiltonian function has much wider capabilities in 
trea ting  different models of liquidity constraints.
viz) I have obtained an approxim ate negative relation between the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion and the intertem poral elasticity of substitution. I used 
this relation to generalise the above results further. The results obtained are very 
useful since they specify the following:
1. How the  time-varying interest rates affect optim al consum ption through 
intertem poral elasticity of substitution which acts as a coefficient.
2. How the intertem poral elasticity of substitution, which has appeared as the 
coefficient of liquidity constraint, affects the optim al consumption behaviour. It 
should be noted th a t equation (3.90) has an interesting property: it sim ultane­
ously captures the effects of the following variables on the optim al consumption 
path: i) the pure preference param eters; u )  the interest rates variations; and Hi) 
the structural param eters prevailing in the credit markets which are m anifested 
in the  modelling of liquidity constraints.
Our analysis of the optim al consumption behaviour in a stochastic environ­
m ent (section 3.8) shows th a t the departure from the certainty equivalence, when
232
an individual consumer is facing an uncertain future income, poses serious prob­
lems in the application of optim al control theory to dynamic optim isation of con­
sum ption. Numerical complexities in calculating the optim al consum ption paths 
w ith fu ture uncertainties are beyond the capacities of either hum an brain or of the 
existing business com puters. Hence, the  backward induction procedure inherent 
in stochastic dynam ic programming, as well as the iterative techniques associated 
with the  m axim um  principle, may be unacceptable optim isation m ethods because 
the relevant agent in the real world cannot identify and a tta in  the solution. We 
have concluded th a t a revival of research interest in the “solved-out” consump­
tion functions and an a ttem p t to bring this data-instigated approach closer to  the 
theory-based Euler approach are needed to  advance our understanding of optim al 
consumption behaviour.
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Chapter Four
Optimal Control of Dynamic Leontief 
Models
4.1 In troduction
Recall th a t in an input-output model, the output at tim e t  can be considered as a 
function of the capacity brought about by investment in the past. Investm ent at 
tim e t and subsequent years, will generate the greater capacity which th e  growing 
output will require in the future. It is the nature of such a link between the  past 
and the  fu ture th a t allows for optim ality in an input-output model. Resources, 
instead of being consumed now, can be devoted to investment in order to expand 
productive capacities for subsequent production, or commodities dem anded in 
future can be produced now and stored. A choice m ust always be m ade at every 
stage if an optimal input-output planning model is desired. This provides the 
possibility of applying optim al control theory to input-output models.
Despite extensive use of input-output models in economic planning since its 
development in 1941 by Leontief, not much attention has been given to form ulate 
this model as a problem in a dynam ic optim ization framework. The few writers 
who contributed to input-output models from a control theoretic point of view [for 
example Brody (1970) and Smirnov (1970)] have used either very simple models 
or have confined their analysis to determ inistic models only. In this chapter, I 
have, for the first time, form ulated and solved both determ inistic and stochas­
tic dynam ic Leontief models with and w ithout a substitution system  and with a
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quadratic as well as non-quadratic (non-linear) objective functions. More impor­
tan t, the  Leontief substitu tion system is formulated as a control process in which 
optim al substitu te activities are derived by using Bellm an’s dynam ic program­
ming. The stochastic dynamic Leontief model with uncertainties about future 
values of output is then solved together with a stochastic substitu tion system 
which includes measurem ent errors.
Section 4.2 presents a brief discussion on the im portance of the dynamic Leon­
tief model in economic modelling from an historical perspective. The significance 
of treating  Leontief’s input-output model as an optim isation problem is also dis­
cussed. The determ inistic dynamic Leontief model is form ulated as a control 
problem  in section 4.3. Section 4.4 deals with optimal consumption policies for 
dynam ic Leontief’s input-output model using Pontryagin’s m axim um  principle. 
Using the H am iltonian function, we have derived the m atrix  Riccati equation, 
which together with boundary conditions and tracking equation, provides the 
optim al sequence of consumption and the associated output vectors.
The analysis of optim al consumption policies for the dynam ic Leontief model 
using Bellm an’s dynam ic programm ing is the subject of section 4.5. In section
4.6 we have form ulated the optim al control of input-output models w ith a sub­
stitu tion  system in which an optim al policy sequence is derived which generates 
optim al substitu te activities such th a t a cost function is minimised. The dynamic 
programm ing solution of the Leontief substitution system is the subject of section
4.7 in which A strom ’s fundam ental lem m a of stochastic control theory is used to 
obtain the functional recurrence equation for the stochastic non-linear Leontief 
substitution system with m easurem ent error and uncertainties about the future 
sta te  of the system. Again, the optim al substitu te activities are derived with 
respect to minimization of a cost function.
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Section 4.8 is concerned with optim al stochastic control of a dynam ic Leon­
tief model w ith future uncertainties and stochastic substitution. The m ethod of 
stochastic dynam ic programm ing is utilised to obtain the optim al consumption 
policies. The functional recurrence equation for the stochastic substitu tion sys­
tem  generates the sequence of optim al base matrices which are then used in the 
process designed to generate the optim al stochastic control of dynam ic Leontief 
models. A feedback optim al control law of optim al sequence of final consump­
tion and the associated optim al ou tput trajectory  are then obtained. And finally, 
section 4.9 provides a sum m ary of the m ain results obtained in this chapter.
4.2 T he L eontief M odel and M athem atica l E co­
nom ic M odelling: Background, Im portance and  
th e  O ptim al Control Approach
Using an historical approach, we discussed in Chapter One (section 1.4), the  
controversial issue th a t whether economic tru ths are discoverable through the 
instrum entality  of m athem atics. We concluded tha t there are economic ques­
tions which can only be answered by specific m athem atical m ethods . 76 Again, in 
Chapter One (section 1.7), we identified the conditions under which m athem ati- 
zation of economics can lead to  results of significant value in analysing the real 
world economic issues. We showed th a t the applications of m athem atical m eth­
ods to  economic analysis are most promising in those areas where the abstract 
economic concepts, to be used in m athem atical machinery, are close approxim a­
tions to economic realities. Inter-industry models, for which Leontief invented 
the input-output technique, is a rem arkable example of successful applications of 
m athem atics to economic analysis. An interesting point of theoretical im portance 
is th a t in all these cases, the application of m athem atics of higher levels have usu­
ally produced results of higher values. Let us examine this point for the Leontief
76See section 1.4.2.
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input-output model in an historical perspective.
It is now agreed th a t the input-output analysis, as a theoretical construct, was 
known to  economists well before 1933 when Leontief began seriously to develop 
his input- ou tpu t technique. Perhaps, Tableau Economique can be regarded as 
the first a ttem p t in which Frangois Quesnay (1759) tried to depict the relation­
ship between agriculture and other sectors . 77 Using elem entary m athem atics, he 
produced a simple version of an input-output model representing the functioning 
of the real world economy.
Nearly one hundred years later, M arx dem onstrated, using a two-sector table, 
the relationship between the capital goods and consumer’s goods sectors (or de­
partm ents) in an economy. An exam ination of M arx’s discussion on Accumulation 
and Reproduction on an Extended Scale,78 suggests a strong theoretical similar­
ity between M arx’s schematic presentation of accumulation and circulation and 
the Leontief’s input-output model. Some authors have even concluded th a t “the 
input-output calculations is simply an enlargement of the conditions of equilib­
rium  in M arx’s formulae of expanded reproduction. The two departm ents have 
been replaced by fourteen, which complicates the picture bu t makes it possible to 
bring it closer to  reality” [Ernest M andel (1962), p. 641]. It should be noted, how­
ever, th a t the m ain difference between M arx’s table of expanded reproduction and 
Leontief’s input-output analysis is th a t the focus of the la tte r is to  calculate the 
interm ediate commodities bought and sold among sectors, w ithout any reference 
to the “value added” expressed by the number of hours of labour, whereas the
77Frangois Quesnay (1694-1774) wrote the first edition of his Tableau Economique in 1758. 
A limited new edition of the book was published in 1759 at Versailles, and was presented to 
Louis XV. He published a simplified version of the Tableau in 1766 in an article which appeared 
in the Journal de Vagriculture with the title Analyse de la formule arithmetique du Tableau 
economique.
78See, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, vol. II, Book II: The Process of Circulation 
of Capital, edited by F. Engels, pp. 489-523, particularly, the section entitled “Schematic 
Presentation of Accumulation” , pp. 505-523, including the first and second illustrations.
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former concentrates on calculating the to tal value of all the commodities bought 
and sold.
The real contribution of input-output approach in modelling the real economy 
emerged when Leontief started  to quantify the Walras-Cassel form ulation of the 
general equilibrium , which was popularised in the 1920’s and 1930. We discussed 
in Chapter One (section 1.2.5) tha t, in his general equilibrium analysis, Walras has 
used the  abstract theoretical concepts which strongly im peded the quantification 
of the relationships among the sectors of an actual economy. The celebrated work 
of Leontief (1941) is essentially the empirical groundwork of W alras’s general 
equilibrium  model, for which Leontief has used the U.S. economy as an example. 
This explains why Leontief’s path-breaking book, i.e. The Structure of  American  
Economy  has been subtitled “An Em pirical Application of Equilibrium  Analysis” .
Leontief’s operational point of view led him to take the position th a t the 
m ain task of an economist is to show tha t the theory can be applied to real 
economies and th a t it leads not only to predictions about the fu ture behaviour but 
the accuracy of predictions can also be tested. Hence, estim ating the technical 
coefficients, which measure the relationships among different sectors and thus 
facilitate quantifying the effects of different economic policy regimes, became the 
central point in the input-output analysis.
Applying higher-level m athem atics was the key to Leontief success. Compu­
tations with input-output models require inverting large m atrices. The history of 
the developments in input-output models shows how the advances in m athem ati­
cal methods (for example, the partitioning methods in m atrix  inversion) and the 
progress in com puter technologies have significantly contributed towards solving 
the interesting real economic problems. Recall tha t when Leontief started  his work 
on inpu t-ou tpu t models in 1933-1934, the punch-card com puters could multiply,
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but could not divide and yet Leontief was working on a model of 44 simultaneous 
equations with about 2 0 0 0  coefficients.
Despite all the m erits and achievements, the dynamic Leontief model soon 
encountered serious theoretical shortcomings. The problem  of causal indeterm i­
nacy, i.e. the possibility of the output and the stock of a t least one com modity 
becoming negative for sufficiently large t , is one of the m ost notable difficulties 
associated with dynam ic Leontief models.
T he general instability  characteristic of the dynamic Leontief model is m ainly 
due to  the model being strictly linear and deterministic. The elements of in ter­
m ediate and capital coefficient matrices are fixed and there is no possibility of 
factor substitu tion in the production function, hence the price mechanism does 
not reflect the effects of dem and and supply on the factors of production. In this 
case, the dynam ic Leontief model can be regarded as a special case of the von 
N eum ann model, in which there is only one production process for producing each 
good, w ith no jo in t output. W ith such constraints, unless the initial ou tput and 
capital stock vectors are on a certain ray from the origin, there is no guarantee 
th a t the model will be stable.
The problem  of instability of a dynam ic Leontief model can partially  be over­
come once it is regarded as an optim al planning model with constraints imposed on 
ou tpu t and capital stocks. A further development in this direction is to  introduce 
a feedback mechanism in which the output of the system, at any period, is ob­
served and used as an input to a controller process, which accordingly determ ines 
the optim al decision for the next period. This is the problem of optim al planning 
and control of a dynam ic Leontief model, which constitutes an exam ple of how the 
advances in m athem atical m ethods (for example, optim al control theory) can be 
used to relax the theoretical shortcoming associated with theorisation of economic
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behaviour. In the next section, we formulate the dynamic Leontief model as a 
control problem  and the subsequent sections consider the complete solutions to 
determ inistic and stochastic cases. My main contribution in this chapter is first, 
to form ulate and solve the Leontief substitution subsystem as a control problem 
and then, to obtain the optim al consumption sequence for the dynam ic Leontief 
model (for bo th  determ inistic and stochastic cases) incorporating determ inistic 
and stochastic substitu te  activities.
4.3 T he D ynam ic L eontief M odel as a C ontrol 
P roblem
Let us define q\ and q2 the to tal current outputs, Vi and V2 the to ta l stocks of
capital in the form of commodities 1 and 2 , Ii  and I2 the investments defined as
follows,
/l(t) =  V !( t+ 1 )-V i( t ) ,
h { t )  = V2(t +  1) — V2 (t)y
r  the capital input-output coefficient m atrix  whose elements 7  measure the re­
quired inputs of capital equipments to produce one unit of output, e the con­
sum ption vector and A  the current input-output coefficient m atrix  whose ele­
m ents measure the inputs of interm ediate product needed to produce one unit of 
each product. The following inequalities will then indicate how the net output is 
lim ited by the pre-existing stocks of capital,
7n[^i(0 + eiOO] + 'lulhit) + e2(^ )] < l^COi (4-1)
7i2[Ll( )^ +  ei(^)] +  722(^2(0 +  e2( )^] <  V2(i)- (4-2)
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) imply th a t the only lim itation to the system ’s expansion 
is the scarcity of capital stock.
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In general, the output of commodity i at tim e t , q{(t), can be used for three 
different purposes: i ) as current flow of interm ediate products Aqi{t), it) as net 
addition to  the capital stock or Hi) as final consumption e*(£),
qi(t) =  A #(t) +  /,■(£) +  e{(t). (4.3)
The productive capacity at tim e t =  1 will be determined by the  given Vi(0) 
and 14(0). The subsequent productive capacities depend upon the allocation 
m ade between consumption and addition to capital stock at each stage of the 
planning. An optimal feasible investment programme is thus associated with a 
unique feasible consumption pa tte rn  for the whole planning period, £= 1 , 2 , ..., 
T . 79 The behaviour of an input-output model, therefore, depends upon the way 
of deciding the consumption pattern  which involves a problem  in the field of 
optim al control theory.
The level of final dem and as a control variable in an input-output model re­
quires the government, as the main economic controller, to  affect final dem and 
by its own current expenditures as well as through taxation and subsidies. This 
enables the government to realize the optim al capital stock trajectory  necessary 
for optim al economic growth.
It is assumed th a t the sta te  of an input-output model at tim e t is given by 
its gross production vector g(£), which is also assumed to  be exhausted by in­
term ediate uses Aq(t)  and extensions to capital stock I ( t)  and consum ption e(t), 
i.e.
q(t) -  Aq(t)  +  I( t)  +  e(t). (4.4)
The dynamics of investment or extension to productive capacity is given by the
79A feasible investment programme is defined as the one which satisfies inequalities (4.1) and 
(4.2) and similarly, a feasible consumption programme must satisfy restrictions on minimum or 
exponential minimum consumption.
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following equation,
I( t)  = FAq  =  F[q(t +  1) -  <?(*)], (4.5)
where A is the first-difference operator. Substituting equation (4.5) into equation 
(4.4) yields
q(t + 1) = r - l ( /  -  a  + r)g(t) -  r _1e(t),
and by defining T~1( /  — A  + F) = B,  we have
q(t +  1) =  Bq(t)  -  T "^ (f ) . (4.6)
Equation (4.6) is the system dynamic equation for the Leontief dynam ic model
where e(t) is the  control vector and q(t) is the state vector. It is also assumed
th a t the state  of the  system at the initial stage t = 0 is given as <?(0).
We will study the dynamic input-output model as a tracking (or servo-mechanism) 
control problem  in which we wish to track a desired output trajectory. The per­
formance m easure (objective or cost functions) for such a system  is usually given 
as
W =  1/2 £  {[?(*) -  q\t)} 'Q\q(t)  -  (ft*)] +  [e(i) -  a d(t)]'R[e(t) -  e \ t ) ) } , (4.7)
t= 0
where qd(t) and ed(t) are the desired or nominal vectors of ou tput and consum ption 
trajectories to  be tracked. Q and R  are usually diagonal weighting m atrices giving 
the relative costs of deviating from the desired trajectories. Q and R  matrices 
may depend on time.
The determ inistic optim al control problem for the dynam ic Leontief model 
is to find an admissible final consumption sequence eopt{t)A  =  0 ,1 ,2 , • • •, T  — 1 
satisfying the system dynam ic equation (4.6) and in so doing minimising the cost 
function (4.7).
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4.4 O ptim al C onsum ption Policies for D ynam ic  
L eon tief M odels using Pontryagin’s M axim um  
P rincip le
We assume th e  following quadratic objective function for the  dynam ic Leontief 
model,
W  =  1 /2 [ ,(D  -  9"(T)]'%(T) -  9<i(r )]+
V 2 E  {feW -  ^Wl'QfeW -  / W l  +  feW -  edW]'#feW -  ed{t)]} ■ (4-8)
t = 0
The above objective function gives particular attention to the constraints imposed 
on the  system  at the term inal stage. Adjoining the Leontief dynam ic system to 
the objective function by using the Lagrange multiplier A(£), yields
W  =  1/219(7) -  9d(T)]'%(T) -  qd(T)]+
i /2 E  {wo -  Amm -  5"w]+ [«w -  e'wr-Rfew -  «■'(*)]}+
t~ o
A'(f +  l)[fl9(i) -  r _1e(t) -  q(t +  1)], (4.9)
and introducing the Ham iltonian scalar function, we obtain
H[q(t),e(t),X(t + l),f] =  l/2[qr(i) -  — «“*(*)]+
l/2[e(t) -  ed(t)]'H[e(t) -  ed{t)} +  V (i +  l ) [ f l9 (i) -  r “1e(*)]. (4.10)
Substituting equation (4.10) into equation (4.9) yields
W  =  1/ 2[9(T) -  9d(r)]'% (T ) -  qd(T)J +  E [ ff -  V (t +  1)9(< +  !)]• (4.11)
f=0
The problem  now is to minimise equation (4.11). Using the m ethod of pertu rba­
tion and assuming tha t the correct optim um  values of q(t) and e(i) as qopt(t) and 
eopt(i), we have
9w=<rw+£w, (4-i2)
q(t + 1) =  q01>‘(t + 1) +  £(t + 1), (4.13)
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e(i) =  eopt(t) +  e(t), (4.14)
where £(t) and e(t) are variations in q(t) and e(t), respectively. Substituting 
equations (4.12-4.14) into equation (4.11) and performing the m inimization, we 
obtain Pontryagin’s necessary conditions for optimality, i.e. ^ |y  =  0, the coupling 
relation, or
R[e(t) — ed(t)] — P/-1A (t -j- 1 ) =  0, (4.15)
and =  A(£ +  1 ) — A(£), the adjoint equation, or
QteCO — qd(t)] +  {B' — H K t  +  1) =  — ^ C0> (4-16)
w ith the following boundary conditions
<y(0) =  given , (4.17)
K T )  =  S[q(T) — qd(T)\. (4.18)
From equation (4.15) we have
e{t) =  R - ' p - ' X t f  +  1)] +  ed(t). (4.19)
Substituting equation (4.19) into equation (4.6) results in
q(t +  1 ) =  Bq{t) -  r ~ 1R - 1[r ' -1\ ( t  +  1)] -  r “ 1 ed(t). (4.20)
We now assume
A (t) = ®(t)q(t) + ®(t). (4-21)
Substituting equation (4.21) into equations (4.20) and (4.16) we obtain
q(t +  1 ) =  Bq{t)  -  r - 1 i T 1 r ,- 1[$ (t +  1 )q{t +  1 ) +  0 ( i  +  1 )] -  I1" V ( t ) ,  (4.22)
and
— ~  ® (0 =  Q[*?(0 — 9 ^ )3  +  {B'  — /)[$(£  +  l )q(t +  1) H- 0 ( i  +  1)]. (4.23)
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q(t +  1) can be obtained from equation (4.22),
9(i +  l) =  [ / + r - 1f l - 1r'"1*(i  +  l ) ] -1fl9( t ) -
[/ +  +  i ) ] - 1r - 1f r 1r '-10 (t + i ) -
[ /  +  +  l ) ] r - V ( f ) .  (4.24)
Substitu te equation (4.24) into (4.23) to obtain
{-$(*) — Q -  ( s '  -  /)$(* + 1)[/ + r - 1i r 1r '-1*(f + i)]- 1^ } ^ )  =
© (t) -  Qqd(t) -  ( s '  -  i ) m  + i ) [ / + r - 1f r 1r ' - 1$ ( t  + i ) ] - I r - 1f r 1r ' - 10 ( t  + 1)- 
(b' -  i )$(t  + 1)[/ + r - 1i?-1r ' - 1^ (* + i)]-lr - 1e,l(<) + ( s ' -  i)&(t + 1). (4.25)
From equation (4.25) we have
$ (t)  =  {B'  -  / ) $ ( i +  ! ) [ /  +  r - ' R ^ B ' - ^ t  + 1)]-‘S  +  Q, (4.26)
which is the m atrix  Riccati equation for the dynamic Leontief system  and
0 (f) =  Qqd(t) +  { ( B ' -  / )$ ( t  +  i ) [ / + r - l i r 1r '-1«(t +  i ) ] - 1r - 1f l - Ir ' -1+
(S' -  /)}© (f + 1) +  (S ' -  / ) $ ( f  + 1 )[/ +  r - ' i r v - 1^  +  i) ] -1 r -1 i j -1 r ' - 1ed(i),
(4.27)
which is the tracking equation.
Substitu ting equation (4.21) into equation (4.19) yields
e(f) =  +  l ) 9(f +  1) +  0(< +  1)] +  ed(t). (4.28)
From equations (4.18) and (4.21) we have
A(7 ) =  % ( 7 )  -  qd(T)] =  $ (7 )9 (7 )  +  0 ( 7 ) .
Therefore
$ ( T )  = S> (4.29)
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0(T) = —Sqd(T), (4.30)
which provide the boundary conditions for equations (4.26) and (4.27). Equation
(4.28) can be written, using equation (4.6), as
e(t) = R - i r l- 1$(t + 1 )Bq{t) -  R - ' T ' - ' m  +  l)I '-1e(f)+  
f T I r ' - 1$ ( f +  l ) 0 ( t + l )  +  e,i(t),
or
e(t) =  [ / +  +  l ) r - 1] -1R r 1T,- 1^ { t  +  1 )Bq( t)+
[ / +  +  l ) 0 ( t  +  1) +  ed(t)]. (4.31)
The Riccati equation (4.26) and the tracking equation (4.27), together with 
the boundary conditions (4.29) and (4.30), determine €>(1 ), 3>(2), and
0 (1 ), 0 (2 ), ..., 0 (T ) . Using the m atrices $ ( 1 ) and 0(1) together w ith equation 
(4.17) we can obtain eopt(0) through equation (4.31). eop<(0), together w ith q(0), 
produces gopi(l)  using the system dynam ic equation (4.16). 4>(2) and 0 (2 ) to­
gether w ith qopf(l)  determ ine eopt(l)  through equation (4.31). In general, $(z) and 
0 («), together with qopt(i — 1 ) which is derived in the (z — l) th  iteration, determ ine 
e°pt(i). The iteration carries on until we use $ (T ) ,0 (T )  and qopt(T  — 1) to find 
eopt(T — 1) which derives the dynamic Leontief model optim ally to  the final stage 
of planning.
4.5 O ptim al C onsum ption  Policies for th e  D y ­
nam ic L eontief M odel using B ellm an ’s D ynam ic  
P r ogr am m ing
Consider again the dynam ic Leontief model (4.6), which is restated  here as equa­
tion (4.32),
q{t +  1) =  Bq(t)  -  r - ^ i ) ,  (4.32)
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and the cost function (performance measure) (4.9), restated  here as 
(4.33),
W  =  1 /2 [q(T) -  qd(T)]'S[q(T) -  qd(T))+
1/2 £{[<?(*) -  9d(i)]'Q[9W -  / M l  +  [«(<) -  eJ(i)]'^[e(i!) -  ed(i)]},
t =0
where all the term s have been defined earlier. Let us now define
?•(*) =  (?i(i) ® (i)-5»(*) qi(t)...qi(t)]',
e»(t) =  [e^i) e2(t)...em(t) e^,(t)...ef(t)]'.
The cost function, equation (4.33), can, therefore, be w ritten as
W  =  1/2  ^ ,(T)S.q.(T) + 1/2 (* )< ? .? .«  + <(t)R.e .{ t) ] ,
t=0
where
1 Su S12 Sin • • • — S12 — Su ^
= ■Snl Sn 2 • * • ^nn Snn • • • ~-Sn 2 ^nl
^nl —Sn2 • ■■ ^nn Snn ••• ^n2 ^nl
V ~ s ll — SU . . . ^ln Sj n • ■ • Sl2 5ll /
the i j th  element in the m atrix  S and
( «U d\2 din Uln ■ ■ ~ d i2 - d n  ^
<
0 * II
uni an 2 . . . dnn dnn ■ ■ • — dn 2 dnl
dnl dn2 * • • ®nn Ctnn . . . dn2 dni
 ^ “ All —a 12 . . . din din . . . d i2 dll /
is the i j  th  element in the m atrix Q. And
f  cn Ci2 . . . ^lm dim — C12 - d u  ^
R* = Cnl cn2 C-nm Cnm • • dn 2 dnl
Cn 1 Cn 2 . . . C-nm cnm . . dn2 dnl
\  —cu -C 12 • • • dim dim • • dl2 dll /
equation
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
(4.36)
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where C{j is the r?'th element in the matrix R .80
The dynam ic Leontief model can be rew ritten as the following equation,
g*(i +  1 ) == -  V e . f f ) ,
where
( Zl 0 0  .. 0 0  0  . . .  0  \
0 ^2 0  .. 0 0  0  . . .  0
B * = 0 0 0  .. 0  0  . . .  0
0 0 0  .. 0 bnn 0  . . .  bnl
0 0 0  .. 0 b(n— l)n 0  . . .  1)1
V 0 0 0  .. 0 bln 0  . . .  611 /
and bij is the  r/'th  element in the m atrix  B  and Z{ is the i th  diagc
m atrix  Z  defined as follows,
qd(t +  1 ) == V ( < ) .
Tm 1 is given by
(  U i 0 0  .. 0 0  0  . . .  0
0 U 2 0  .. 0 0  0  . . .  0
1 7  = 0 0 0  .. Un 0  0  . . .  0
0 0 0  .. 0 7nm 0  • ■ ■ 'Jnl
0 0 0  .. 0 T(n— l)m 6  • • • H(n—1)1
V 0 0 0  .. 0 7lrn 0 . . .  7 ll
(4.37)
/
where 7 ij is the i j t h  element of the m atrix  T_i and Ui is the zth diagonal element 
of the m atrix  U defined as follows,
ed(t +  1 ) =  Ued(t).
The optim al control of the dynam ic Leontief model as a problem in servo-mechanism, 
equations (4,32) and (4.33), is now reduced to a regulator problem , equations
(4.36) and (4.37).
80Matrices S , Q and R  can be assumed to be diagonal.
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In w hat follows, we om it the * from q*(t), e*(t), 5», Q*, i?*, B± and F” 1 for 
notational convenience. Define
Wolq(T)] = l / 2q ' (T )Sq (T )  = W ^ [ q ( T ) \ .
The cost of operation over the final period is
Wi[q{T — 1), e(T — 1)] =
1 /2q'(T -  \ )Q q (T  -  1) +  1 /2e‘(T  -  1 )Re(T  -  1) +  l / 2q ' {T )Sq (T ) .  (4.38)
We have, by definition
W ^ [ q ( T  -  1)] =  min (W i[«(t -  1), e(T -  1)]},
e(T -l)
which upon using equation (4.37) becomes
W r \ q { T  -  1)] =  min {1/29'(T  -  l )Q q (T  -  1) +  1 /2e'(T  -  1 )R e (T  -  1)+
e(T -l)
l / 2 [B q (T  -  1) +  r _1e(T -  1)]'$(0)[B 9(T -  1) +  r _1e(T  -  1)]}, (4.39)
where $(0) =  S.
To minimise equation (4.39) w ith respect to e(T — 1) we differentiate the 
quantities in the brackets and set the derivatives equal to zero. This yields
R e (T  -  1) +  r ,“ 1$(0)[B qr(r -  1) +  r ~ l e(T -  I)] =  0. (4.40)
Equation (4.40) m ay be solved for e(T  — I) to give
e°rt(T  - 1 ) =  - [ r  +  r - 1$ ( o ) r - 1] - 1r ' - 1$ (o )B 9(i - 1),
or
e ^ \ T  -  1) =  —A(T -  1 )q{T -  1), (4.41)
where
A(T  -  1) =  [R + r ' - 1$ ( 0 ) r - 1] - 1^ (0 )S . (4.42)
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We now substitu te  equation (4.41) into equation (4.38) and upon using equation
(4.37) we have
W?pt[q(T -  1)] =  l / 2q ' (T  -  1 )Qq(T  -  1) +
1/2[A(T -  1 )q(T  -  l)] 'J?[A (r -  1 )q(T  -  1)] +
1 /2 [Bq(T  -  1) +  r -" A (T  -  l)q (T  -  1)]'*(0)[Bq(T  -  1)+  
r ~l A{T  -  1 )q(T  -  1)] =  1 /2q'(T  -  1 )Qq{T  -  1)+  
l/2 [q '(T  -  1)A'(T -  1)]1J[A(T -  l ) ? ( r  -  1)]+
1/2q' (T  -  1)[B +  r _1A(T -  1)]'$(0)[B  +  r -1A(T -  1 )]?(T -  1 ),
or
W ^ ‘[q(T -  1)] =  1 /2q \ T  -  1){<3 +  A '(T -  1)RA{T -  1)+
[B + T~lA (T  -  1)]'$(0)[B  +  T - 'A fT  -  1)]}«(T -  1). (4.43)
Equation (4.43) can be w ritten  as
W ^ l q i T  -  1)] =  1/2q'(T  -  1)$(1)?(T  -  1), (4.44)
where
$(1) = Q + A ' (T  -  1)RA(T  -  1)+
[£  +  r - ‘A(T -  i) ] '$ (o ) [ s  +  r - ‘A ( r  - 1)]. (4 .4 5 )
The cost function for a two-stage process is
Wi[q(T  -  2), e (T  -  2), e(T  -  1)] =  1 /29'(T  -  2)Qq(T  -  2 )+
1 /2e'(T  -  2)Re(T  -  2) +  W M ( T  -  1), e(T  -  1)], 
which by using the  principle of optim ality becomes
W ^ [ q ( T  -  2)] =  m in { l/2 q '(T  -  2)Qq(T  -  2 )+
e(T—2)
1/2e '(T  -  2)Re(T  -  2) +  W^pt[q{T -  1)]}. (4.46)
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By substitu ting  equation (4.44) into equation (4.46) we obtain
W ^ [ q ( T -  2)] =
™ ™ { l / 2 q ' { T - 2 ) Q q { T - 2 )  + l / 2 e ' { T - 2 ) R e { T - 2 )  + l / 2 q \ T - l ) $ ( l ) q ( T - l ) } ,
e(i — 2)
or
W ^ [ q ( T -  2)] =
m in {1/2q'[T  -  2)Qq{T -  2) +  1 /2e'{T  -  2)Re{T  -  2) +  1/2[9'(T  -  2)B '+
e(T~ 2)
e'(T  -  2 ) r /- 1]# ( l) [ JBq(T -  2) +  T“1e ( r  -  2)}. (4.47)
Taking derivatives w ith respect to e(T  — 2) yields
R e (T  -  2) +  ^ “ ^ ( ^ [ ^ ( T  -  2) +  Te(T -  2)] =  0, (4.48)
which is similar to equation (4.40), From equation (4.48) we can derive the  optim al 
control at stage two as follows,
e<n*(T - 2 )  =  - [ £  +  r ,- 1$ ( l ) r - 1]“ 1r /“ 1$ ( l )£ g (T  -  2),
which is similar to equation (4.41). Alternatively, we have
e°vi{T  -  2) =  —A (T  -  2)q{T -  2), (4.49)
where
A ( r  -  2) =  [r  +  r ' - 1^ ( i ) r - 1] - 1r ,- 1^ ( i ) ^ .
If we now substitu te  equation (4.49) back into equation (4.46), we will obtain
W r ‘[ q ( T -  2)\ =
1 /2q'(T -  2 ){ [£  +  -  2 ) ] '$ ( 1 )[B +  r -1 A(T -  2 )]+
A '(T — 2 )R A (T  — 2) +  Q}q{T  — 2), (4.50)
which can be w ritten as
W i pt[q{T -  2)] =  1/2q'(T  -  2)<f (2)q{T -  2), (4.51)
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where
$ (2) =  [B +  r _1A(T -  2)]'$(1)[B +  r _1A(T -  2)]+
A'(T -  2)RA{T  - 2 )  + Q. (4.52)
By induction, we obtain the  following relation,
eopt(t) =  ~ [ r  + -  i ) r “1]-1r /- 1$(i -  i ) B q(t), (4 .53)
or
eop<(t) =  -A ( t )q ( t ) ,  (4.54),
where
and
or
where
A (f) = [ R +  -  l ) r _1] - 1r ' “ 1$ ( i -  1 )B,  (4.55)
w % i km ] = 1 / 2  m { Q + m m t ) +
[B +  T -1A(i)]'$(< -  1)[B +  r - ' A m m ,  (4.56)
W T - M t )  \ = l / 2 q ' m ( t ) q ( t ) ,  (4.57)
$ ( t)  =  Q +  A'{t)RK(t)  +  [B +  r - 1A(*)],$ ( t  -  1 )[B +  I ^ A f i ) ] .  (4.58)
Equation (4.58) is the discrete m atrix  version of the Riccati equation for the 
dynam ic Leontief model.
To summarise, the determ inistic optim al control of the dynam ic Leontief model 
can be obtained by the following steps:
i ) Evaluate A(T — 1) from equation (4.55) using $(0) =  S.
ii) Substitu te A(T — 1) into the Riccati equation (4.58) in order to  com pute
$(1). Evaluate A(T — 2) from equation (4.55) using $(1) and substitu te  it into
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equation (4.58) to  obtain $(2). Continue this process until all values of A (T — 1), 
A(T — 2), A(0) and $(0), $ (1), 4>(T — 1) are computed.
in )  The optim al control for the base period eopit(0) can be evaluated by using 
equation (4.54) together w ith the value of #(0). eopt(0) can be used to com pute 
<fp*(l) through equation (4.37).
iv)  Substitu te qop*(l) and A (l) into equation (4.54) to determ ine eop*(l). Con­
tinue this process until the optim al sequence of final dem and eopi(0), eop*(l), ... 
and eopt(T  — 1) and the optim al trajectory  of output qopt( 1), qopt(2), ... and qopt(T)  
have been determ ined.
4.6 O ptim al Control o f the D ynam ic L eontief 
M odel w ith  Substitution:
P roblem  Form ulation
Dynamic input-output analysis using Leontief models w ith substitu tion  has been 
well-known for m any years. Dantzig (1955), Koopmans (1951), and Samuelson 
(1951) were the first writers to use a linear programming approach to  the Leontief 
model w ith substitution. In the rem ainder of this chapter we assume a substitu­
tion system  in which there exists an uncertainty about the system ’s future sta te  
resulting from the current decisions on substitute activities. For greater gener­
ality, we assume the presence of m easurement errors in the substitu tion system. 
The sta te  of the substitu tion system is, therefore, described by a conditional prob­
ability density which should be updated, at every stage, according to  Bayes1 rule. 
The generalized stochastic dynamic programm ing functional recurrence equation, 
developed by Jacobs (1977), has been used to obtain the optim al substitu te  ac­
tivities.
The optim al solution for the substitution system, as described above, is re­
garded as an input to the greater problem of stochastic control of a Leontief
253
dynam ic system. The stochastic dynamic Leontief model is assumed to have a 
disturbance te rm  affecting its fu ture state. A quadratic cost function is used 
and the dynam ic stochastic Leontief model with substitution is then  solved as a 
tracking problem in stochastic control theory.
Let us consider a discrete tim e Leontief dynamic system in which we observe 
the behaviour of the model at discrete points in tim e, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T . At tim e t 
we are given an n-dimensional vector g(t) where g(t) £ R n and t £ {1,2, ...,T } . 
g(t) can be interpreted as the given bill of final goods to be produced. The set of 
possible decisions at tim e t is given by d(t) where
d(t) \{A(dt)q(t) = g(t)}. (4.59)
The system  described by equation (4.59) is the Leontief Substitution System.  In 
what follows we derive a policy sequence which generates optim al substitu te activ­
ities such th a t a  cost function, which will be defined later, is minimised. In other 
words, the solution to the system  need not be unique because the set of different 
policies can determ ine alternative substitu te activities in the Leontief model. The 
essential problem  is to choose the values of activity levels such th a t a cost function 
is minimised. Arrow (1951), Samuelson (1951) and Morishima (1965) have solved, 
for the first tim e, the Leontief substitution model with a linear cost function.
In this chapter, we will derive the optimal policies for a Leontief substitu­
tion system w ith non-linear dynamics and subject to a non-linear cost function. 
Moreover, we assume a stochastic non-linear Leontief substitution system  in which 
there exists uncertainties about the sta te  resulting from a given policy. In order 
to achieve a greater generality, we solve the optim al non-linear stochastic Leontief 
substitu tion system with measurem ent errors as well as future uncertainties.
Suppose th a t at tim e t there are n  commodities to be produced, gi(t ), q2 (t),
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qn(t)j w ith the corresponding current prices pi(£), p2 (t), —■) Pn{t)- It is desired 
to produce the to ta l ou tput vector q(t) such th a t a given bill of final goods is 
satisfied. We assume th a t there are k different substitu te activities, therefore
A(d,) =  {A(d*),A(^)1...1il(d*)}.
If the policy A(dJ) is chosen, the to tal cost of interm ediate goods necessary to 
produce q(t), which is sufficient to generate g( t ), will be
c1^ )  =  p'(t)[I  -  AidDlq^t ) ,  (4.61)
where p(t)  is the n-dimensional price vector and pr denotes the transpose of p. 
Applications of policies A(d2), A(df), ..., A(d{*) will result in c2(t), c3(i), ..., ck(t) 
through equation (4.61). Among the set of possible policies, A(dJ), i ~  1, 2, ..., 
the optim al policy is th a t which generates the minimum cost.
We now assume th a t the policy A(dt), taken in a particular period (a year), 
can be used as an argum ent in a function for the price vector p(t + 1) the following 
year. Such an assumption can be justified on the ground th a t the policy taken 
in any year influences the dem and for different commodities in th a t year and the 
supply pa ttern  of goods in the next year. More specifically, the optim al policy 
next year will depend on the price structure next year and the la tte r is a function 
of the current policy. The policy next year will not, therefore, be independent 
of w hat we are going to do this year. It follows tha t an optim ising solution is 
necessary over the entire period of planning substitute activities. Note th a t the 
price vector next year, p(t -fi 1), is a function of a number of variables including 
A(dt). W ith no loss of generality, we concentrate on the following simple function,
p(t  +  1) =  h\pt , A(dt)\.
Moreover, we assume the presence of uncertainties in fu ture value of p(t) when a 
policy A(d^) is chosen. The dynamics of a stochastic non-linear Leontief substi­
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tu tion  system  is, therefore, described by
p{t +  1) =  h[pt , A(d t), ui(t)\,  (4.62)
where u i( t)  is an n-dimensional vector of random  disturbances at tim e t  w ith a 
given probability distribution. The price vector at tim e zero, p(0), is assumed to 
be fully specified.
It is also assumed th a t there exists an uncertainty about the present value of 
the price vector p(t), th a t is, the price vector cannot be measured exactly and the  
available m easurem ents are, therefore, noisy. The dynamics of the m easurem ent 
subsystem  in a Leontief substitution system can be form ulated as follows,
p*(t) =  h*[p(i),u2(t)], (4.63)
where a j-dim ensional random  vector with given probability distribution,
represents the  disturbances in the m easurem ent sub-system. The functions h and 
h* are assumed to be completely specified over the entire planning horizon and
ui(£) and u2{t) are independent sequence with zero means and are independent,
jointly  Gaussian random  vectors.
For the class of stochastic substitution systems with uncertainty about the 
future state, equation (4.62) and with measurement error, equation (4.63), the 
following cost function is assumed,
W 'jv = I> [p ( i) ,A (d O ], (4'64)4=0
where Wjv is the cost of interm ediate products over IV-stages of planning. Any 
decision chosen at tim e zero, A(d0), will, together with the specified p(0), generate 
the cost, LF(0), according to equation (4.64). A(do) will affect the price vector 
p( 1) next year using equation (4.62) and any policy chosen next year, w ith regard 
to the price vector at th a t tim e, will generate the cost tT ( l) ,  at tim e one. This
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procedure continues until the policy A (d r-i)  is chosen which generates the price 
vector p{T)  for the last stage of the planning. The objective is to find a policy 
sequence which minimises the to tal cost over the entire planning period.
Since the value of <j> in equation (4.64) depends on i) the uncertain current 
value of price vector p(t) and ii) the uncertain future values of the random  dis­
turbance vectors ui(t)  and u2(t), the sum m ation of <f> over t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T  will 
be a random  scalar. In order to provide a determ inistic cost function we need to 
take the expected value V  of W  w ith respect to the probability distributions of 
all stochastic variables,
VJv( )^ =  ffp(f))Ut[Jr(;£)], (4.65)
where id is the future sequence of the disturbance vectors, Ui(t) and u 2{t), defined 
as follows,
u* ~  { u i ( t ) , w i ( i +  1 ) , . . . , U ! ( T -  1), u 2(£ +  1 ) , . . . ,  u 2( T  -  1 )} .
u i(T )  and u 2( T ) are not included in the sequence because they do not affect the 
to tal cost defined by equation (4.64). The sequence for u2 s tarts  at u 2(t +  1) 
since we have already obtained the conditional probability density for the current 
price vector p(t).  The optim ization problem for a Leontief stochastic non-linear 
substitution system  with both  future uncertainty and m easurem ent error is to 
find a policy sequence {A[d(t)],£ =  0,1, ... ,T  — 1} which minimises the expected 
value of the cost function defined by equation (4.65).
4.7 A  D ynam ic Program m ing Solution  o f th e  
L eontief S u b stitu tion  System
The current price vector in a Leontief substitution system is described by a prob­
ability density function. This is because measurement errors are present in the 
price vector p(t). Such a probability distribution for the current price vector will
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be conditional on the past m easurements of price vector i = 1, 2, ..., t  and
on the past policies chosen on substitu te activities, A(dt), i= 0 , 1, ..., t -1. If we 
denote such a history of information, available at tim e t, by a f then
a* =  { A ( d 0) , A { d 1) , . . . , A ( d t. 1) , p \ l ) , p ' ‘( 2 ) , . . . , p ‘( t)}.
In a* the policy sequence term inates at tim e t — 1 because the policy chosen at 
tim e t has no effect on current price vector and the measurem ent sequence starts 
at tim e t =  1 since it is assumed th a t the initial m easurem ent p*(0) is already 
used to  construct prior probability for the initial price vector p(0). Using the 
notation the conditional probability distribution for the current price vector 
can be sum m arised as
Pr[p(*)|a*].
For a Leontief substitu tion system described by equation (4.62), the conditional 
probability density function for the price vector can be updated a t each stage 
by Bayes3 rule. The optim al policy A opt(dt ) will be chosen with regard to  the 
updated conditional probability density for the current price vector p(t).
The conditional probability density for the price vector can be updated  at each 
stage according to  Bayes’ rule, i.e.
Prr„/.-v|„<i _  Pr[p(4)] Pr[p*(t)|p(<)]
b ( ) l  ] /p(i)Pr[p(4)]Pr[p*WlpW]<4p(i)’ ( }
where Pr[(p(i)] is the prior probability density for the random  price vector p(t) 
before the noisy m easurem ent p*(t) is made. Pr[p*(^)b(^)] is the likelihood func­
tion and specifies the relative probabilities of the noisy price m easurem ent vector 
p*(t), taken its observed value as a function of the range of possible values p(t). 
Pr[pC0b*(i)] is ^ ie conditional probability density for the random  price vector 
p(t) after the noisy m easurement p*(t) is made.
If V)v,*{Pr[p(i)|p*(£)],T} is the expected value of W ,  as defined by equation
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(4.65) and obtained by using optim al policies over N-stages, starting  from the 
uncertain s ta te  a t tim e (T  — N  -f i) described by the conditional probability for 
price vector Pr[p(T  — N  +  i)|p*(i)] an(I term inating at tim e T , then
V 7 ‘W  s  mm[Vir(t)], (4.67)
where V f f \ t )  is a shorthand for V ^{Pr[p(£)|p*(£)], T }  and A(d)* is the policy 
sequence defined as
A(«0* =  {A[«i(t)],...,A[<f(i +  4 V - l ) ] } .
V ^ i t )  in now a functional rather th a t a function. It includes as one of its argu­
m ent the probability density function for the price vector Pr[p(£)|p*(£)], which is 
itself a function of the uncertain price vector. The dynamic program m ing recur­
rence equation hence can be w ritten in term s of such a functional. Applications 
of Bellm an’s principle of optim ality yields the following recurrence equation,
VNP\ t )  — +  1) +  +  I)]}- (4.68)
A( dt )
Equation (4.68) determ ines the m anner in which optim al policies A ( d y  for the 
Leontief substitu tion system  can be produced.
For linear systems w ith a quadratic cost function and Gaussian random  vari­
able, there exists an analytic solution to the functional recurrence equation [see, 
for example, Dreyfus (1965), Dreyfus and Kan (1973)]. For the  class of non-linear 
systems w ith a general non-linear cost function such as the Leontief substitution 
system  presented here, an appropriate search technique can be employed to derive 
the optim al policies using equation (4.68).
In what follows, we derive the functional recurrence equation for the stochastic 
non-linear Leontief substitu tion system. We employ A strom ’s fundamental lemma 
of stochastic control theory [Astrom (1970)] as generalized by Jacobs (1977) for
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non-linear systems. The to tal cost of interm ediate product generated by policy 
sequence A(dY  can be divided into two components: the cost associated with 
stage (t +  1), nam ely <j)(t +  1) and the subsequent cost, W N -i ( t  +  1), where Wjv-i 
indicates th a t the  cost is summed over the N  — 1 remaining stages, i.e.
W)v(i) =  (j>{t -j-1) +  +  1)- (4.69)
Equation (4.69), by using equations (4.65) and (4.67), can be w ritten  as
V T W  =  +  1) +  W n - i (t  4-1)]}, (4.70)
or
=  ™;}g{^p(t).utW i +  1)] +  £?(*),«* [^ v - i (*  +  I)]}- (4-71)A{dy
The to tal cost of interm ediate goods <f>(t +  1), at tim e t +  1, depends only on the 
policy chosen at tim e t and, therefore, is independent of the decisions taken at
tim e t + i , i  >  0. The cost at tim e t -j-1 is also independent of the fu ture sequences
of random  vectors u\ and u 2. Note th a t the disturbance te rm  u2(t -f- 1) in the 
price m easurem ent subsystem at tim e t -J-1 does not atfect the  cost of interm ediate 
goods at tim e t -f 1. Hence, we have
E p{t)>ut[<j>(t +  1)] =  Ep{tU{t)[4>(t +  1)]. (4.72)
Using equation (4.72), equation (4.71) can be w ritten as follows,
^NPt 00 =  rain{f£p(q)Ul (*)[</>(£ -f 1)] +  ^m in^^p j^ tfV U v-if^  +  I)]}}- (4.73)
Using A strom ’s fundam ental lemma of stochastic control theory, we will show th a t
+ ^  =  vn- S + n  (4-74)
where A(d)t+1 is the policy sequence starting  from tim e t -f 1 and term inating at 
the end of the  planning period.
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The two following lemmas are stated  without proof.81 Consider the functional 
m inim ization,
m m {E k[ f( k yr )]}, (4.75)
where & is a random  sta te  variable w ith a given probability density P r (k) and r  
is a control variable which is to be chosen to minimise the m ean value of / .  Such 
a difficult functional m inimization can be simplified by conversion to  a series of 
ordinary m inimization.
L e m m a  1 For the class of functional minimization expressed in equation (4.75), 
the operation of m inimization and expectation commute. Thus we have
m m {E k[f{k, r)]} =  E k{m m [f(k , r)]}. (4.76)
The following lem m a is the generalization of Lemma 1 when th e  scalar function /  
is a function of more than  one random  variable. Consider the case of two random  
variables ki and k2 w ith given jo in t probability density Pr(fci, k2) and r  the control 
variable which may be chosen to minimise the m ean value of / .
L e m m a  2 The m inim um  of the joint mean is the same as m arginal m ean of the 
m inim um  of each conditional mean,
min[ E kuk2(f)]  =  { m i n ^  ( f \ k 2)]} =  £ fcl{min[£,t2(/|/ci)]} , (4.77)
where the jo in t m ean is defined as
E kuk2( f )  -  /  /  f i ( k u k2,r )P r (k u k2)dkidk2 .Jkl Jk2
In what follows, these two lemmas are applied to the optim al cost function for 
the Leontief substitu tion system. The expectation in equation (4.74) is over the 
random  price vector p(^), the sequence of disturbances in the substitu tion  system
81The proof is given, for example, in Astrom (1970).
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(4.62) and the m easurem ent system (4.63). If we now partition  p (t) and u t into 
the following two groups
ki =  p(t), and  &2 =  U2 {t +  1), u*+1,
then according to  equation (4.77) we will have
{-EpCfjy + 1)]} =
+ l ) |p ( t ) ,«!(<)]}^  ■ -  -   (478)
p(t) and u i( t)  are conditioning variables in equation (4.78) and as tim e passes
and they take their specific values, u 2(t +  l) will then determ ine the next updated
probability distribution for the price vector p(t +  1). Hence
K 2q+i),nt+1 + l) \p ( t) ,u i( t)}  -
Ep(t+i),u(+1 {Wat_i(£ +  l) |p (t) , u i(t)}  , (4-79)
and its m inim um  with respect to policies A(d)*+1 is
{ £ p(<+i),-,+1tlyw-i(< +  l)|p (i),« i(i)]}  =
^ [ ( t  +  l)llK*).«i(<)]- (4-80)
Substituting equations (4.80) and (4.78) into equation (4.73) gives
Vfpi t )  =  +  1)] +  £ „ ( « ) , +  l)b(<),«i(*)]}}- (4.81)
A \ a t )
By rearranging the above equation, we have
V^pi(t) =  min {E p(t)iUl(t)[(/)(t +  1) +  +  1)]}, (4.82)
where the dependency of +1) on the values of p(t) and Ui(t) is not explicitly
shown.
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Equation (4.82) is the functional recurrence equation for the  stochastic non­
linear Leontief substitu tion system with measurement error and uncertainty about 
fu ture states of the system  . It formulates the optim al policy, at any tim e t, to 
achieve the m inim um  value of the to tal cost of interm ediate products over the 
entire planning horizon.
4.8 O ptim al Stochastic Control o f D ynam ic Leon­
t ie f  M odels w ith  Future U ncertain ties and  
a S tochastic  Substitu tion
A dynam ic Leontief model w ith uncertainty about its fu ture s ta te  is considered 
as a tracking problem  in optim al stochastic control theory. A quadratic objective 
function is used in which any deviation of the to tal output vector from its desired 
trajectory  is to be minimised. It is assumed th a t there is no m easurem ent er­
ror in the system. A stochastic substitution subsystem with non-linear dynamics 
and uncertain ty  about both  the  present and future states is incorporated in the 
stochastic dynam ic Leontief system. The optim al sequence of policies for the sub­
stitu tion  system, developed in section 4.7, is regarded as an input to  the  controller 
of the stochastic dynamic Leontief model which updates the Leontief m atrix  at 
each planning period.
The stochastic dynam ic Leontief model is described by the  following difference 
equation,
q{t +  1) =  B (t)q (t) -  +  £(i), (4.83)
where q(t) € R n, e{t) €  R m and R n denotes the n-dim ensional Euclidean space. 
We also have t= 0, 1, ... , T. £(t) is an n-vector of state disturbances and all other 
term  are defined earlier. £(t) is assumed to be a white random  disturbance vector 
w ith zero m ean and covariance m atrix  B(i). The problem is to  find a control
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sequence
eopt(t) = {e°p,(0), eopt( l ) , e ° # ( T  -  1)} 
which minimises the following cost function,
WN =  1 /2 \q(T) -  qd{T)YS[q(T) -  qd(T)] +
1 / 2  -  t f 'w r o w f a w  -  1d(t)]+
t - 0
[e(t) -  ed(t)];i2(i)[e(i) -  ed{t)]}, (4.84)
where qd and ed are desired values of vectors q and e, respectively.
The stochastic dynamic substitution subsystem defined in equations (4.62- 
4.64) is included in the Leontief dynam ic model, equation (4.83). The optim al 
sequence of decisions [d0, d i , ..., dy-ij obtained from equation (4.82) will generate 
optim al base matrices A(0), A ( l ) , ..., A (T), which will enter equation (4.83).
The optim al stochastic dynamic Leontief model with substitu tion, presented 
here as a tracking problem, can be easily translated into a regulator problem  by 
defining new and higher order m atrices for 5 ,  T, 5 , R  and Q. The m athem atics 
of such a transform ation is given in section 4.5 and is not repeated here. For 
notational and algebraic convenience, but with no loss of generality, the  Leontief 
model will be discussed as a regulator problem.
4.8 .1  A  D yn am ic P rogram m ing Form ulation  o f  th e  P rob ­
lem
The inform ation available at tim e t for deriving the optim al control solution for 
a stochastic Leontief system  consists of the output history, q* and the past final 
consumption sequence, ei_1, defined as
<f = {$(0),g(l)}.■■>$(*)},
et_1 = {e(0),e(l),„.,e(*- 1)}.
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Since the value of W  in equation (4.84) depends on the uncertain fu ture values of 
the random  disturbance vector f ( i) , its value will be a random  scalar. In order to 
provide a determ inistic cost function one needs to take the  expected value of W  
w ith respect to  the probabilistic variables. Let us define as optim al
cost over (N  — k ) periods from tim e t to the end of optim ization process at tim e 
T. We, therefore, have
i/7-\-(0= ,T   o(T){E[g'(i)<2(<)9W+
e'(i)fl(i)e(<)] +  <{{T)S{T)q(T) |g!}}. (4.85)
Equation (4.85) can be w ritten as
K-k(t) = ., {£„,,)..,(r){g'W<3(iMi)+
e '(t)R {t)e(t)  +  +  e'(]£)7il(*)e(2)]+
i = t + 1
9'(T)5(T)g(T)|5r'}}. (4.86)
The two term s q'{t)Q (t)q(t) and e '(t)R (t)e(t)  can be taken out of brackets because 
e(t +  1), ..., e(T  — 1) will not affect them . Therefore
=  m inJM iW M gW  +  e’(t)R(t)e(t)]+
s(t)
T —l
, .,min,T 1.{-E«(«+i),...,,<r){ E W(t)Q{t)lW+e(t+l), .. . ,e(r-l)  t=f+1
e ^ ) ^ ) e ( t ) ]  +  q \T )S (T )q (T ) \q \  c(t)}}}. (4.87)
By using the property of conditional expectation, namely,
ErAf(r,k)} = Er{Ek[f(r,k)\r}}, 
equation (4.87) can be w ritten as follows,
Vn - M  =  m in {q \t)Q (t)q { t)  +  e'(t)R(t)e(t)-\-
e{t)
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T—1
, f x , m i n , „ _ i . { B 9 ( t + i ) { £ 9 ( < + 2 ) , . . . , , ( r ) {  E W(*)Q(t)<l(t)+e( i+ l)(...,e(.T 1)
e ' m m t ) }  + < f(T )S (T )q (T )tf,q< t +  l ) ,e W } |9‘}}}. (4.88)
Using A strom ’s fundam ental lem m a of stochastic control theory, equation (4.76), 
we rew rite equation (4.88) as follows,
K - k i t )  = m in {q '(t)Q (t)q(t) +  e '(t)R (t)e(t)+
e { t )
T —1
£ 9(*+l){ ,t, ,,min(7. ,.{^(*+2) 9(r){ E W(t)Q(t H t )+
< * + i >.... “(T- 1) l = t + l
e '(t)R (t)e (t)} + q '(T )S (T )q (T )]lq \ q(t +  1), e(i)}}}}. (4.89)
We can now write an equation for + 1 ) analogous to  equation (4.85) and
thus rew rite equation (4.89) as follows,
V£p±k(t) =  mm{g'(i)<3(*)g(t) +  e '(t)R (t)e(t)  +  £<Km ) [V7-V-i(* +  I)]}- (4.90)
eoJ
Equation (4.90) is the fundam ental dynamic programming recurrence equation 
for the dynam ic Leontief model incorporating uncertainties only about its future. 
Equation (4.90) m ust be solved backwards beginning with the following term inal 
condition,
V°pt(T ) = E {q '(T )S (T )q (T )\q T, eT~1}.
Note th a t the stochastic dynam ic Leontief model, equation (4.83), implies th a t 
the ou tpu t history, qt , at tim e t provides no information about q(t +  1) which is 
not contained in q(t). Hence
+ 1)1?', e(*)] =  Eqlt)[VS’l k_1(t + l ) k ( i ) ,  e(i)]. (4.91)
Assuming th a t the optim al cost for dynamic Leontief models w ith linear dy­
namics and quadratic performance criterion is quadratic, we have
VN-k{t) =  (4.92)
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where e(t) is assumed to  be independent of q(t) and § (t)  is a sym m etric n- 
dimensional m atrix . We now substitu te equation (4.92) into the functional re­
currence equation (4.90) to obtain the following equation,
V N -kW  =  ™ in{q'(t)Q (t)q(t) +  e '(t)R (t)e(t)+
e(t)
+  !)$(*  +  +  1) +  e(^ +  l)|<?(t), e(t — 1)]}. (4.93)
In order to  w rite the  following term
E q(t+ljbX* +  !)$(*  +  +  !)] (4.94)
in term s of the m ean m  and covariance m atrix  a  of the random  variable q, we
first rew rite expression (4.94) as follows,
E[q'{t + l ) $ ( t  + 1 ) ^  +  1)] =
E{[q(t +  1) -  m (t  +  1 )]'$(* -f 1 )[q(t +  1) -  m (t  +  1)] +  
m \ t  +  1 )$ ( t  +  l)g (i +  1) +  q \ t  +  1 )$ ( i +  l)m (i +  1) —
m '(i +  l ) § ( t  +  l)m (£ +  1)}. (4.95)
Since E(q) =  m, equation (4.95) can be w ritten as
E[q'(t +  1)$(£ +  1 )q(t -fi I)] =
E[q(t + 1) — m (i +  l)] /$ ( t  +  l)[g(i +  l)  — m (t +  l)]4-rri/( ^ + l)$ ( i  +  l)m (t +  l) . (4.96) 
Since
£?{[#(£ -f 1) — m(£ +  l) ] /$ ( t  +  1)[#(£ +  1) — m (t  +  1)]} =
t r { $ ( t  +  1 )[q(t +  1) -  m (t +  1 )][q(t +  1) -  m (t  +  1)]'}, (4.97)
substituting equation (4.97) into equation (4.96) yields
E[q*(t +  l ) $ ( t  +  1 )q(t +  1)] -  tr[$ (t +  l)<r(* +  1)]+
m r(t +  1 )Q(t +  l)m (i +  1), (4.98)
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which makes equation (4.93) as follows,
V£pl k(t) =  m m {q '(t)Q (t)q (t)  +  e'(*)i2(i)e(*)+
e(t)
+  l)cr(i +  1)] +  m f(t H- l)$ (tf +  l )m ( t  -f 1) +  e(t +  1)}. (4.99)
Using the  dynam ic stochastic Leontief model, together w ith the knowledge th a t 
E[q(t -f- 1)] =  m {t +  1) and 2?[e(£)] =  0, equation (4.99) can be w ritten  as
V tflk it)  =  m in { ^ )(5 (^ )g ( t)  +  e '(t)R (t)e{t)+
e{t)
[B(t)q(t) -  r- \ t )e( t )Y*(t  +  1 )[B(t)q(t) -  r - 1 (*)«(*)]+
i r [$ ( i  -f- l ) ^ ^  +  1)] T  1)}* (4.100)
By com pleting the square for the term s containing e(i), equation (4.100) becomes
V tflh(t) =  min{[e(t) +  A (i)9( t)] '[ r '"1(f)* ( t +  1 ) ^ * +
e(t)
fi(i)][e(i) +  A (i)?(i)] +  ? '(t){Q (i) +  B '( i)$ ( i +  1 )B(t)~ 
A'(t)[r'~1(t)$(i +  l ) r - ‘(i) +  Rm ( t ) }q ( t )+
i r [« ( t  +  l)o- (i +  1)] +  e(t + 1)}, (4.101)
where
a  (t) =  [r'-1(<)$(< +  l j r - 'W  +  R(t)}-l r'{t)$(t + 1  )£(<), (4.102)
is the gain m atrix  for the stochastic dynamic Leontief system. If we examine 
equation (4.101) it will become obvious th a t the m inim um  cost can be achieved if
eop‘(t) = - A  (t)q(t). (4.103)
Let us now substitu te  equations (4.92) and (4.102) and the minimising value of 
final consum ption eopt(t) equation (4.103), into equation (4.101), to obtain
q'(t)m<i(i)  + <t) = q 'm Q it)  + B ' m ( t + 1 )B(t)~
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B\t)&(t + i)r~I(i)[r-1(i)$(i + + mt)]-1*
r  *(f)$(f + l)B(t)}9(i) + tr[$(i -j- l)o"(t + 1)] + c(t + 1). (4.104)
It follows from equation (4.104) tha t
$ (t)  = Q{t) + B '( t)$ ( t  + l ) B ( t ) -  
+  l j r - 1^ )^ '" -1^ ) ^  +  l j r - 1^) +  n (t)]-1r - 1(t)$(* +  i ) 5 (t), (4.105)
which is the  m atrix  Riccati equation for the stochastic dynam ic Leontief model 
w ith exact m easurem ent and
e(t) =  tr[Q(t +  l)<r(t +  1)] +  e(t +  1). (4.106)
The boundary conditions for the solution of equations (4.105) and (4.106) are as 
follows,
4>(T) =  S, (4.107)
and
e(T) = 0. (4.108)
Equations (4.102) and (4.103), together with equations (4.105)-(4.108), com­
pletely determ ine the optim al stochastic control solution for a dynam ic Leontief 
model with fu ture uncertainty and quadratic objective function. The stochastic 
substitu tion system  which is incorporated in the dynamic Leontief model oper­
ates independently of the Leontief controller in obtaining the  optim al policies. 
The functional recurrence equation for the stochastic substitu tion system , equa­
tion (4.82), generates the sequence of optim al base matrices and feeds them  to the 
process form ulated to  find the  optim al stochastic control of the dynam ic Leontief 
model. The im m ediate effect of this operation is tha t the m atrix  A  and all the 
m atrices depending on it, such as B , become time-variant.
Equations (4.102) and (4.103), which give the optim al sequence of final con­
sum ption for the stochastic Leontief model with future uncertainty, are exactly
269
the same as those equations which give the same control solution for a determ inis­
tic dynam ic Leontief model. Addition of the white random  forcing function, £(i), 
which can be in terpreted  as the future output uncertainty associated with any 
sequence of final consumption does not change the optim al control policy as ob­
tained in the determ inistic case. It adds, however, a scalar te rm  to the minim um  
expected cost.
Although the analytical optim al control solutions are the same, there exists an 
im portan t difference between optim al control of determ inistic dynam ic Leontief 
model and th a t of the stochastic model with future uncertainty. In the  determ in­
istic case, the dynamics of the Leontief model can usually be expressed as
qit +  1) =  B (t)q (t)  +  r _1(i)e(i),
and, therefore, if we know the initial output vector, q(t =  0) and the  sequence 
of final consum ption e(i), t —0, 1, 2, T -l, the state of the model will become 
completely specified. Hence, a control law can be form ulated as a function of 
the initial ou tpu t vector q(0) and tim e t, i.e. eop% (0 ) , t] and thus need not 
be a feedback control. This is not, however, true for the stochastic control of 
a dynam ic Leontief model since there exists a random disturbance vector £(i) 
in the system  dynamics. This explains why in the stochastic case, the optim al 
sequence of final consumption m ust be defined as a function of ou tpu t and tim e,
i.e. eopt[q(t), t]. Feedback control is, therefore, an essential condition in stochastic 
control of Leontief models.
4.9 Sum m ary and C oncluding Rem arks
In this chapter, we have, for the first tim e, formulated and solved dynam ic deter­
m inistic and stochastic Leontief models with and without a substitu tion system. 
Section 4.3 is concerned w ith formulating input-output models as a control pro­
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cess in which the system dynamic equations for the Leontief dynam ic model is 
expressed as a tracking (or servo-mechanism) control problem w ith the aim of 
tracking a desired output trajectory. The objective (or cost) function is assumed 
to be quadratic. Although the  optim al control of the input-output model in  section 
4.3 is form ulated in a determ inistic environment, the generalization to  stochastic 
optim al control w ith future uncertainties and measurement errors is proposed in 
the subsequent sections.
O ptim al consum ption policies for the dynamic Leontief model using Pontrya- 
gin’s m axim um  principle is the subject of section 4.4. Using the H am iltonian 
function, we have obtained the m atrix  Riccati equation and the tracking equa­
tion when the objective function is quadratic. It is shown in this section th a t by 
solving simultaneously the m atrix  Riccati and tracking equations together w ith 
the boundary conditions one can derive, using an iterative technique, the optim al 
consumption policies and the resulting optim al output tra jectory  for the entire 
planning period.
Bellm an’s dynam ic programm ing has been used in section 4.5 to obtain the 
optim al consum ption policies for the same model introduced is section 4.4. How­
ever, for m athem atical convenience, we have first reduced the optim al control of 
Leontief models in tracking form at to a regulator problem. This will markedly 
facilitate the applications of Bellm an’s principle of optim ality to  obtain  the func­
tional recurrence equation for Leontief models. By using a forward and backward 
solution, we have obtained optim al consumption policies and the  ensuing optim al 
ou tput path.
Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 extend determ inistic optim al control of the dynamic 
Leontief model to  the case where there exists i) a determ inistic (and stochastic) 
substitu tion system, ii) uncertainties about the future sta te  of the  Leontief model
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resulting from the current decisions on substitu te activities, Hi) m easurem ent 
errors in the substitu tion system and iv ) a stochastic substitution system  together 
w ith the  stochastic Leontief system dynamics.
It is well-known th a t the optim al solution to  an input-output model is not 
unique since the  set of different policies on alternative substitu te  activities will 
result in different outpu t trajectories. This implies th a t the values of alternative 
activities should be chosen in such a way as to minimise a cost function. Arrow 
(1951), Samuelson (1951) and M orishima (1965) have solved, for the first tim e, 
the Leontief substitu tion model w ith a linear cost function using the m ethod of 
linear programm ing. In this chapter, I have solved the extended version of this 
problem  where the objective function is non-linear and the system dynamics is 
stochastic. More im portantly, I have solved the stochastic dynam ic Leontief model 
when there exists a stochastic substitution system.
The generalized stochastic dynam ic programming functional recurrence equa­
tion, developed by Jacobs (1977), has been used to  obtain the optim al substitu te 
activities. This optim al solution is then regarded as the input to the greater 
problem  of stochastic control of a linear Leontief dynamic system  which itself 
is assumed to  be perturbed by a disturbance term  affecting its fu ture state. A 
quadratic cost function is used and the dynamic Leontief model w ith substitution 
is then solved as a tracking problem in stochastic control theory. Further gen­
eralization are m ade by using i) a non-linear (non-quadratic) cost function, ii) 
non-linear system dynamics and Hi) m easurem ent errors in substitu te  activities.
O ptim al control form ulation of substitu te activities is presented in section 4.6. 
We have assumed in this section th a t a policy taken in a particular period can be 
used as an argum ent in the price behaviour next period since such policies influ­
ence the dem and pattern  for different commodities in th a t period and the supply
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p a tte rn  of such goods. Our policy on substitu te activities will not, therefore, be 
independent of th e  current policies. It follows th a t an optim ising solution is nec­
essary over the entire period of planning substitute activities. We have further 
assumed the presence of uncertainties in future values of the  price vector when 
a policy is chosen in substitu te activities. The existence of m easurem ent errors 
is assumed in the substitution system. For the class of stochastic substitution 
systems w ith uncertainties about its future state  and with m easurem ent errors a 
general non-linear cost function is assumed.
The dynam ic program m ing solution of the Leontief system  of substitu te  ac­
tivities is presented in section 4.7. We have assumed in this section th a t, due 
to m easurem ent errors, the current price vector in a Leontief substitu tion  system 
is described by a  probability density function. This function will be conditional 
upon the past measurem ents of price vector as well as on th e  past policies chosen 
on substitu te  activities. This conditional probability density function is assumed 
to be updated at each stage in the optim ization process by Bayes’ rule. Thus we 
are faced with two separate functions for updating conditional probability for the 
price vector together w ith generating optim al policies for the Leontief substitu te 
system.
By using Bellm an’s principle of optim ality, we have obtained the dynam ic pro­
gram m ing recurrence equation which determ ines the way in which optim al policies 
for the  Leontief substitu tion system can be produced. In doing so, we have used 
A strom ’s fundam ental lem m a of stochastic control theory as generalized by Ja­
cobs (1977) for non-linear systems. The functional recurrence equation formulates 
the optim al substitu te  activities at any tim e t, in order to achieve the  m inim um  
value of the to ta l cost of production over the entire planning horizon.
Section 4.8 deals with optim al stochastic control of a dynam ic Leontief model
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w ith future uncertainties and stochastic substitution. In this section, a quadratic 
objective function is used in which any deviations of the to ta l ou tpu t vector 
from its desired trajectory  are to be minimised. A stochastic substitu tion system 
w ith non-linear dynamics and uncertainties about both the present and future 
states is incorporated in the stochastic dynamic Leontief model. The optim al 
sequence of policies for the substitution system obtained in section 4.7 is then 
regarded as an input to the controller of the stochastic dynamic input-output 
model which updates the Leontief m atrix  at each planning period. Again, by 
using A strom ’s fundam ental lem m a of stochastic control theory, we have obtained 
the  m atrix  R iccati equation for stochastic dynamic Leontief model which together 
w ith boundary conditions determ ine the optim al feedback control law for the final 
consumption path.
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